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ABSIBACT 
The purpose of this study was to detennine the attitudes of 
superintendents and principals in the state of Florida toward the 
issue of merit pay. 
The evaluation instrument used for the collection of data was a 
questionnaire that was developed and validated by Rometo in 1961. For 
this study, the instrument consisted of 34 statements and four ques-
tions related to merit pay. 
During the 1983-84 school year, the instrument was mailed to a 
total of 1,990 educators in the state of Florida. Included in the 
sample were all 67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected prin-
cipals. Usable returns were obtained from 47 superintendents and 
1,262 principals. 
The responses were tabulated and analyzed by a computer which 
was programned to evaluate responses for each of the 34 statements in 
terms of eight derrographic variables. These variables were used as a 
basis for testing eight hypotheses. The data was analyzed by the use 
of the chi-square test for significant relationships and the Cochran's 
Q test for related observations to opinion responses. 
The following sumnary includes some of the findings of this 
research study: 
An application of the chi-square test produced 36 significant 
chi-squares for the 34 attitude statements. 
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Over 58% of the principals and superintendents were of the opinion 
that with adequate salaries, merit pay VK>uld be unnecessary. 
Alrrost 85% of the administrators were in agreement with the state-
ment that high salaries for outstanding teacher perfonnance are justi-
fiable. 
Over 81% of the administrators indicated that merit pay should be 
subsidized by the state. 
Administrators were in agreement (66.1%) with the statement that 
a teacher should be eligible for a merit increment as S(X)n as outstand-
ing teaching has been derronstrated. 
Over 68% of the administrators were of the opinion that teachers 
should have the opportunity to assist in planning and administering 
merit pay in their respective systems. 
The overwhelming majority of educators indicated that the prin-
cipal should participate in the evaluation of teaching perfonnance. 
The position of supervisor was the second choice and fellow teachers 
was third. 
The highest ranking criteria for evaluating teaching performance 
selected by administrators was quality of instruction and pupil test 
scores. The lowest ranking criteria was cormrunity participation and 
service. 
Despite the widespread apprehension surrounding the issue of 
merit pay, the results of this study suggest that agreement exists 
airong the composite attitudes of principals and superintendents in 
iv 
the state of Florida with regard to premises relative to merit pay, 
policies concerning merit pay, and possible effects of merit pay. 
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Perhaps one of the rrost heated discussions in American education 
today is related to the merit pay controversy for teachers. The 
resurgence of interest in this timely issue is evidenced by the multi-
tude of articles appearing in newspapers, magazines and journals; 
media publicity on radio and television; and from public platfonns 
expressed by concerned citizens, school board members, professional 
educators, governors, state and federal legislators, and even the 
President of the United States. 
This increased interest has been stimulated by the public's 
concern over the quality of education rendered in our schools, the 
demand for higher salaries by teachers, and professional employee 
shortages in the field of education. Merit pay for teachers appears 
to be a concept that embraces the fundamental Puritan \\Ork ethic: 
"Workers should be paid on the basis of their skills and performance" 
(Educational Research Service [ERS], 1983, p. 1). 
Incentive pay plans for teachers, including merit pay and master 
teacher plans, have sparked public support by many Americans as a 
means to improve the quality of education in the nation's schools. 
As evidenced by the 1983 Gallup Poll, 61% of the Americans surveyed 
preferred paying teachers according to the quality of their perform-
ance; 31% favored paying teachers according to a standard scale; and 
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8% expressed no opinion. Fifty-eight% of those surveyed supported a 
tax increase to help raise the standard of education in the United 
States (Gallup, 1983). 
It is important that renewed national interest in quality educa-
tion has prompted state and local school districts to investigate 
possible solutions that will bring lasting improvements in American 
education. In order to rrove in a positive and constructive direction, 
facts and information are needed about the issues of merit pay. In 
addition to comparing and investigating contemporary incentive pay 
plans, an equally important issue is determining the opinions and 
attitudes of select groups who are directly involved with the imple-
mentation of a merit pay system. The success or failure of any 
business venture can often be attributed to the attitude of those 
responsible for instituting a program. Considering the viable role 
that attitude can play in any situation, it is apparent that attitudes 
of personnel directly involved with merit pay warrant an investigation 
in such a vigorously debated issue. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to survey, analyze, and compare 
the attitudes of principals and superintendents of the state of Florida 
toward merit pay. As this study was based upon a questionnaire with 
negative and positive statements concerning merit pay, it provided a 
quantifiable measurement of general attitudes toward the concept of 
merit pay. 
Null Hypotheses 
This study examined the differences in attitudes of principals 
and superintendents toward merit pay. A null hypotheses was utilized 
to assume no significant relationship. A level of significance of 
0.05 was the criterion used for rejecting the null hypotheses. 
The null hypotheses tested in this study were as follows: 
1. There is no significant relationship between attitudes of 
principals and superintendents toward merit pay. 
2. There is no significant relationship in attitudes of 
principals of elementary, middle, junior high, and high schools 
toward merit pay. 
3. There is no significant relationship between years of 
experience as an educator and attitudes toward merit pay. 
4. There is no significant relationship between number of 
years of experience as a principal and attitudes toward merit pay. 
5. There is no significant relationship between number of 
years of experience as a superintendent and attitudes toward merit 
pay. 
6. There is no significant relationship between age classifi-
cation of educators and attitudes toward merit pay. 
7. There is no significant relationship between sex classifi-
cation of educators and attitudes toward merit pay. 
8. There is no significant relationship between marital 
status of educators and attitudes toward merit pay. 
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Significance of the Study 
Throughout the educational scene, numerous atterr.pts have been 
made to hold schools accountable for student achievement. Today, 
rrore than ever, every professional educator is faced with the reality 
of accountability. If indeed accountability is to be measured in 
terms of teacher effectiveness with err.phasis on student achievenent, 
then merit pay surfaces as a prominent alternative for achieving 
these goals. 
Many state legislatures and local school districts are develop-
ing rrodels of a merit pay system for the purpose of accountability. 
Of utrrost irr.portance in irr.plerrenting a merit pay program seems to be 
a knowledge of the attitudes of those professional educators directly 
involved with the operation. Without this knowledge, the irr.plemen-
tation could be encumbered and ineffective. 
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The two key facilitators in the pursuance of a merit pay program 
are the principal and the superintendent. Therefore, a study which 
would survey the attitudes of the respondents concerning some of the 
salient issues involved in a merit pay program for teachers seems 
critical. Some prominent elements highlighted by the literature are: 
Are there contrasts or similarities of opinions that may be associated 
with derrographic information? Are there comron factors relating to 
those who support and those who oppose a merit pay program? If these 
groups show a divergence of opinion, are these differences significant? 
In attempting to determine these attitudes and their magnitude, 
this study seerred viable and relevant to the rrodern educator. At this 
point in time, attitudinal studies concerning merit pay in the state 
of Florida are virtually nonexistent. Therefore, research on this 
topic is necessary to ensure and help facilitate the implementation 
of a merit pay program. 
Definition of Tenns 
For the purpose of this study the following definition of terms 
were utilized: 
Attitude refers to a predisposition to respond positively or 
negatively to certain objects, situations, institutions, concepts, 
or other persons (Aiken, 1982, p. 260). 
Merit Pay refers to a system of canpensation which singles out, 
according to a predetermined procedure, the rrore effective educator 
and provides to that educator some form of additional salary 
(Brooks, 1979, p. 13). 
Single Salary Schedule refers to a schedule whereby teachers 
are paid according to their years of experience and their educational 
attainment level or number of college credits earned (Lipsky & 
Bacharach, 1983, p. 1). 
Principal refers to the presiding administrative officer of a 
school. 
Superintendent refers to the administrative director of a 
school district. 
5 
Delimitations of the Study 
The scope of this study was limited to the public school systems 
in the state of Florida during the 1983-84 school year for the 
6 
purpose of determining the attitudes of principals and superintendents 
toward merit pay. 
Assumptions 
The "Educational Survey on Merit Pay" is a straight forward 
device for classifying opinions of administrators. With suitable 
assurance of confidentiality, it is assum2d that rrost of the respond-
ing population described themselves with relative candor. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The concept of merit pay has been with school systems rrore than 
60 years. It has been the subject of numerous studies and endless 
debate. Yet, one of the basic issues seems to have remained the 
same--"Effective teachers are rrore valuable to an educational program 
than ineffective teachers and deserve to be paid rrore for their 
services" (ERS, 1979, p. 1). 
One of the difficulties in discussing the issue of merit pay is 
the plight of defining the tenn itself. The literature contains a 
number of definitions and terminology. The tenn merit pay has been 
used interchangeably with many other terms. Regardless of the ¥.Drds 
used to describe the concept, the meaning remains similar. Templeton 
(1972) stated, "In simplest terms merit pay means paying a teacher 
according to the quality of his (or her) teaching. In practice, 
however, programs range from vague statements allowing school boards 
to exceed regular pay schedules under sane conditions to programs 
in which all teachers and administrators are paid according to an 
evaluation rating" (p. 1). 
Davis defines merit pay rating as a " ••. recorded judgnent 
about a teacher which detennines, at least in part, the anount of 
his (or her) salary and may affect the rate of salary progress or 
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ul t.imate maximum" (p. 535). The Research Di vision of the National 
Education Association (NEA) has applied the phrase "quality-of-
service recognition" to merit pay defining it as "any device that 
adjusts salaries to recognize different levels of teaching performance 
(1968, p. 3). Therefore, a merit salary schedule is "any salary 
schedule for classroom teachers, whatever its plan of recognizing 
position, experience, and preparation may be, if it either authorizes 
or specifies above the regular schedule to reward teachers who have 
been judged to be rendering superior service" (Davis, 1957, p. 127). 
Merit rating has been defined by the California Teachers Assoc-
iation as the term is used in business and industry. Merit rating 
"refers to processes very similar to the 'evaluation procedures' 
used by rrost school districts" (California Teachers Association, 
1976, p. 1). 
Whenever merit rating is used as the basis for determining a 
teacher's pay, the terminology changes to a merit pay plan. The 
New Jersey Education Association's Research Division composed a 
definition for merit rating conm::>nly used in business and industry. 
Merit rating is a systematic method of evaluating employee perform-
ance for the following: 
1. To help determine prorrotions, transfers, denotions, 
disnissals, and salaries; 
2. To provide an analysis of strong and weak points so that 
employees' perfonnance may be improved through a guidance 
program; 
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3. To provide the personnel division with a yardstick to measure 
the effectiveness of testing, recruiting, and inservice train-
ing programs. (New Jersey Education Association, 1963, p. 6) 
Templeton (1972) noted that merit pay programs may differ widely 
from one school system to another. However, the NEA Research Division 
(1973) conducted an analysis of teachers' salaries and found three 
identifiable types of merit pay plans: 
1. Those in which authority to exceed the salary schedule due 
to superior service is vested in the board of education. 
2. Those programs in which superior teachers progress at an 
accelerated rate on the regular salary schedule, however, 
these teachers do not usually exceed at any time the 
salary schedule maximum. 
3. other merit plans contain provisions for exceeding the 
maximum on the salary schedule by fixed dollar aIIDunts. 
(p. 1) 
The New York State Teachers Association, in the mid 1950s, 
identified four types of merit pay plans being used in that state: 
1. A formal evaluation procedure with a weighted point scale; 
2. A formal evaluation procedure with an unweighted point scale; 
3. A formal evaluation procedure with no point scale; 
4. A recorrmendation by the superintendent with no formal 
evaluation procedure. (Davis, 1957, pp. 535-536) 
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Stoops, Rafferty, and Johnson (1975) have identified seven forms 
that merit pay plans have acquired: 
1. Super-maximums 
2. Accelerated incre.tIEnts 
3. Bonus 
4. Multiple track 
5. Periodic merit evaluation 
6. Annual outstanding teacher awards 
7. Surrmer merit teacher projects program. (p. 632) 
Johnson supports the notion, that there are many variations in 
merit pay plans, however, rrost are similar in three respects. ''First , 
merit is used to determine only a part of the teacher's pay. Second, 
nierit is usually only one factor used to determine salary increments. 
Third, decisions about a teacher's m::>rth are based on systematic 
performance appraisals'' (Johnson, 1984, p. 12). 
Bhaennan (1973), using a different approach, classified IIErit 
plans into tm::> categ;ories: old-style and new-style. The old-style 
traditional merit plan rates teachers according to input factors. 
These factors may include such criterion as classroom effectiveness, 
ethical and professional behavior, cooperation, and corrnrunity partic-
ipation. The new-style approach rates teachers according to output 
factors. These output factors are linked with a behavioral approach 
to education in order to attain certain g;oals and objectives with 
students. Teacher pay is determined by student achievement. Simply 
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defined, a rrerit pay program is designed to pay individuals differ-
ently who are performing similar tasks at different levels of quality. 
The output rrodel, paying teachers according to a rreasurable 
progress of their students, led to a controversy surrounding perform-
ance contracting in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Perfonnance 
contracts began in Arkansas and Texas in 1960-70. The pay of teachers 
was dependent upon student achieverrent. The reactions of teachers 
were less than favorable and questions arose regarding the reliability 
of standardized test scores used to rreasure student achieverrent. 
Therefore, many perfonnance contracts failed to rreet their stated 
goals (ERS, 1974). 
In 1974, an ERS Research Brief stated that internal perfonnance 
contracts were attempted in only a anall number of school systems 
and were generally rrore successful than those involving outside 
contractors. Also, the rronograph noted that "the fanfare that 
surrounded the entry of educational technology companies into the 
field of instruction and the disappointrrent surrounding their gener-
ally unspectacular achieverrents have led many educators and laymen 
to explore another possible form of performance contracting--the 
'internal' contract--a performance contract made between an educa-
tional authority and its own teachers" (ERS, 1974, p. 4). 
Given the controversy and multitude of definitions and termin-
ology of rrerit pay and rrerit pay plans, there have arisen differences 
in opinion as to what actually constitutes a rrerit pay plan for 
teachers. Davis (1957) states that rrerit pay plans are not salary 
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increases for professional growth, withholding increments to penalize 
unsatisfactory service, and providing extra pay for extra duties. 
According to Flippo and Munsinger (1975), neither are the terms 
merit rating and performance rating synonyrrous. They explain merit 
rating as a system which emphasizes employee characteristics such as 
intelligence, ingenuity, and personality, while performance rating is 
based on employee contributions, such as quantity and quality of work 
and the responsibilities an employee assumes. 
In the same context, differentiated staffing seeks to compensate 
teachers according to different jobs they perform and the different 
responsibilities that accompany these jobs. For example, Rand and 
English (1968) explain a differentiated staffing rr:odel used in Temple 
City, California in the late 1960s. This rrodel consisted of a pro-
fessional panel that selected teachers on the basis of their exper-
ience and qualifications for various positions on a hierarchy ranging 
from academic assistant to staff teacher, senior teacher, teaching 
curriculum asoociate, and teaching research associate. Teachers were 
assigned and retained in these position categories based on their 
ability to perform satisfactorily in these capacities. 
Stocker (1975), another advocate of differentiated staffing, 
makes a clear distinction between the intent of differentiated 
staffing and the intent of merit pay. He insists that salary for 
teachers is based on measured differences in responsibility while 
merit pay is based on the quality of perfonnance in situations where 
teachers have a similar task and the same degree of responsibility. 
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A search of the literature reveals that the concept of merit pay 
has acquired varied meanings depending upon how, where, and by whom 
it is used. According to a 1979 ERS report and a 1983 update, the 
research found "that school districts across the country use the term 
'merit pay' to cover a wide variety of plans and programs for provid-
ing extra compensation to deserving teachers" (p. 6). Thus, the term 
merit pay, difficult and nebulous as it may seem to define, has been 
resurrected numerous times along the educational scene in the United 
States, having a long life of controversy and instability. 
History of Merit Pay 
Merit pay as a method of paying teachers on the basis of their 
performance is neither a new nor a unique concept to this generation. 
The origin of rating worker performance dates back to antiquity. 
Early accounts report that in 200 A.D. the Wei Dynasty in China had 
a system of rewarding oorkers according to their merits. In 1869, 
Sir Francis Galton of England used a normal distribution curve to rate 
his employees (Stinnett, 1969). 
During the early days of this country, colonial America paid a 
snall arrount to teachers for their services. However, the rurount of 
reward for teaching was thought to be in the gratification of helping 
another person. Schools were periodically inspected by special com-
mittees consisting of the clergy and prominent citizens. The teacher's 
pay was corrmensurate with the degree to which the comnittee was pleased 
with the teacher's performance. Obviously, under these circumstances, 
salary schedules were impossible to uniformly control (Elsbree, 1939). 
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In 1789, Benjamin Franklin made an accusation to the trustees of 
The Academy concerning teacher pay. Franklin wrote a complaint which 
discussed the inequity of decreasing the pay of an English teacher 
while increasing his duties and increasing the pay of a Latin teacher 
while decreasing his duties by one-half (Woody, 1931). 
Early in the educational scene teachers were examined by trustees 
or school corrmittees and paid according to their quality of service. 
These expectations and rewards were very similar to the JJErit pay 
plans of today (Reeder, 1958). T. M. Stinnett (1969) reports that, 
"By the latter part of the nineteenth century, corrmunities had become 
too large, curricula too expanded, and teaching methods too complex 
to permit laymen to evaluate the work of the teacher. By this time 
professional school administrators were ernployed by rrost school dis-
tricts. This group inherited the task of rating teachers" (p. 172). 
The first recorded merit pay plan for teachers in the United 
States was administered in the Newton, Massachusetts, school system 
in the early 1900s (Mitchell, 1961). Interest in such plans grew 
rapidly, however, floundered near the time of World War I when the 
average salaries of teachers in school systems using merit pay dropped 
below teachers' salaries in non-merit pay systans. The following is 
an account of Stegeman's sunmary of the status of merit pay plans 
from 1915 through World War I, as quoted by Kidwell: 
In 1915, there were approximately three hundred merit programs 
in operation. However, these evaluation programs tended to be 
vague and indefinite, with only general and unsystematized 
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rating. A study conducted shortly after World War I indicated 
none of these 300 programs were still in operation. It is 
generally believed that these programs failed because the varied 
increments for different merit levels of teaching had not been 
sufficient. The top salaries for superior teachers were approx-
imately the same and the differences in rewarding superior 
teachers were lost. The average salaries for teachers in the 
districts with merit programs fell below those of the other 
districts. (1968, p. 17) 
In order to change the disparity in teachers' salaries, the 
single salary schedule was developed to provide teachers with a stable 
income based on training and experience only (Rometo, 1961). In 1919, 
the National Association CDrrmission Series conducted a comprehensive 
research on teachers' salaries. The corrmission reconrnended that a 
single salary schedule be used with an automatic increment for each 
year of experience up to a designated maximum. 
"Prior to 1920 less than one-half the cities had salary schedules. 
By 1922-23 however, approximately 65 percent of the city school systems 
inaugurated a schedule for salary payments to instructional personnel" 
(Knezevich, 1962, p. 374). During the peak of the 1920s, it was dif-
ficult to find a school district which had not developed and utilized 
a salary schedule for teachers. 
The popularity of the single salary schedule continued through 
the 1930s and World War II. Due to the advent of the war and infla-
tionary factors in 1942, the schools found themselves in a precarious 
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position. "Many teachers left the schools to serve in the anned 
forces or to \IDrk in better paying jobs directly related to the imne-
diate defense effort. By the end of World War II this situation was 
further aggravated by the great increase in the number of children of 
school age" (Van Z\IDll, 1964, p. 254). 
School districts were faced with numerous shortages of teachers 
which ultimately led to state boards of education lowering training 
and experience requirerrents in an effort to provide teachers for 
classrooms. By lowering certification requirements many people entered 
the teaching profession functioning at low levels of competence. 
In order to rectify this problem, the 1950s experienced a 
resurgence of interest in merit pay plans with many states either con-
sidering or adopting legislation on merit pay. States stiffened 
certification requirements, with emphasis on academic preparation. 
Completion of advanced degrees or graduate \IDrk was often rewarded 
with rronetary incentives (Van Zwoll, 1964). 
The revival of the idea that teachers should be paid according 
to merit led to the adoption of a resolution opposing merit pay for 
determining salaries by the National Education Association in 1956. 
In 1960, the National Education Association published this statement 
regarding merit pay: 
The National Education Association believes that it is a major 
responsibility of the teaching profession, as of other profes-
sions, to evaluate the quality of its services. To enable 
educators to meet this responsibility rrore effectively, the 
17 
Association calls for continued research and experimentation to 
develop means of objective evaluation of the performance of all 
professional personnel, including identification of (a) factors 
that determine corrpetence; (b) factors that determine the 
effectiveness of corrpetent professionals; (c) methods of eval-
uating effective professional service; and (d) methods of rec-
ognizing effective professional service through self-realization, 
personal status, and salary. 
The Association further believes that use of subjective 
methods of evaluating professional performance for the purpose 
of setting salaries has deleterious effect on the educational 
process. Plans which require such subjective judgments 
(cormDnly known as merit ratings) should be avoided. Arrerican 
education will be better served by continued progress in devel-
oping better means of objective evaluations than by expanded use 
of subjective ratings. (pp. 59-60) 
In 1961, the National Education Association Research Division 
reported on the number and percentage of sch(X)l systems in cities 
over 30,000 population which had a provision permitting superior 
teachers to exceed the salary schedule maximum. Beginning with the 
years 1938-39, 20.4% of the reporting systems provided a plan for 
corrpensating superior teachers. By 1952-53 the number of reporting 
systems had declined to 4.0%. From that point, the percentage of 
merit pay plans gradually increased reaching 8.3% in the years 
1960-61 (Davis, 1961). 
A follow-up study by Kidwell (1968) reported that approximately 
one-third of the 140 school systems that reported a merit pay plan 
for teachers in 1958 were still in existence one decade later. 
Data provided by the National Education Association Research 
Division (1971) indicated that the percentage of school systems with 
enrollments of 6,000 or rrore pupils having merit pay provisions 
reached a peak of 11.3% in 1968-69 but declined to 7.9% by 1971-72. 
During the period of 1972-73 the decline in school systems having 
merit salary provisions had fallen to 5.5% (Stieber, 1973). 
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A study conducted in 1971-72 by the Wichita, Kansas, Unified 
School District surveyed eight public school systems with enrollments 
between 50,000 and 77,000 adding six school systems identified by the 
:NE.A Research Division in 1970-71 as having some sort of merit pay 
plans for teachers. None of the 14 systems studied reported having 
a merit pay plan in operation (Liechti, 1972). According to Elseroad, 
in 1970 there were no merit pay programs in force in school districts 
with pupil enrollments over 100,000. State level surveys on merit 
pay confirm these national trends. 
A report by Love in 1970 exemplified the lack of success in state-
wide programs: 
A study of previous attempts at supporting merit pay on a 
statewide level reveals much failure. Many state legislatures 
have at one t~ or another been interested in merit pay plans, 
and several have appropriated large sums of rroney for studies 
in this area. Ten states in the past twenty-five years or so 
have either carried out large scale experiments or studies 
dealing with merit pay plans, or they are contanplating doing 
so. Three states actually placed these plans into effect and 
later abandoned them after they were judged to be impractical. 
These states were Delaware, Florida, and New York. (p. 25) 
In addition, Love reported that in 1969 the Alabama legislature 
enacted a merit pay program, but repealed it in a subsequent session 
before it ever went into operation. 
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The California Teachers Association (1966) found that 81 school 
systems were using some fonn of merit pay plans in 1965-66. In a 
follow-up study, only 48 were reported to be in operation. Of the 
school systems with merit pay plans in existence in 1963-64, IIDre than 
one-third had discontinued their plans in 1965-66. 
Oates (1966) surveyed Texas school systems and found that all 
merit programs existed in districts with a student population of 
50,000 or less. The percentage of teachers receiving merit pay ranged 
from 2.4% to 35.0%. 
In 1972-73, a survey was conducted by Farthing, Hughes, and Dorn 
on the status of merit pay programs in Oregon. Of the 47 school 
systems reporting plans of merit pay, only 23.4% had a merit pay plan 
in operation and 53.2% had no alternative pay plans for teachers. 
The Governor's Education Study Comnittee in Louisiana compiled 
an extensive report in 1975 studying teachers' salaries. The conmittee 
recorrmended that no state-wide merit pay program be adopted for 
Louisiana teachers. However, a reconmendation was made to encourage 
individual systems to operate their own merit pay plans. 
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Moreover, merit pay plans in the 1960s and 1970s have fallen 
frequently on hard times due to subjective evaluations, administrative \ 
personnel problems, and/or lack of funds. The 1980s are experiencing 
a renewed interest in merit pay and master teacher plans sparked by 
the President, several national reports, and legislation in Tennessee, 
California, and Florida (Tursnan, 1983). 
In a recent report of the National Corrmission on Excellence in 
Education, the conmission discussed the unprecedented attention being 
paid to the quality, or lack of quality, of education presented in the 
public schCXJl system today. One of the essential messages from the 
comnission is that "mediocrity, not excellence, is the norm in American 
education'' (Goldberg & Harvey, 1983, p. 15). 
As a consequence of this mediocrity, the corrmission observed that 
the following results threaten to overwhelm the educational foundations 
of American society: 
On 19 international assessments of student achievement, U.S. 
students never ranked first or second; in fact, when compared 
only with students from other industrialized nations, U.S. 
students ranked in last place seven times. 
Some 23 million American adults are functionally 
illiterate. 
About 13 percent of U.S. teenagers (and up to 40 percent 
of minority adolescents) are functionally illiterate. 
From 1963 to 1980 a virtually unbroken decline took 
place in average scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). 
Similarly, a dramatic decline took place in the number of 
students who derronstrate superior achievement on the SAT. 
Between 1975 and 1980 the number of remedial mathematics 
courses offered in four-year public colleges increased by 72 
percent. 
Only about one-fourth of the recent recruits to the Arrred 
Services were able to read at the ninth-grade level, the 
minimum necessary to follow safety instructions. (p. 15) 
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The conmission made broad recorrrrendations addressing the problems 
discerned in Arrerican education. Regarding teaching, "the corrmission 
concluded that too few academically able students are attracted to 
teaching; that teacher preparation programs need substantial inprove-
ment; that the professional working life of teachers is, on the whole, 
unacceptable; and that a serious shortage of teachers exists in key 
fields'' (p. 16) • 
The conmission's recorrmendation on teaching includes seven 
proposals. Of these seven proposals, only three are pertinent to merit 
pay for teachers: 
Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and 
should be professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and 
perfonnance-based. Salary, prorrotion, tenure, and retention 
decisions should be tied to an effective evaluation system 
that includes peer review so that superior teachers can be 
rewarded, average ones encouraged, and poor ones either 
improved or tenninated. 
School boards, administrators, and teachers should 
cooperate to develop career ladders for teachers that distin-
guish am::>ng the beginning instructor, the experienced teacher, 
and the master teacher. 
Master teachers should be involved in designing teacher 
preparation programs and in supervising teachers during their 
probationary years. (p. 17) 
Merit Pay Plans 
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Responding to the corrmission's recomrendations that schools 
strongly consider a system of merit pay for teachers, state legisla-
tures and school districts have begun to implement merit pay programs. 
According to a 1982 survey conducted by the Southern Regional 
Educational Board task force, only three states were involved in 
acknowledging superior teachers. However, none of these included a 
financial incentive pay plan. The following year three prominent 
organizations of state educational and political leaders analyzed the 
need for a comprehensive study of plans to recognize outstanding 
teachers. The 1983 report of the task force recorrmended that 
"financial incentives should be established to reward outstanding 
teachers to facilitate recruitment and retention of highly talented 
and rrotivated individuals for the teaching profession" (Walton, 1983, 
p. 1). That same year the National Governors' Association supported 
resolutions aimed toward the establishment of career ladders for 
teachers accentuating the ability to attract and retain quality 
teachers. At the 1983 annual meeting of the Education Comnission of 
the States, discussions emphasized the importance of merit pay and 
incentive plans for teachers. 
State Plans 
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State legislatures and boards of education have begun to focus 
attention on the issue of merit pay. In 1983, ERS surveyed each of 
the state departments of education and the state associations of 
school administrators in an effort to compile a comprehensive over-
view of the status of incentive and merit pay plans at the state 
level. Presented below are the findings of the ERS report with regard 
to state activities related to merit pay, master teacher plans, or 
other forms of financial incentives. 
Alabama. Alabama reported no state level plan for instituting merit 
pay or incentive pay to teachers nor were any plans of proposals for 
adoption given. 
Alaska. A bill had been brought before the Alaska state legislature 
and considered during the current session. If enacted, it \\Ould 
mandate the use of performance and merit as partial criteria of indi-
vidual salary increases in future negotiated contracts of teachers. 
Arizona. Arizona reported no state level plan for awarding merit pay 
to teachers. However, a j oint legislative conmittee was in the 
process of discussing the issue. 
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Arkansas. The Arkansas General Assembly failed to pass a master 
teacher bill in the last session. A proposal related to merit pay is 
anticipated for introduction in the next session. 
California. The California legislature signed into law a Mentor 
Teacher Program which was implemented during the 1983-84 school year. 
The plan was designed "to encourage teachers currently employed in the 
public school system to continue to pursue excellence within their 
profession, to provide incentives to teachers of denonstrated ability 
and expertise to remain in the public school system, and to restore 
the teaching profession to its position of primary importance within 
the structure of the state educational system" (California Senate 
Bill No. 813, 1983). 
The program makes provision for $4,000 in extra pay for each 
rentor teacher. School districts have the authority to choose up to 
five% of its instructional personnel as mentor teachers. Funding 
for the program is provided solely by the state. 
To qualify for the position of mentor teacher, teacher applicants 
"must be credentialed classroom teachers with permanent status; have 
substantial recent experience with classroom instruction; derronstrate 
exemplary teaching ability, as indicated by, arrong other things, 
effective conmunication skills, subject matter knowledge, and mastery 
of a range of teaching strategies necessary to meet the needs of 
pupils in different context" (California Senate Bill No. 813, 1983). 
The mentor teacher selection conmittee is composed of classroom 
teachers elected by other classroom teachers and school administrators 
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appointed by the district board of education. Classroom teachers rrrust 
comprise the majority of the selection corrmittee. The nomination 
process also consists of input from parents, students, and the corrmu-
nity. The school board is responsible for making the final selection 
of nominees. 
Mentor teachers are excluded from the evaluation of other teachers 
and are exempted from additional administrative or pupil service 
duties. A minimum of 60% of a mentor teaching assignment is to be 
spent instructing pupils. Additional responsibilities include staff 
development for other teachers, curriculum development, and assistance 
to new teachers as a major emphasis. 
Colorado. Colorado reported no state level plan existed for awarding 
merit pay to teachers. Governor Richard Lamn, in his report ''Campaign 
for Quality: An Education Agenda for the Eighties," proposed nine 
items of utrrost importance to be discussed by the educational leaders 
in the state. Teacher compensation, including merit pay, was one of 
the issues designated. Currently, the Colorado State Board of 
Education assigned a task force to study merit pay and master teacher 
plans. The task force was responsible for making suggestions for use 
at both the state and local levels. 
Connecticut. Connecticut reported no state level plan for instituting 
merit pay for teachers. However, the incoming Corrmissioner of 
Education had indicated an interest in the issue. 
Delaware. Delaware reported no merit pay plan for teachers in 
existence and no legislative proposals pending. 
26 
District of Columbia. The District of Columbia's sch(X)l system has 
been required by the U.S. Congress fiscal 1984 appropriations bill to 
study the feasibility of a merit pay plan for teachers. 
Florida. In July 1983, the Florida legislature passed a bill enacting 
a merit compensation program for teachers. The plan was designed "to 
increase the performance of public school students and to provide 
economic incentives to attract and retain qualified instructional 
personnel" (Florida Senate Bill No. 38-B, 1983). The initial program 
consisted of t\\D tiers: The Florida Meritorious Instructional 
Personnel Program (MIPP) and the District Quality Instruction 
Incentives Program (QIIP). 
In 1984 the Florida legislature amended section number 231.533 
of the Florida Meritorious Instructional Personnel Program to estab-
lish the State Master Teacher Program. The purpose of the program is 
to recognize superior ability am:>ng Florida's instructional personnel 
and to provide an economic incentive to such personnel to continue in 
public school instruction. A person may participate in the program 
as an associate master teacher or as a master teacher; participation 
is on a voluntary basis (1984 Supplement to Florida Statutes 1983). 
The qualifications for an associate master teacher are: (1) 
Document four years' teaching experience, t\\D of which must be in the 
state of Florida, and hold a professional service contract or a 
continuing contract; (2) Docurrent a superior score on the appropriate 
subject area examination or docurrent completion of a master's degree 
in-field when a subject area examination has not been developed in an 
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appropriate field; (3) Document superior performance on two evaluations 
directed by the principal and/or principal designee, additional per-
formance points may be awarded by the principal and reviewed by the 
State Department of Education. 
Documentation of the above criteria is forwarded to the Cormris-
sioner of Education for approval or disapproval. On approval, the 
associate master teacher designation lasts for a term of three years, 
contingent upon successful performance of assigned responsibilities. 
An annual award of $3,000 is distributed in two payments of $1,500 
each in June and September. The associate master teacher designation 
is transferable rurong school districts in the state and may be renewed 
upon satisfactory derronstration of the above criteria. 
The qualifications for a master teacher include the same criteria 
for an associate master teacher with the exception of: (1) Ibcument 
seven years' teaching experience, five of which must be in the state 
of Florida, and hold a professional service contract or a continuing 
contract; (2) Document at least three years experience as an associate 
master teacher; (3) Ibcument the degree or educational requirements 
and subject area test results; (4) Document outstanding performance 
evaluation results, however, the results must exceed those designated 
for the attainment of the associate master teacher status. 
The Florida Master Teacher Program was implemented in the 1984-
85 school year. Based on the estimate of 90,655 total instructional 
personnel in Florida, only an estimated 6,333 (6.9%) awards may 
actually be made for the 1984-85 school fiscal year. 
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The second tier of the Florida plan includes the District Quality 
Instruction Incentives Program. The goals of this program are to 
increase perfonnance of students and to provide economic incentives 
to instructional and other approved personnel. Participation in the 
program is optional by districts. The general requirements of the 
district QIIP are that a program must: (1) Be designed to meet the 
t\\D guals; (2) Be free from racial or other prohibited discriminations; 
(3) Provide for voluntary participation by eligible personnel; (4) Be 
for no rrore than one year in duration; (5) Award at least half of the 
allocated funds in the categury of meritorious schools; (6) Provide 
for prescribed distribution of all funds allocated to the district 
for the program; (7) Include provisions for recognizing student 
progress at meritorious schools. 
The state requires that 50% of the allocated dollars be utilized 
for the establishment of a meritorious school program. The remaining 
allocations can be distributed to individuals based on one or rrore of 
the following categuries: (1) Outstanding attendance; (2) Employment 
in critical teacher shortage area; (3) Ehployment in critical short-
age area school; (4) 0:>rrpletion of at least eight semester hours of 
in-field graduate credit with "B" or better at a standard institution; 
(5) Superior evaluation results conducted by the principal, using 
acceptable instruments; (6) Salary incentives for math, science, and 
computer education personnel for the extended school day and extended 
school year. 
Georgia. No state level plan for merit pay was reported by Georgia, 
although the issue is currently being studied by the State Board of 
Education and the Superintendent. 
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Idaho. Idaho reported no state level plan of merit pay for teachersQ 
Illinois. Illinois reported no state level plan of merit pay for 
teachers. 
Indiana. Neither a state level plan for merit pay nor formal discus-
sion of the topic was reported by Indiana. 
Iowa. Iowa reported no state level plan for merit pay and no antici-
pation of legislation in the near future. 
Kansas. Even though no state level plan for merit pay was reported, 
the Kansas Legislative Special Corrmittee on Education was assigned 
to discuss the topic. 
Kentucky. Kentucky reported no state level plan for merit pay and 
no discussion of the issue was contemplated. 
Louisiana. Louisiana state officials reported no state level plan 
for merit pay was in existence and the topic was in the early discus-
sion phase. However, the 1980 Louisiana state legislature enacted a 
plan called the Louisiana Educational Employees Professional Improve-
ment Program with provisions similar to merit pay plans in other 
states. This program is not based on the evaluation of teacher per-
formance, but is focused on a teacher acquiring additional education. 
Participants in this program receive additional salary while accruing 
points over a five-year period. 
Maine. No state level plan for merit pay was reported by Maine. 
However, both the governor and the Maine School Superintendents 
Association had issued an endorsement of the issue. 
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Maryland. Although Maryland reported no state level plan for merit 
pay, the Maryland Corrmission on Quality Teaching had made a reCOIIIren-
dation to the State Board of Education. The corrmission recomnended 
the development of a system of ranks to recognize superior teachers. 
Massachusetts. ~o state level plan or legislation related to merit 
pay for teachers was reported by Massachusetts. 
Michigan. Michigan reported no state level plan for merit pay, nor 
discussion of any legislative action. 
Minnesota. No state level plan for merit pay was reported, but the 
Minnesota State Board of Education had been designated to study the 
issue. In addition, an endorsement of merit pay for performance was 
issued by an education corrmittee of the state legislature. 
Missouri. Missouri reported that merit pay was a probable topic of 
discussion in the next legislative session, however, no state level 
provision for rronetary incentives currently existed. 
Montana. Although no state level plan was currently in existence, 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction had recorrmended to the 
State Board of Education that a study be conducted regarding the 
issue of merit pay. 
Nebraska. No state level plan for merit pay was in operation; and no 
specific proposals were reported by Nebraska. 
Nevada. Nevada reported no state level plan for merit pay and no 
action relating to the issue was anticipated by the legislature. 
New Hampshire. No state level plan for merit pay was in existence 
in New Hampshire. 
New Jersey. No merit pay program at the state level was reported, 
however, the topic was being considered for study. 
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New Mexico. Although no state level plan for merit pay was reported, 
the issue was receiving some serious discussion. 
New York. New York reported no state level plan for merit pay, but 
indicated that a study of the issue was being conducted. 
North Carolina. A study on the issue of merit pay and incentive pay 
had been initiated by the North Carolina Department of Public Instruc-
tion. The North Carolina General Assembly failed to pass a bill that 
\\Ould have provided for the development of a five-step classification 
system of teachers. Therefore, no state level plan was in operation. 
North Dakota. North Dakota reported no state level plan for merit 
pay and no plan for fonnal discussion on the issue. 
Ohio. No state level merit pay plan was reported by Ohio, however, 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction had issued a report 
recorrmending further study of career ladders for superior teachers. 
Oklahoma. Oklahoma reported that master teacher and career teacher 
programs were only in the discussion phase, with no state level plan 
in effect. 
Oreg-on. No state level merit or incentive pay program was reported 
by Oreg-on. 
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania reported that neither a state level plan 
nor legislative proposals for merit pay was anticipated. 
Rhode Island. No existence of a state level plan for merit pay was 
reported by Rhode Island. 
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South Carolina. Neither a state level plan nor any formal legislative 
activity related to the introduction of merit pay was reported by 
South Carolina. 
South Dakota. Although South Dakota reported no state level plan in 
existence, the _State Board of Education was in the process of study-
ing the issue of merit pay in quality education. 
Tennessee. In March 1984, the Tennessee legislature in special ses-
sion passed Governor Lamar Alexander's educational refonn package 
known as the Comprehensive Education Refonn Act (CERA). One of the 
components of the CERA is the Career Ladder Program. 
According to French (1985), this program consists of five steps 
with incentive pay for the participants. The first step comprises 
first-year teachers who are licensed for one year as probationary 
teachers. Upon satisfactory completion of the first year, new 
teachers receive a $500 payment above their regular salary and are 
awarded an Apprentice certificate in the second year. 
The second step is the Apprentice certificate which is valid for 
a three-year period. Teachers receive a proportion incentive after 
each year of apprenticeship. If satisfactory classroom perfonnance 
over the three years has been established, the teacher may then 
proceed to a Career Level I certificate. 
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Upon entering the third step or Career Level I, a teacher 
receives $1,000-per-year incentive. This level certificate is valid 
for five years and must include at least t\\O years of evaluation. At 
the conclusion of the five-year validation, a teacher must choose 
between two options: apply for recertification at Career Level I or 
apply for certification at Career Level II. 
To progress to Career Level II status, the fourth step, the 
teacher must pass an evaluation with a superior rating during the 
fifth year of Career Level I. A Career Level II certificate is valid 
for five years and includes a $2,000-per-year state supplement and 
the opportunity of working under an 11-rronth contract for an extra 
incentive of $2,000. During this certification period the teacher 
is evaluated over a two-year cycle. Based on the outcome of the 
evaluations, the teacher has t\\O options: apply for recertification 
at Career Level II or apply for certification at Career Level III. 
If evaluation criteria are not met for either Career Level, the 
teacher returns to Career Level I. 
The fifth step, Career Level III, is valid for five years and 
can be continued based on evaluation data. Teachers receive a $3,000-
per-year supplement and the option of working on either an 11-rronth 
or a 12-nonth contract for an additional $2,000. The evaluation 
process is the sarre as indicated in Career Level II. 
Texas. In September 1984, Texas irr:Jplemented a career ladder plan for 
incentive corr:pensation to teachers who produce quality performance. 
At the beginning of the school year teachers were boosted to Level I 
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on the career ladder and by the end of the school year will be 
eligible to rrove to Level II. The state has set a ceiling (20% to 
25%) on the number of teachers who can advance. As a result of state 
funds, not all teachers who are qualified to step up will be awarded 
progression. According to Dronka (1984), Texas educators have 
expressed a concern about insufficient funding and the lack of a 
uniform evaluation system. In 1985, the Texas legislature is antic-
ipated to discuss further funding for the incentive program and the 
development of a standardized evaluation instrument. 
Utah. The Utah State Office of Education was in the process of dis-
cussing a proposal , ''Enhancing the Teaching Profession by Providing 
Career Ladder and/or Other Incentivese" The recomnendation is based 
on a differentiated staffing rrodel which divides a teacher's \\Ork 
into components. 
The proposed Utah Career Ladder provides three level of addi-
tional teacher responsibility and salary increrrents for teachers. 
In Level I, the Apprentice Teacher \\Ould \\Ork under the supervision 
of a Teacher Leader and would receive the regular teacher salary. A 
teacher must spend a minimum of two and a maximum of three years as 
fu~ Apprentice Teacher before advancing to the next level. 
In Level II, the Professional Teacher \\Ould be designated respon-
sibilities in addition to teaching. These teachers would be awarded 
an additional 10% over their regular salary. 
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Verrront. Neither a state level plan for merit pay nor any legislative 
activity related to the issue was reported. 
Virginia. Governor Charles Robb has assigned a task force to estab-
lish guidelines to evaluate recomrendations for pilot programs and 
submit the findings to the State Board of Education. State funds have 
been appropriated to finance pilot projects to evaluate several plans 
for teacher performance-based pay. 
In speaking to the United States House of Representatives Task 
Force on Merit Pay, Governor Robb outlined two types of programs. 
The first, called a Master Teacher/Merit Program is a plan to select 
and compensate teachers who exhibit excellent performance in the 
classroom. The second of Robb's proposals is a Performance Evaluation 
Program that would allow teachers to establish guidelines for evalua-
tions of fellow teachers. The results of the evaluations would be 
delivered to the local board of education to be used in determining 
the rurount of pay incentive. 
According to the 1984 report by the Arrerican Association of 
School Administrators, National Association of Elementary School 
Principals, and National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
the Virginia legislature is considering a career ladder plan with 
four levels: probationary, teacher, senior teacher, and master 
teacher. The criteria for advancement to senior teacher and master 
teacher include application, performance assessnent, and selective 
prOODtion. At each level teachers would have specific responsibilities 
to fulfill. A goal of the plan is for teachers to spend the majority 
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of their time in classroom instruction. Opportunity exists for 
senior and master teachers to have extended \\Drking days and extended 
contracts. 
Washington. No state level plan for rrerit pay was reported by 
Washington. 
West Virginia. Although no state level plan was in existence, the 
State Board of Education has appointed a subcorrmittee to study the 
issue of rrerit pay. The governor and the Chainnan of the House 
Education Comnittee anticipate discussion relating to merit pay in 
the next legislative session. 
District Plans 
In the 1983 study of rrerit pay plans for teachers, ERS also 
surveyed local school districts to provide information in reference 
to merit pay and incentive pay plans either fonnerly or currently in 
use. "Districts responding to the ERS survey were asked to indicate 
whether input type evaluative criteria (e.g., knowledge of subject, 
preparation, etc.), student test scores, or results oriented evalua-
tive criteria other than test scores were used in the evaluation and 
selection process" (ERS, 1983, p. 21). 
The concept of rrerit pay has assumed many varied forms at the 
district level. There are distinct differences in the criteria used 
for input, evaluation, and am:mnt of nonetary incentives. The 
following sunmaries present an overview of various incentive plans 
for teachers currently in operation by school districts throughout 
the United States. 
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Tempe Union High School District: Tempe, Arizona. The purpose of the 
merit pay program is to create a feeling of estean among faculty 
members and to recognize and improve the quality of instruction. 
Eligibility for the program is based on classroom instruction and 
management; outstanding contributions to students, department, or 
school; and, professional involvement. 
Teachers are nominated for merit incentives by members of the 
faculty and administration. The nominations are forwarded by the 
principal to the superintendent, who detennines the final award. 
Tv.o teachers from each high school are selected to receive a $1,000 
grant to be used for the purchase of classroom materials or equip-
ment and to attend saninars on excellence for the purpose of further-
ing district staff development. 
Los Angeles Unified School District: Los Angeles, California. The 
Master Teacher Program was implemented during the 1982-83 school year. 
The purpose of the plan is to identify teachers who exhibit outstand-
ing ability in instructing students. Selection criteria for a master 
teacher includes training experience, professional growth and activity, 
human relation skills, experience in grade level or department func-
tions, and leadership potential. Candidates are selected by a corrmit-
tee according to each region or division. Each region or division is 
allocated a quota of teachers who may receive the title of Master 
Teacher. Teachers selected as Master Teachers receive a semester 
supplement of $504. 
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Cherry Creek School District: Englewood, Colorado. A merit pay plan 
was instituted in 1975. Eligibility for the program is based on prep-
aration and knowledge of subject area. Both individual and team evalu-
ations are conducted. The supplement awarded to teachers is based on 
the teacher's training and experience. In the 1982-83 school year, 
the arrount of the awards ranged from $1,040 to $1,247. 
Glastonbury Public Schools: Glastonbury, Connecticut. The Glastonbury 
merit pay program has been in existence since 1967. According to 
Johnson (1984), this plan pennits teachers to progress toward the top 
of the pay scale at an accelerated pace of rrore than one step per 
year. Evaluation is based on input criteria and made by a single 
evaluator. Teachers may qualify for a double-step award if deemed to 
be superior and exhibit instructional effectiveness and growth. In 
addition, teachers must contribute significantly to the school, 
department, school system, or field of education. The rurount of 
awards during the 1982-83 school year ranged from $250 to $2,040 with 
no rronetary limit on the funding available to pay the increments. 
Dundee Corrmunity Unit School District: Dundee, Illinois. In 1979, 
the district of Dundee instituted a Senior Status merit pay plan for 
teachers. Teachers must have at least 16 years of teaching experience 
and a Master's degree plus 30 credits to be eligible for the program. 
Every three years stipends are granted to teachers who possess an 
outstanding level of performance. 
Assessnent criteria are based on the teacher's self-evaluation of 
input components in all areas of classroom effectiveness. The Senior 
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Status C-orrmittee, comprised of five administrators and six teachers 
' 
make the final choice of awards. 
Pentucket Regional School District and School Union Number 53: West 
Newbury, Massachusetts. A merit pay Master Teacher Scale was inaugu-
rated in 1967 for teachers who have reached the maximum step on the 
salary schedule and have acquired a Master's degree plus 36 hours of 
credit. Principals recomnend to the superintendent candidates who 
have daronstrated leadership, teaching effectiveness, professional 
attitude, understanding of children, ability to v.ork with others, 
formal training, reliability, and poise. Assessnent of the candi-
dates is perforrred by both an individual and group evaluation. The 
azrount of rroney each teacher receives relies upon the teacher's 
placement on the Master Teacher Scale. For the 1982-83 school year, 
azrounts ranged from $400 to $2,300. 
City of Ladue School District: St. 1.Duis, Missouri. Ladue School 
District has one of the oldest merit pay systems in the United States. 
With its inception in 1953, the plan has remained virtually unchanged. 
According to the American Association of School Administrators (1983), 
salary schedules are divided into three levels. In 1983, the first 
salary schedule ranged from $14,300 to $14,700; the second schedule 
reached $23,200; and the third schedule had a maximum of $30,000. 
For the 1982-83 school year the merit awards ranged from $2,100 to 
$4,500. It is possible for teachers to receive rrore than the maxi-
mum salary at the second and third schedules. 
When setting salaries for teachers who are new to the district 
and inexperienced, the district takes into account courses taken, 
grades received, instructor's recomnendations, and out-of-school 
experiences. 
Experienced teachers new to the district are placed on the 
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salary schedule according to professional training and recornnendations, 
observation of classroom perfonnance, nl.Ililber of years of experience, 
present salary, out-of-school experience, and potential value to the 
district. 
No formal application is necessary in the Ladue merit system 
since all teachers are placed on the merit salary schedule fran the 
time of employment. 
Teacher evaluations for merit increments are based on how 
effective they are in five areas: teacher-student interaction; 
relationships with colleagues; contacts with parents and members of 
the comrrunity; contributions to the total school program; and curric-
ulum development and professional :improvement. 
The evaluation criteria used to determine merit pay were designed 
by a joint effort of teachers and administrators. Evaluations are 
perfonned by principal~ and assistant principals only. 
Westside Corrmunity Schools: Qnaha, Nebraska. Merit pay has been a 
part of the Westside Corrmunity School District since 1971. All 
teachers are eligible to receive incentive pay which is negotiated 
each year. The anount and recipients of award are never published. 
Incentive pay for each teacher is detennined by the assessnent 
by the principal and a team of central office personnel with final 
decision by the superintendent. Evaluation criteria is based on 
quality classroom teaching, leadership, other responsibilities such 
as curriculum leadership or coaching, professional growth, and total 
contribution to the school district. Incentive pay is an on-going 
cumulative payrrent that continues year after year. 
The district has stated that there are tw::> significant factors 
attributing to the success of the program: the Board of Education 
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is willing to pay the dollars necessary for funding the program; and 
the nonpublishing of the names of the teachers who receive merit 
awards as well as the arrount of the incentive. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools: Charlotte, North Carolina. The 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Teacher Career Development Program has evolved 
into a career ladder rrodel with six levels. The career ladder begins 
with provisional teacher status with emphasis on classroom instruction 
and participation in training programs. The next step is the career 
nominee level which requires participation on task or study corrmittees 
within the school in addition to those duties performed by provisional 
teachers. At the third step, the career candidate performs the aoove 
duties while assuming added responsibilities related to the overall 
excellence of teaching. Teachers on these first three levels are 
probationary until they are eligible for tenure in the fourth year. 
Career Level I, II, and III teachers are responsible for assuming 
"leadership in areas such as serving as mentors for beginning teachers 
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and participating in program evaluation, staff development, diagnosis 
and remediation of instructional problems, development of curriculum 
materials, and the design and implementation of action oriented class-
room research'' ( Schlechty, 1985, p. 5) . 
The rrost critical component of the career ladder program is 
evaluation. Each participant in the program nru.st compile docl.llilented 
evidence of successful perfonnance. This docurrentation must include 
an Action-Growth Plan as well as an appropriate time frame for meeting 
the stated criteria. An advisory assessnent team, consisting of the 
principal, assistant principal for instruction, and a peer teacher, 
will assist, support, and encourage the teacher. 
Evaluations are conducted a number of times by a number of 
individuals who follow specific criteria over a designated period of 
time. The observer-evaluator plays an important role in the success 
of the program. "An observation schedule allows for each provisional 
teacher to be observed three times by three different observer-
evaluators during the second semester of employment. These observa-
tions are unannounced but scheduled in consultation with the principal. 
Second year provisional teachers are observed six times, three times 
in the fall and three times in the spring. Three of these observations 
will be announced, and three will be unannounced. Three observer-
evaluators conduct t\ID observations each. Career candidates are 
observed nine times by three different observer-evaluators, six obser-
vations in the fall and three in the spring. Three will be announced, 
six unannounced" (Schlechty, 1985, p. 6). The observer-evaluator must 
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submit a written report as part of the teacher documentation process. 
Following the observation, conferences may be scheduled upon request. 
Teachers at Career Level I receive a pay incentive of $2,000 and 
an additional $2,000 for each satisfactory evaluation which is con-
ducted every three years. Career Level II can be achieved after three 
years at Career Level I. Teachers at Career Level II receive $2,000 
rrore than Career Level I. Career Level III can be achieved after five 
years at Career Level II. Teachers at Career Level III receive $2,000 
rrore than Career Level II. Under the present salary schedule, 
teachers can earn a maximum of $22,000; under the new plan it will be 
possible for teachers to earn a maximum of $39,000 (American Associ-
ation of School Administrators, National Asoociation of Elementary 
School Principals, & National Asoociation of Secondary School Prin-
cipals, 1984) • 
The career ladder incentive program is designed to increase 
career earnings of teachers by 50% over a 30-year period. During the 
1984-85 school year, teachers who enter the school system must partic-
ipate in the program. Teachers currently errployed have the option not 
to participate. Currently there are 150 tenured teachers who have 
entered the program at the career candidate level. 
Seiling Public School: Seiling, Oklahoma. In the Seiling Public 
School District, 38 of the 43 teachers received merit pay awards in 
1983. Evaluations are determined exclusively by student test scores. 
At the beginning and the end of the school year a standardized test 
is administered to students. If student test scores increase by a 
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predetermined rurount, merit pay is awarded. Included in the plan is 
a method by which teachers in an entire school receive a pay incentive 
if the scores of the student population exceed a stated goal as well 
as student scores in individual classrooms. 
Dallas Independent School District: Dallas, Texas. Since the fall of 
1982, the District has utilized student achievement test scores to 
determine the top 25% of the District schools. The primary goal of 
the program is to ensure that the students at each school perform at 
their highest possible level of achievement. Part of the rationale 
of the plan is to eliminate individual competition between teachers 
and to encourage alliance and collaboration within the schools. Each 
employee in the selected schools receives a pay incentive. 
Once a school has been selected for an award the criteria used 
for distribution of pay incentives are: successful evaluation, 
attendance of professional personnel, and attendance of support per-
sonnel. The am::>unt of the incentive is based on the number of student 
contact days present. 
Houston Independent School District: Houston, Texas. Houston's 
Second Mile Plan is based upon specified minimum requirements to be 
eligible to participate. A teacher must "hold a valid teaching cer-
tificate or permit appropriate to the teaching assignment; be assigned 
to a school or instructional site; be a certified teacher with a 
bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree; have an acceptable rating 
on the rrost recent evaluation; have five or fewer days of absence 
during the current school year; have no unexcused absences; and be a 
full-time teacher, nurse, or media specialist/librarian" (Say, 1982, 
pp. 270-271). 
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According to the 1983 ERS report, teachers may qualify for the 
merit pay program in six categories. These categories are: (1) 
teachers willing to teach in a high-priority location with high con-
centrations of educationally disadvantaged students are eligible for 
$2,000 stipends; (2) teachers assigned to subject areas of critical 
shortage such as mathematics, science, special education, and bilin-
gual are eligible for stipends ranging from $700 to $2,000; (3) 
teachers exhibiting outstanding attendance of five or fewer days 
absent during the year are eligible to receive stipends ranging from 
$50 to $500; (4) teachers completing college courses in curriculum 
areas related to their teaching assignrrent or district inservice are 
eligible for stipends of $300 for each six hours of coursew:>rk and 
$400 if the courses are related to an area of critical shortage; 
(5) teachers improving student test scores exceeding the predicted 
achievement are eligible to receive stipends of $800 and an addi-
tional $400 is awarded to the top 10% of those schools which show 
the greatest anount of achievement; (6) teachers assigned to unique 
campus sites for which no test data are available are eligible for 
the Unique Campus Assignrrent stipend ranging from $450 to $750. 
Weber Schools: Ogden, Utah. The Weber School District plan was 
initiated as a pilot project as part of the Utah Educational Produc-
tivity Study. The program was designed to increase teacher salaries 
by increasing student contact time and by lengthening the school day 
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and year. Selected teachers are scheduled to teach seven periods with 
an incentive average of $5,600. Teachers can also receive an addi-
tional $1,300 bonus based on results of student achievement test 
scores. 
Round Valley School District: Covelo, California. Round Valley has 
implerrented a merit pay program that emphasizes teacher-initiated 
projects. Projects proposed by teachers can earn 4 of 10 possible 
merit points. Two and one-half points are given for joint efforts 
to encourage cooperation arrong teachers. The final three and one-
half points are determined by the principal's evaluation. Arrounts 
of the incentive award range from $140 to $2,800 each year (American 
Association of School Administrators, National Association of Elemen-
tary School Principals, & National Association of Secondary School 
Principals, 1984). 
Upper St. Clair Township School District: Upper St. Clair. 
Pennsylvania. Teachers designated as curriculum leaders are awarded 
extended-year contracts. Awards are granted to approximately 5% of 
the teachers in the district. The criteria for selection are knowl-
edge of subject matter and ability to corrmunicate with fellow teachers 
based on IIIllltiple evaluations. Curriculum Leaders are contracted for 
an additional 20 days each year and they are compensated an extra 15% 
of their base salaries. A primlry responsibility of Curriculum 
Leaders is to irrprove the district's instructional program. This 
responsibility "is exercised through curriculum evaluation and 
revision; efforts to stay informed of important developments in the 
teachers' fields; assisting principals in planning and conducting 
inservice activities; observing and assisting teachers who request 
help; and supervising Sl.lIIID2r v.orkshops" (Arrerican Association of 
School Administrators, National Association of Elementary School 
Principals, & National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
1984 , p . 26 ) • 
Pros and Cons of Merit Pay 
Most of the contentions for and against .rrerit pay are founded 
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on a set of assumptions. According to Johnoon (1984), "the first 
assumption is that teachers prefer perfonnance-based pay over a 
standard salary scale. Second, .rrerit pay proposals assume that 
dissatisfied, unchallenged teachers are a significant part of today's 
school problems, and that a COIT![)etitive approach to their w:>rk could 
ultimately improve student learning. Third, merit pay critics chal-
lenge these causal links and agree that while ~etitive pay may be 
consistent with the tenets of free enterprise, there is no certainty 
that its use in schools WJuld make teachers happier or sch(X)ls better" 
(pp. 10-11). 
Opponents and proponents of merit pay for teachers have been 
debating the issue for over six decades. The literature on merit pay 
is replete with an abundance of material regarding the pros and cons 
of merit pay for teachers. Johnson (1984) concisely presents these 
argurrents in favor of and against rerit pay. The following sunmary 
is an overview of the merit pay debate • . 
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Arguments for Merit Pay 
Merit pay is compatible with the doctrine of free enterprise. 
Individuals outside of the teaching profession are afforded the 
opportunity for receiving oonuses for their accomplishments. Like-
wise, teachers should also be allowed to be compensated for their 
achievements in the classroom. Most school systems which operate 
under the single salary scale merely reward teachers for post-graduate 
course\\Ork and length of service, but not for their ability in the 
classroom. On the other hand, merit pay plans award teachers based 
on their accomplishments as well as their performance in the class-
room. 
Merit pay would attract and maintain quality teachers. By 
acknowledging and compensating superior teachers, merit pay \\Ould 
afford teachers the opportunity to increase their income as well as 
establish a feeling of worth and esteem. The argument recognizes the 
lack of competitiveness with teachers' salaries and salaries in other 
professions. It has been assumed that teachers leave the field 
because of the lack of recognition and insufficient pay. By rewarding 
teachers for their accomplishments it increases the likelihood that 
they will continue in their profession. 
Merit pay \\Ould encourage teachers to analyze their own \\Ork, 
thereby stimulating quality canpetition. The opportunity for teachers 
to gain pay increases \\Ould encourage them to be critical of their 
classroom skills and perfonnance. Competition arrong teachers \\OUld 
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increase the awareness of quality perfonnance of colleagues receiving 
merit awards . 
Merit pay v.uuld help incr ease the support of education by the 
American taxpaying public . ational Slll'Veys continue to report the 
dissatisfaction of taxpayers toward the lack of quality teaching. The 
implementation of merit pay -muld ensure citizens that tax rrnnies used 
to pay teachers' salaries v;ould be based on perfonnance . Canpensating 
teachers for increased productivity of classroom performance \IDuld in 
turn lead to increased public support. 
Arguments against Merit Pay 
The research indicates that there is a lack of consensus regard-
ing what constitutes effective teaching. Studies have revealed few 
correlations between teacher characteristics and effective instruction. 
Studies of teacher characteristics have shown that only the verbal 
ability of a teacher is directly related to a student's performance. 
Likewise, research on instructional techniques have provided few 
definitive answers. It appears in nnst cases, teacher- effec iveness 
is dependent upon an administrator's subjective decision. 
The IIEasuranent system used to evaluate teachers is neither 
objective nor has it been standardized. This practice in turn, 
supports the argume t that nnst merit pay evaluation systems are 
" inherently unreliable and potentially inequitable" ( Jobn.s:m, 1984, 
p. 26) . Until objective measures of evaluation are instit ted the 
single salary schedule provides teachers with protection against 
administrative favoriti9Il and patronage . 
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Merit pay plans would hinder effective supervision and suppress 
teacher individuality. In order for supervision to be effective, ooth 
administrator and teacher must be able to discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of a teacher. This type of interaction can only take place 
in a non-threatening environment. When teachers are judged competi-
tively, professional growth as well as supervision is impeded. This 
type of competition encourages confonnity and in some instances 
perpetuates mediocrity. 
There is evidence to support the argument that the cost of merit 
pay plans may not be "liIDrth the investment. There is no guarantee that 
increases in teachers' salaries will produce quality instruction. A 
significant added cost is the arrount of m::mey required to train, 
implement, and rrnnitor the plan by administrators. In addition, the 
time devoted to administering a merit pay program means less time 
available for curriculum development or inservice training. 
Merit pay plans tend to lower teacher roorale and minimize coop-
eration anong colleagues. When teachers are competing for individual 
merit awards there is less exchange of ideas and materials between 
teachers to improve the overall effectiveness of instruction within 
the school. Those teachers not selected for merit pay may become 
disillusioned embittered and distrustful toward fellow teachers and 
' ' 
the system itself. 
Research does not support the assurrption that merit pay will 
produce quality education. Merit pay merely rewards superior 
teachers and does not address the issue of improved instruction for 
the majority of teachers not selected. "If the problems of the 
teaching profession are as serious and pervasive as the critics and 
corrmission studies conclude, then a systematic, thorough approach to 
i.rq)roving teaching is necessary, one that directly addresses the 
problems of average and :[XX)r teachers. Merit pay is not such an 
approach. Identifying good teaching may be an inportant elerrent of 
efforts to improve the profession, but it is insufficient in itself 
and may prove to be counterproductive" (Johnson, 1984, p. 28). 
Views of Merit Pay 
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A 0:>ngressional Task Force was appointed in October 1983 to 
study merit pay for teachers. The report states that the question 
facing the United States "is not simply how to implerrent performance-
based pay for educators but how we can lift the standards of instruc-
tion in the nation" (Merit Pay Task Force Report, 1983, p. 6). 
According to Paul Si.Iron, chairman of the study corrmittee, "No one on 
the task force views rrerit pay as a single, easy, dramatic answer to 
the problems of education" (Kappan Staff, 1983, p. 301). 
The report states that "merit pay is but one of many pieces in a 
puzzle. It can be an important piece, but it is neither inexpensive 
nor easy to achieve, and other pieces of the puzzle must be put into 
place aloo. Despite mixed and inconclusive results with perfonnance-
based pay in the private sector and in education, we support and 
encourage experilrents with performance-based pay" (Corrmittee on 
Education and Labor House of Representatives, 1983, p. 6). 
The conmittee reconmended that merit pay plans should include 
the following features: 
1. Teachers, administrators, and the corrnrunity should be 
involved in the developing of merit pay plans. 
2. In developing merit pay programs, special consideration 
"should be taken to avoid abuses that \\Duld grant rewards 
for reasons other than outstanding teacher performance" 
(p. 7). 
3. Periodic review should be extended to each teacher 
participating in the merit program. Incentives for 
teacher self-improvement should be included in each plan. 
4. The plan "should be subject to periodic review for 
refinement, improvement or abandonment" (p. 7). 
5. When establishing a merit pay plan, "a school district 
should recognize the needs and contributions of competent 
teachers who do not fall into a superior category" (p. 7). 
Views of Educators 
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The 1984 Gallup survey of the attitudes of teachers toward public 
schools included the issue of merit pay. Teachers in the United 
States oppose the concept of merit pay by a t\\D to one ratio. They 
object to the issue on t\ID major points. First, is the major diffi-
culties involved in the evaluation process in determining who should 
receive merit pay. Second, is the possibility of low teacher norale 
if a plan is implemented. 
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In addition, three-fourths of the respondents reported that 33% 
of the teachers in their own schools were qualified to receive merit 
pay. If a merit pay plan were implemented, teachers favored evalua-
tion by fellow teachers, administrators, or educators from outside of 
the school district. Only one-fifth of the teachers supported 
involvement of students or parents in the selection process. 
Teachers reported that selection criteria for merit pay should 
be based on: "(1) an evaluation by educators, either teachers, or 
administrators, and (2) an advanced degree or years of experience" 
(Gallup, 1984, p. 98). Only a small percentage of teachers responded 
favorably toward the consideration of students' academic achievement, 
students' evaluations, or parents' opinions. 
Views of the Public 
The views of the public elicited a major difference to the views 
of educators. Only half of the respondents to the 1984 Gallup Poll 
reported having read or heard anything about merit pay programs. Of 
those who were aware of the merit pay issue, 76% were in favor of it, 
19% were opposed, and 5% had no opinion. Of the total sample, 65% 
approved of merit pay, 22% were opposed, and 13% had no opinion. 
Gallup surveys have reported a steady increase in the publics' 
view supporting merit pay. In 1970, 58% of the public favored 
performance-based pay and 36% favored single salary schedule.- By 
1983, 61% favored merit pay and 31% favored the single salary schedule. 
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Views of Teacher Unions 
Since their inception, merit or incentive pay plans for teachers 
have been opposed by both the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 
and the National Education Asoociation (NEA). Carl J. Megel, past 
president of AFT, in an undated pamphlet published by AFT titled 
"Merit Rating: Educationally Unoound ..• and Why," stated that "the 
Arrerican Federation of Teachers has vigorously opposed the specious 
practice for rrore than 50 years." 
Albert Shanker, current president of AFT, in several issues of 
the New York Tilres, oontinued the historical oondemnation of merit pay 
by teacher unions. In oolumn dated January 24, 1983, Shanker 
declared that "merit pay has failed in the past because the over-
whelming majority of teachers viewed it as politics and patronage 
rather than pedagogy" (p. 11). 
Traditionally, NEA has aloo opposed incentive based pay for 
quality teaching. In an interview published in Education Week, 
Bernie Freitag, vice-president of NEA, stated that "merit pay hasn't 
oorked yet. It has been subjected to a lot of political influence 
and patronage and abuse" (1983, p. 11). 
Today, however, both unions have expressed a willingness to 
discuss the issue of rrerit pay. During the 1983 annual oonvention, 
AFT delegates ooncluded that oome merit pay plans are \\Orth oonsider-
ation. The resolution stated that merit pay plans must meet three 
oonditions: merit pay must provide higher base salary for all 
teachers; provide fair and equitable evaluations by administrators; 
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and consider all aspects of classroom teaching in the rating process. 
The resolution also included opposition toward the use of student 
achievement as the sole measure of successful classroom teaching 
(ERS, 1983). 
NEA also specified certain conditions regarding the establishment 
of merit pay plans. Willard McGuire, past president of NEA, asserts 
that "NE.A will consider any fair and equitable salary proposal. .• with 
a clear definition and how it is implemented11 (1983, p. 25). Jordan 
and Borkow (1983) report that the NEA proposals for merit pay plans 
should include "competitive entry level salaries; career ladder 
options; adequate evaluation processes; and allowances for adapta-
tions at the local level 11 (p. 25). According to the Phi Delta Kappan 
Staff, Mary Hatwood Futrell, current president of NEA, states that 
11although NEA does not support rrerit pay, it is willing to work with 
school officials in developing rrerit pay plans that would be accept-
able to teachers'' ( 1983 , p. 301) • 
Views of Administrator Groups 
Positions of administrator groups toward the issue of merit pay 
were studied in 1983 by Jordan and Borkow. They reported that the 
American Association of School Administrators support merit pay with 
certain qualifications. The qualifications include: "all teachers' 
salaries should be raised to competitive levels; teachers, the 
comnunity, and administrator s should agree on the administration of 
the system; school systems should consider incentive pay plans 
rather than master teacher plans" (p. 24). 
The O:>uncil of Chief State School Officers holds no official 
position regarding merit pay. The 0:>uncil states that "it is not 
the role of the Federal governrrent to establish a position regarding 
teachers' salaries'' ( Jordan & Borkow, 1983, p. 24) . 
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The National Association of Elementary School Principals states 
that merit pay plans are "often divisive and counter productive. 
Systems of merit pay do not WJrk because of the many inequities and 
difficulties encountered in establishing, implementing, and maintain-
ing meaningful measurable criteria" ( Jordan & Borkow, 1983, p. 25) . 
The National Association of Secondary School Principals asserts 
that merit pay plans are "M>rthy of further discussion" (Jordan & 
Borkow, 1983, p. 25). 
The National Sch(X)l Boards Association urges local school 
districts to evaluate teachers' salaries for components that are 
"competitive, market sensitive, and performance based" (Jordan & 
Borkow, 1983, p. 25). 
The 1984 task force of the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development (ASm) released a preliminary report on merit 
pay and career ladders. The task force members concluded that merit 
pay by itself: ''will not solve problans now facing schools in their 
efforts to reach higher levels of excellence; has been shown to be 
ineffective and self-defeating, in fact, may be a disincentive for 
improved perfonnance; does not have a good track record in the private 
sector; and represents a simplistic popular approach to the very 
complex problem of trying to recognize, rrntivate, and utilize talent 
in the schools" (English, 1985, p. 34). 
Other Professions using Merit Pay 
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Merit pay and incentive pay plans have long been a major deter-
minant of the salaries of workers in business, industry, and govern-
ment. Those who support rrerit pay for teachers often maintain that 
because performance-based pay is successful in other professions, it 
should succeed in the field of education. The following discussion 
first sunmarizes the utilization of merit pay in business and indus-
try and then the adaptation of merit pay principles by the government. 
Business and Industry 
Edward E. Lawler, an expert in the field of business rrotivation 
and compensation, reports that "the principle of paying for perfonn-
ance is often honored rrore in the breach than in reality" (1981, 
p. 82). Therefore, the actual use of merit pay is not as prevalent 
in business and industry as proponents of rrerit pay might lead us to 
believe. 
Also, Lawler asserts that merit pay is not effective in all 
types of business, but rather is successful in some sectors and not 
in others. For example, rrerit pay can be an effective incentive in 
the sales or production of individual items, where the total compet-
itive effort of individuals expands the output of the enterprise. 
In such settings it is "appropriate to implement an incentive plan 
that rrotivates these employees to maximize their individual produc-
tivity and to pay little attention to cooperative activities" 
(Lawler, 1981, p. 97). 
As a counterpart to rewards for individual effort, incentives 
exist for total group effort. A large number of businesses and 
industries rely heavily on the teamwork of employees to increase 
productivity. Thus, Lawler contends that merit pay is inappropriate 
for tasks that IIR1st be completed "either successively (work that 
passes from one person to another, e.g., assembly operations) or 
coordinately (work that is a function of the joint effort of all 
employees, e.g., process production as is done in chemical plants)" 
(1981, pp. 97-98). 
In reality, there is an extremely snall number of work settings 
where the contribution of an individual employee can be accurately 
r:reasured and evaluated. In addition to the difficulty of individual 
performance assessrrent is the likelihood of suppressing employee 
cooperation and compromising individual creativity. Only when the 
benefits of productivity are shared with all employees will individ-
uals contribute and participate cooperatively to the enterprise. 
58 
Due to the complexity of the production process, the majority of 
r:rerit pay plans used by business and industry reward group performance 
as opposed to individual perfonnance. When rewards are established 
by the perfonnance of a total group effort, individuals realize the 
:importance of teamwork in the success or productivity of the company. 
However, a major weakness of a group merit pay plan is that employees 
may be incapable of establishing the relationship between individual 
contribution and overall group effectiveness and, thus, may lack 
rrotivation by a rronetary reward. 
When subjective criteria nru.st be a factor in the evaluation 
process, business, like education, has a difficulty identifying and 
establishing the criteria used to IIEasure effective perfonnance. 
Issues such as trust and the rater's reliability also surface when 
subjectivity is a component in the process of assessnent. 
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The concept of merit pay has been acknowledged to be consistent 
with the traditional American work ethic and the values of business 
and industry of corrpetition, independence, and self-sufficiency. 
However, it is interesting to note that many large successful American 
corrpanies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Intel prorrote just the 
opposite of these values. In reality, business and industry operate 
on the premise of errployee interdependence whereby emphasis is placed 
on group perfonnance-based pay rather than individual (Lawler, 1981). 
GoverlllIEnt 
The federal guverlllIEnt corrpleted the irrpleIIEntation of the IIErit 
pay system in 1981. Merit pay was initiated by the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 which was the rrost substantive change in public , 
administration (Silverman~ 1983). The Act mandated the pay of Civil 
Service supervisors and management officials be contingent upon their 
performance ratings. A major corrponent of the _merit pay plan was 
that its expense could not exceed that of the previous general 
schedule step system. 
Even though performance-based pay was designed to improve 
employee compensation practices in the federal government, a number 
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of problems were identified after the implementation. A study con-
ducted by Pearce and Perry (1981) found: employees were not convinced 
that their performance was accurately measured; employees were not 
rrotivated by pay incentives for performance; employees did not per-
ceive rronetary reward as the rrost irnportant factor in their w::>rk; 
employees' confidence in the system was diminished by the use of 
quotas in pay pools and the authority used by managers to change 
performance ratings; and employees becrure rrore concerned with obtain-
ing good ratings and less concerned with effective management 
practices. 
Silverman, in the article "Why the Merit Pay System Failed in 
the Federal Government", lists 10 major problems of the federal 
employee compensation system: "unintended statutory provisions; 
open-ended regulations; novice technical assistance; drifting imple-
mentation policies; flagrant administrative errors; ludicrously 
complicated inconsistent employee treatment; rrotivational factors; 
managerial pay compression; and simultaneous budget reductions" 
(1983, p. 294). 
In addition, Silverman states that politics not only created 
merit pay but also destroyed it. ''Or maybe the program was doomed 
from the start by faulty conceptions, contending bureaucracies, and 
ill-timed budget cutbacks" (Silverman, 1983, p ·. 302). 
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According to Johnson, these reports on merit pay from business, 
industry, and government provide four inportant lessons for those who 
support merit pay plans for teachers. "First, employees may be rrore 
rrotivated by challenging \\Ork responsibilities or fringe benefits than 
opportunities for competitive pay. Second, it is inportant that the 
evaluated criteria of a merit pay plan reflect the rrost important 
elements of employees' work so that they will direct their efforts 
toward the right goals rather than just measurable goals. Third, 
individualized merit pay is appropriate for some kinds of work and 
not others. Competition rurong employees may be counter-productive 
in work that is sequential or that requires cooperation. Fourth, 
individuals are rrotivated by merit pay only to the extent that they 
believe extra effort will be rewarded. The rrore subjective rerit 
ratings are, the rrore likely employees will decide that they are not 
worth working for'' ( 1984, pp. 32-33) . 
Future Prospects for Merit Pay 
It is likely that within the next several years many school 
districts will adopt merit pay plans. The rationale for this assurr:p-
tion seems to be threefold. First, there is an increasing danand for 
accountability in schools by the public and state legislatures. 
Second, there is growing ·support from both teachers and teachers' 
unions for perfonnance-based pay and merit recognition. However, 
Goodlad' s research may question the validity o_f this assurr:ption. His 
research suggests that the best teachers leave the profession prima-
rily due to low salaries. Therefore, it may be necessary to increase 
salaries by a substantial arrount rather than award token bonuses 
based on achieverent. Third, there is an unproven expectation that 
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a causal relationship exists between rronetary incentives for teachers 
and improved instruction in the classroom. 
Throughout the rerit pay debate, it is :important to recognize 
that no single concept will be a panacea to reredy the problems in 
public education. Merit pay offers only one alternative in striving 
for excellence in education. In deciding whether rerit pay will be 
beneficial for future consideration, everyone involved nrust weigh 
the projected benefits against the potential detriments of such plans. 
Considering the vagueness of the available knowledge in the 
literature, an attitudinal study of administrators in the state of 
Florida may help to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the issues of 
merit pay. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This chapter includes the methods and procedures of the study 
that was conducted to determine the attitudes of principals and 
superintendents of the state of Florida toward merit pay. The data 
in this study was collected by a survey instrument. 
Subjects 
The population for this study consisted of 1,990 administrators 
in the state of Florida. Included in the sample were all 67 district 
superintendents and 1,923 selected principals. These superintendents 
and principals were selected from The Florida Education Directory 
1983-84. 
Instrument 
The evaluation instrument used for the collection of data was a 
questionnaire that was developed and validated by Rorreto in 1961. 
For this study, the instrument was comprised of 34 statements and 4 
questions related to rrerit pay. The instrument consisted of a too-
part questionnaire with accompanying cover letter for clarification. 
Page one of the instrument included a letter to the educator explain-
ing the reasons for the questionnaire and instructions for completing 
and returning the instrument. 
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Part One of the survey form consisted of derrographic data which 
might influence the nature of the reactions. Part 'I\ro included 34 
opinion statements and 4 questions designed to determine the reactions 
and attitudes of the respondents toward the various aspects of merit 
pay. 
Before each statement a three-point scale was provided with the 
following responses: agree, disagree, undecided. The respondent was 
asked to circle the response. 
Numerical weightings were assigned to the options on a 1-2-3 
basis in the direction of the rrost positive attitude toward merit pay. 
A score of three for an item meant agreement with positive items or 
disagreement with negative items. A score of one meant disagreement 
with positive items or agreement with negative items. A score of too 
indicated undecided on the items. Total score was the surrmation of 
nUirerical weights assigned to the responses which an individual 
circled, after taking into consideration the negatively stated items. 
Design 
The study was conducted during the fall of the 1983-84 school 
year. The questionnaire was mailed with stamped return envelopes. 
Data Analysis 
Responses to the questionnaire were recorded by the researcher. 
The responses for each of the 34 statements were tabulated and 
analyzed by eight denographic variables. The data was analyzed using 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Nie, Hull, 
Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Bent, 1975). 
Categories used in classifying respondents by derrographic data 
were: sex, marital status, age, present position, school classifi-
cation, years of experience as an educator, years of experience as a 
principal, and years of experience as a superintendent. In apprais-
ing attitudes of principals and superintendents in terms of various 
background factors, three procedures were used. These were: (1) 
percentage distribution of responses to each of the 34 statements, 
broken down in accordance with subgroups within each background 
factor; (2) application of the chi-square test of independence to 
opinion responses on each item for all background factors; and (3) 
application of Cochran's Q test for related observations to opinion 
responses on Item 35 for all background factors (Daniel, 1978). 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Analysis of Returns 
The evaluative instrurrent was mailed to a total of 1,990 
educators in the state of Florida. Included in the sample were all 
67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected principals. These 
superintendents and principals were selected from The Florida 
Education Directory 1983-84. 
Table 1 shows the number of questionnaires mailed and the 
number and percentage of returns. 
TABLE 1 
RESPONSES W QUESTIONNAIRE 
Number Number Percentage 
Mailed Returned 
Superintendents 67 47 70.15 
Principals 1,923 1,342 69.79 
Totals 1,990 1,389 69.80 
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As shown in Table 2, there were 1,309 usable returns. The usable 



















There were a total of 80 returns which had to be discarded for 
the following reasons: 
1. Seventeen instruments did not contain complete derrographic 
data. 
2. Fifty-four instruments did not contain complete responses 
to all 34 statements. 
3. Nine instruments were returned with a notation of a refusal 
to respond to the issue of merit pay. 
As indicated in Table 3, the study includ~d 67 school districts 




SCHOOL DISTRICTS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY 
School District Number Percentage 
Alachua 25 1.9 
Baker 5 .4 
Bay 20 1.5 
Bradford 6 .5 
Brevard 45 3.4 
Broward 92 7.0 
Calhoun 5 .4 
Charlotte 3 .2 
Citrus 11 .8 
Clay 14 1.1 
Collier 16 1.2 
Columbia 6 .5 
Dade 149 11.4 
Desoto 5 .4 
Dixie 2 .2 
Duval 82 6.3 
Escambia 38 2.9 
Flagler 4 .3 
Franklin 2 .2 
Gadsden 13 1.0 
Gilchrist 3 .2 
Glades 2 .2 
Gulf 4 .3 
Hamilton , 5 .4 
Hardee 4 .3 
Hendry 6 .5 
Hernando 7 .5 
Highlands 10 .8 
Hillsborough 49 3.7 
Holmes 5 .4 
Indian River 13 1.0 
Jackson 10 .8 
Jefferson 3 .2 
Lafayette 2 .2 
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TABIB 3 Continued 
School District Number Percentage 
Lake 26 2.0 
lee 31 2.4 
Leon 21 1.6 
levy 8 .6 
Liberty 3 .2 
Madison 3 .2 
Manatee 25 1.9 
Marion 22 1. 7 
Martin 9 .7 
Monroe 12 .9 
Nassau 8 .6 
Okaloosa 22 1. 7 
Okeechobee 5 .4 
Orange 71 5.4 
Osceola 11 .8 
Palm Bay 57 4.4 
Pasco 25 1.9 
Pinellas 61 4.7 
Polk 55 4.2 
Putnam 14 1.1 
St. Johns 11 .8 
St. Lucie 10 .8 
Santa Rosa 18 1.4 
Sarasota 15 1.1 
Seminole 35 2.7 
Sumter 9 .7 
Suwannee 3 .2 
Taylor 4 .3 
Union 2 .2 
Volusia 34 2.6 
Wakulla 5 .4 
Walton 5 .4 
Washington 3 .2 
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Analysis of Derrographic Data 
Table '4 presents the frequency of returns by derrographic 
categories. In this study 74.1% of the respondents were .rren and 
88.2% of the respondents were married. Of the principals responding, 
ele.rrentary school principals accounted for 66.8% of the returns. The 
majority of the respondents were between the ages of 46 and 55 and 
42. 8% had 25 years or rrore experience as an educator. According to 
the number of years of experience as a principal, 68.7% of the 
respondents had between 5 and 19 years of experience. Forty-five 
(3.4%) of the respondents reported having 1 to 9 years of experience 
as a superintendent. 
TABLE 4 
EXTENT OF RETURNS BY DEMXR.APHIC DATA 
Category Number Percentage 
SEX 
Male 970 74.1 
Female 339 25.9 
MARITAL STATUS 
Married 1,154 88.2 
Single 93 7.1 
Other 62 4.7 
AGE 
26 to 35 68 5.2 
36 to 45 440 33.6 
46 to 55 533 40.7 
56 or over 268 20.5 
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TABLE 4 Continued 
Category Number Percentage 
PRESENT POSITION 
Superintendent 47 3.6 
Principal 1,262 96.4 
SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION 
Elementary 843 66.8 
Middle 136 10.8 
Junior High 98 7.8 
High School 185 14.6 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS EDUCATOR 
1 to 4 4 .3 
5 to 9 20 1.5 
10 to 14 130 9.9 
15 to 19 292 '22.3 
20 to 24 303 23.1 
25 or over 560 42.8 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS PRINCIPAL 
None 28 2.1 
1 to 4 317 24.2 
5 to 9 305 23.3 
10 to 14 277 21.2 
15 to 19 208 15.9 
20 to 24 103 7.9 
25 or over 71 5.4 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS SUPERINTENDENT 
None 1,246 95.2 
1 to 4 30 2.3 
5 to 9 15 1.1 
10 to 14 6 .5 
15 to 19 6 .5 
20 to 24 2 .2 
25 or over 4 .3 
Analysis of Responses 
Background factors were used to classify respondents into the 
following categories: sex, marital status, age, present position, 
school classification, years of experience as educator, years of 
experience as principal, and years of experience as superintendent. 
Three statistical procedures were used to analyze the eight back-
ground factors in relation to the attitudes of principals and 
superintendents in Florida toward merit pay. These procedures 
include: (1) percentage distribution of responses to each of the 
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34 staterrents, broken down in accordance with subgroups within each 
background factor; (2) application of the chi-square test of inde-
pendence to opinion responses on each item for all background factors; 
and (3) application of Cochran's Q test for related observations to 
opinion responses on Item 35 for all background factors. 
In this study of attitudes, the .05 level of significance was 
used when a result was significant. At this level we can say that 
95 times out of 100, the results are not due to chance but associated 
in some way with background factors. When the results are reported 
at a lower level of significance (e.g., .01), it means that the 
results are less likely to be due to chance. 
Responses Classified According to Sex 
The initial background factor analyzed was that of sex. Table 5 
contains the results of 970 male respondents ~d 339 female respond-
ents. In the responses of agreement, there were 18 out of the 34 
statements where male and female respondents vary less than 2%. The 
snallest variance in responses of agreement, .3%, was found in Item 
22, which states that cooperation annng teachers \\Duld be reduced by 
a merit pay program. 
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In only 2 of the 34 statements, Items 15 and 18, was there a 
difference in responses of agreement of rrore than 5%. Table 5 shows 
that four chi-squares were produced by grouping respondents according 
to the sex classification. Item 15, which states that a teacher 
should be eligible for a rrerit increment as soon as outstanding 
teaching has been derronstrated, had the largest percentage of differ-
ence in responses of agreement. The percentage difference of 7.8% 
is significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
Although the majority of respondents was not in agreerrent with 
Item 2, which states that the teaching profession is losing good 
teachers because of the lack of a merit system, the female respond-
ents had the largest percentage of agreement, 23.0%. 
In response to Item 13, the majority of respondents was in 
disagreement that merit increments should be pennanent rather than 
on an annual basis. Only 8.0% of the female respondents expressed 
agreement and 9.7% of the male respondents agreed with this statement 
for a slight difference of 1.7%. 
Over 59% of all the respondents disagreed with Item 19, which 
states that a rreri t pay program \\DUld tend to assure the taxpayers 
better education for their children. Proponents of merit pay argue 
that the quality of education \\Duld be improved by its use, however, 
TABLE 5 
RESPO~SES TO IIDlS AcxmDI NG TO SEX 
c;n_1p I: PRD!ISES REI.ATIVE TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item 
1. A fair way to ~-a.rd outstanding teaching 




2. !be teaching profession is losing good 















5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 














8, Merit pay v.ould only be necessary in 




9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 




10. Merit pay is a disguised atteupt at 
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TABLE 5 Continued 
GROL'P 11: POLICIES CDNCER.'\JNG MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item 
11. Administrators in the state of Florida 
are adequately qualified by professional 
traininb and experience to adrranister 




12. There should be a limit to the number 
of teachers receiving rrerit increments 




13. Merit incrarents should be penna.nent 









15. A teacher should be eligible for a rrerit 
increment as soon as outstanding teach-




16. Only school administrators should rate 




17. A merit system should be organized so as 
to penni t an appeal by teachers ~no are 




18. Teachers should have the opportunity to 
assist in planning and aaninistering 
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TABLE 5 Continued 
(a)lJP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item 
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay 
v.ould encourage youn6 people to enter 




28. Merit pay v.ould initiate a breach 
between administrator and teacher 




29. Teachers not receiving merit increments 




30. A rerit pay program would cause an 
undesirable strain on teachers 









32. Teachers denied mer i t increrrents v.ould 




33. Merit pay v.ould stirrlllate individual 




34. Teachers not receiving merit increments 




• Significant at .05 level 
Pe r cent.age 
Mal e Femal e 
27 . 5 28. 0 
47 .2 49 .9 
25 .3 22 .1 
40.2 38 .9 
36. 9 36 . 9 
22 .9 24. 2 
17 .9 21. 8 
50 . 0 48.4 
32.1 29.8 
33.1 33.9 
49 .6 49.9 
17 .3 16 . 2 
24 .5 23. 3 
55 .4 56. 6 
20 .1 20 .1 
47. 0 46 . 3 
24 .3 28 . 6 
28 . 7 25 .1 
4L7 42 . 8 
31.4 3-,1. 8 
23 .8 22 .4 
36.4 33. 0 
32 .9 35 .4 









0 . 52 
0 .51 
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the responses of males and females agreed with this statement only 
20.1% and 24.8% respectively. 
Responses Classified According to Marital Status 
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Marital status was studied as a possible factor in determining 
attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were classified into three 
groups: married, single, and other (separated, widowed, or divorced). 
Table 6 reports the marital status of the respondents in percentages. 
In the responses of agreement, there were 5 out of the 34 statements 
where all three groups vary less than 2%. The snallest variance in 
responses of agreement, .5%, was found in Item 20 and Item 31. Item 
20 states that teachers who receive merit increments would be sub-
jected to resentment by professional associates. Item 31 states that 
merit pay VJOuld help professionalize teachers. 
An examination of Table 6 discloses that, in the responses of 
agreement, there were 16 out of 34 statements that vary less than 5% 
and 18 statements that vary rrore than 5%. The table also shows only 
tVJO statistically significant differences occurring in this category. 
Although the majority of total responses for Item 3 disagree that 
merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable, respondents who are single 
had the largest percentage of agreement, 44.1%, for that item. 
Item 23, which states that merit pay oould encourage guod teachers 
to stay in the profession, had the largest percentage of difference 
in responses of agreement, 23.1%. 
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TABU: 6 
RESPONSES TO IIDIS ACffiRDING TO MARITAL STATIJS 
CiOJPI: PRD!ISF.S RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage: p 
Married Si ngl e Other \"al ue 
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the granting of merit inc.rerents. 
Agree 44 .3 41.9 43. 5 0 . 93 
Disagree 36 . 5 40 .9 38. 7 
Undecided 19 . 2 17 .2 17. 7 
2 . The teaching profession is losing good 
teachers because of the lack of a merit 
system. 
Agree 21.3 23.7 25. 8 0.83 
Disagree 67 .1 65 .6 66.1 
Undecided 11. 6 10.8 8.1 
3. Merit pay for salary p\J.?1)0ses is 
inevitable. 
Agree 37 .4 44 . 1 43 .5 0 . 01,.. 
Disagree 43.1 35.5 24 .2 
Undecided 19.5 20 .4 32 .3 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit 
pay . 
Agree 9.8 15.1 12.9 0.29 
Disagree 82.8 81. 7 80 . 6 
Undecided 7 .4 3.2 6.5 
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes clown. 
Agree 10 .6 11.8 9. 7 0.17 
Disagree 65 . 6 55 .9 7-L 2 
Undecided 23.8 32.3 16 .1 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
incail)at ible. 
Agree 28. 0 29 . 0 35 . 5 0. 78 
Di sagree 55. 9 54. 8 51. 6 
Undecided 16 .1 16 .1 12 . f\ 
7. With adequate salaries, reri t pay v.ould 
be Wl!'lecessary . 
Agree 59. 5 73.1 58.1 0 .08 
Disagree 30 .3 21. 5 35. 5 
Undecided 10.1 5.4 6.5 
8. Merit pay v.ould only be necessary in 
ti.Ires of teacher soortages. 
0 .13 Agree 4.5 5.4 
Disagree 85.4 80 .6 95 .2 
Undecided 10.1 H. O ·L B 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonmnce are justifiable. 
0.88 Agree 81. 2 77 .4 79 . 0 
Di~ 10.9 14.0 11.3 
Undecided 7 .9 8 .6 9 . 7 
10. Merit pay is a disguised attenpt at 
disc.riminat ion through rerit increments. 
Agree 13.2 15.1 12. 9 0.85 
Disagree 71.0 65 .6 72. 6 
Undecided 15.9 19 .4 14.5 
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TABLE 6 Continued 
GFO.lP II: POUCIES CDNCERNING MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage, p 
Married Single Othe r Value 
11. Aaninistrators in the state of Florida 
are adequately qualified by professional 
training and experience to administer 
a rer it pay program. 
Agree 29.3 26.9 19.4 0.24 
Disagree 48.5 55.9 59. 7 
Undecided 22.2 17.2 21.0 
12. n>ere should be a limit to the nunber 
of teachers receiving merit increments 
in a school system in any one year. 
Agree 13.0 8.6 12.9 0.39 
Disagree 77.6 78.5 72.6 
Undecided 9.4 12.9 14.5 
13. Merit increrrents should be permanent 
rather than on an annual basis. 
Agree 9.0 10.8 11.3 0.91 
Disagree 80.6 76.5 80.6 
Undecided 10.4 10.8 8.1 
14. Merit pay soould be subsidized by the 
state. 
Agree 81.0 76.3 85.5 0.65 
Disagree 8.9 9.7 6.5 
Undecided 10.1 H.0 8.1 
15. A teacher should be eligible for a nerit 
increment as sr::x:m as outstanding teach-
ing has been dem:mstrated. 
Agree 63.3 55.9 56.5 0.17 
Disagree 22.4 28.0 33.9 
Undecided 14.3 16.1 9. 7 
16. Only scoool administrators should rate 
teachers for rerit increments. 
Agree 18.3 22.6 19.4 0.60 
Disagree 68.3 61.3 71. 0 
Undecided 13.4 16.1 19.4 
17. A merit system soou.ld be organized so as 
to penni t an appeal by teachers who are 
denied a merit increrrent. 
Agree 53.6 51.6 59. i o. 74 
Disagree 32.4 31.2 25.8 
Undecided 14.0 17 .2 H.5 
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to 
assist in planning and aan:inistering 
rerit pay in their respective systems. 
0.42 Agree 76.4 75.3 83.9 
Disagree 14.1 17 .2 12.9 
Undecided 9.4 7 .5 3.2 
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TABLE G Continued 
CiOJP Ill: :ro&SlBU: EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentat:e p 
Married Singl e Other Value: 
19. A merit pay program 110uld tend to assure 
the taxpayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 20.9 25.8 22.6 0.28 
Di~ 59.0 61.3 64.5 
Undecided 20.1 12.9 12.9 
20. Teachers who receive merit inc:rerrents 
would be subjected to resentment by 
professional ass:>ciates. 
Agree 63.3 63.4 62.9 0.47 
Disagree 18.5 17 .2 25.8 
Undecided 18.3 19.4 11.3 
21. Merit pay would encourage professional 
groll,'th . 
Agree 46.5 45.2 50.0 0.31 
Disagree 31.1 39.8 27.4 
Undecided 22.4 15.1 22.6 
22. Cboperation am::mg teachers would be 
reduced by a l!Erit pay program. 
Agree 49.0 55.9 45.2 0.40 
Disagree 27.4 25.8 35.5 
Undecided 23.6 18.3 19.4 
23. Merit pay '11,Quld encourage good teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 47 .9 39.8 62.9 0.02 * 
Disagree 30.6 41.9 2·L2 
Undecided 21.5 18.3 12.9 
24. ''Politics" would influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 63.0 62.4 62.9 0. ii' 
Disagree 13.8 18.3 H.5 
Undecided 23.2 19.4 22.G 
25. The use of l!Eri t pay "'°uld ilJt)rove 
the quality of instruction. 
O.BG Agree 25.8 24. 7 2-L2 
Disagree 45.2 50.5 48. 4 
Undecided 28.9 24. 7 2, .4 
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to 
CCIJl)rcmise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
36.0 36.G 32.3 0.69 Agree 
Disagree 40.3 34.4 
43.5 
Undecided 23. 7 29.0 
24.2 
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T,IBLE 6 Continued 
CRXJP III: POSSIBU: EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
Married Single Other Value 
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay 
110uld encouraf:1? young people to enter 
the teaching profession. 
Agree 27.4 23. 7 38. 7 0.07 
Disagree 47 .4 52. 7 50.0 
Undecided 25.2 23. 7 11.3 
28. Merit pay 110uld initiate a breach 
between administrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
Agree 39.2 43.0 48.4 0.18 
Disagrcc.' 36. 7 41.9 33.9 
Undecided 24.2 15.1 17. 7 
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments 
v.ould increase their efforts. 
Agree 18.5 21.5 2-L2 0.58 
Disagree 49.4 51.6 50.0 
Undecided 32.1 26.9 25.8 
30. A merit pay program would cause an 
W1desirable strain on teachers 
when evaluators visit the classrocm. 
Agree 33.3 36.6 29.0 0.83 
Disagree 49.9 46.2 50.0 
Undecided 16.8 17 .2 21.0 
31. Merit pay v.ould help professionalize 
teachers. 
Agree 24.2 24. 7 2-L:? o. 9-i 
Disagree 55.6 58.1 53.2 
Undecided 20.2 17 .2 22.6 
32. Teachers denied merit increrrents v.ould 
becare professionally denoralized. 
Agree 46.4 53.8 43.5 0.18 
Disagree 24.9 28.0 32.3 
Undecided 28. 7 18.3 24.2 
33. Merit pay v.ould stim..llate individual 
self-evaluation &1TOng educators. 
Agree 44.4 38. 7 
50.0 0.00 
Disagree 31.6 45.2 
25.8 
Undecided 24.0 16.1 
2-L:? 
34. Teachers not receiving merit increments 
-.ould limit their efforts. 
Agree 35.2 34.4 43.5 
0.60 
Disagree 33.4 37 .6 
30.6 
Undecided 31.5 28.0 
25.8 
.. Significant at .01 level 
• Significant at .05 level 
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Responses Classified According to Age 
In the determination of attitudes toward merit pay, age was 
considered as a viable factor. Respondents were classified into five 
groups ranging from the under 26 years of age group to the 56 or over 
age group. 
An examination of the responses of agreement in Table 7 shows 
that the replies of all five age groups vary less than 5% in Items 
6, 7, 8, 12, 16, 21, 24, 27, 31, and 33. Item 27, which states that 
salary increases based upon merit pay \\Ould encourage young people to 
enter the teaching profession, was found to have the Ernallest vari-
ance, 2.1%, even though the majority of respondents disagreed with 
this statement. 
For Item 17, which states that a merit system should be organized 
so as to permit an appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increrrent, 
the older respondents were in rrore agreement than the younger respond-
ents. The responses of agreement ranged from 58.6% for the 56 or over 
age group to 36.8% for the 26 to 35 age group. This item was found 
to have the largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 
21.8%. Table 7 shows that a significant percentage difference exists 
between these t\ID age groups. 
In response to Item 1, the respondents 45 years of age or under 
tended to agree that a fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by 
the granting of merit increments, while those 46 years of age and over 
agreed to a lesser extent. 
For Item 20, the majority of respondents agreed that teachers 
who receive merit increments \IDUld be subjected to resentment by 
professional associates, with the highest percentage of agreement, 
70.5%, in the 56 years or over group. 
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Although the majority of respondents agreed that cooperation 
anong teachers \IDuld be reduced by a merit pay program, the percent-
age of difference in responses of agreement was 17.0% for Item 22. 
The 35 years of age and under group were the least favorable toward 
this staterrent with 38.2% expressing agreement, while the rrost agree-
ment was given by the 56 years or over group where 55.2% expressed 
this opinion. 
The majority of the respondents disagreed that the use of merit 
pay \IDuld improve the quality of instruction. The snallest percent-
age in responses of agreement, 17.6%, was found in the 26 to 35 years 
of age group with the largest percentage of agreerrent, 27.6%, in the 
46 to 55 group. 
For Item 26, which states merit pay \IDuld cause teachers to 
compromise their individuality in order to please the evaluator, the 
difference of opinion azrong the various age groups was diverse. 
Forty-three % of the 26 to 45 age group disagreed, 41.8% of the 56 
years or over group agreed, while the 46 to 55 group agreed 38.5% 
and disagreed 39.6% with a percentage difference of only 1.1%. 
In Item 28, 43.5% of the 46 years of age and older group agreed 
that merit pay v.ould initiate a breach between administrator and 
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TABLE 7 
REsro:'\SES TO IID,IS ACCXllDING TO AGE 
GRO.JP I: PRDIISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
26-35 36-45 46- 55 56 or over \'a l ue 
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the grant i nh of ITl..'rH incran.:nt s . 
Agree 48 . 5 47 . 5 41. 8 41. 8 0 . 01 •• 
Disagree 32.4 30 . 0 39 . G 44 .0 
Undecided 19.1 22.5 18 . G 14 .2 
2. The teaching profession is losing good 
teachers because of the lack of a merit 
system. 
Agree 27.9 23.4 19 . 9 20 .9 0 .34 
Disagree 61.8 65.2 67. 2 70 . 5 
Undecided 10 .3 11.4 12.9 8.6 
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is 
inevitable. 
Agree 44.1 39.3 36.4 38.4 0. 57 
Disagree 33.8 39.1 44.3 42 . 5 
Undecided 22 .1 21. 6 19.3 19. 0 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit 
pay. 
Agree 13.2 10. 5 9.2 11 .6 
Disagree 82 .4 81.4 83.9 82 . 5 
Undecided 4.4 8.2 6.9 G. 0 
5 . Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes down. 
Agree 4.4 9.3 10.9 13 .8 0. 17 
Disagree 67. 6 64.1 67.2 63.1 
Undecided 27 .9 26. 6 22 .0 23.1 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
incaTpat ible. 
Agree 30. 9 28.9 28 . 1 27. G 0 . 58 
Disagree 48.5 56.4 57 . 0 53.4 
Undecided 20 . 6 14.8 14 . 8 19.0 
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay v.ould 
be unnecessary. 
Agree 63. 2 58.4 61.4 61. :? 0. 90 
Di sagree 25 . 0 32. 0 29 .3 29 .1 
Undecided 11.8 9.5 9.4 9 . 7 
8. Merit pay v,ould only be necessary in 
times of teacher shortages. 
Agree 2 . 9 6.4 3. 6 3. 0 
Disagree Ti.9 85.9 86 . 5 6-L7 
Undecided 19.1 7. 7 9. 9 12 .3 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonna.nce are justifiable. 
78 . 4 0.21 Agree 89. 7 81.1 80 .7 
Disagree 7 .4 9. 8 11.1 14. G 
Undecided 2.9 9.1 8.3 7 .1 
10. Merit pay is a disguised atterrpt at 
dis::.r imina t ion through merit increrents, 
18.3 0. 06 
Agree 10,3 10.7 13.3 
Disagree 6 7.G 74 . 8 70 . 2 6 5. 7 
Undecided 22.1 14. 5 16.5 
l G, 0 
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TABLE 7 Cont i nued 
GRa.JP II: POLICIES CDNCER.l\ING MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage- p 
26-35 3~45 46- 55 56 or over \ 'a l ue 
11. Actninistrators in the state of Florida 
are adequately qualified by professional 
training and experience to administer 
a merit pay program. 
Agree 23.5 29.5 29. 1 27 .6 0 .18 
Disagree 60.3 46 . 6 51. 8 47.4 
Undecided 16 .2 23. 9 19.1 25 . 0 
12. There should be a limit to the m.11i>er 
of teachers receiving rrerit increnents 
in a school system in any one year. 
Agree 10.3 12. 0 14.3 11. 2 0.31 
Disagree 73.5 78.2 77. 5 77 . 2 
Undecided 16.2 9.8 8.3 11. 6 
13. Merit increnents should be pernanent 
rather than on an annual basis. 
Agree 8.8 6. 6 9. 0 H. 2 0. 05 
Disagree 79.4 83 . 9 80.3 75.4 
Undecided 11.8 9.5 10. 7 10.4 
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the 
state. 
Agree 79.4 82.3 81.8 77 .2 0 .20 
Disagree 7. 4 6. 6 9 .4 11 .9 
Undecide d 13 . 2 11.1 8.8 10 .s 
15. A teacher should be eligible for a rrerit 
increnent as soon as outstanding teach-
ing has been dem:mstrated. 
Agree 57 .4 62. 7 63. 8 60. 4 0 . 00 
Disagree 27.9 20 . 0 22. 9 28 . , 
Undecided 14. 7 17 .3 13.3 10.8 
16. Only school administrators should rate 
teachers for merit increnents. 
Agree 22 .1 17.5 19.3 18 . 3 0 . 78 
Disagree 69.1 69 . 8 66 . 0 68 . 3 
Undecided 8.8 12 . 7 H.6 13.4 
17. A uerit system should be organized &> as 
to penni t an appeal by teachers who are 
denied a merit increnent. 
Agree 36.8 55.9 51.8 58. G 0.01 •• 
Disagree 42.6 30 . 2 35. 5 25.4 
Undecided 20.6 13.9 12 .8 16.0 
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to 
assist in planning and aaninistering 
uerit pay in their respective systems. 
0 .15 Agree 64. 7 80.0 75 .8 76.1 
Disagree 19.1 12.0 15. 2 14.9 
Undecided 16.2 8. 0 9.0 9.0 
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TABU: 7 Continued 
GOJP III: rossrnu: EFFOCI'S OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
26-35 36-45 46-55 56 or over \"a]ut 
19. A merit pay program v.ould tend to assure 
the taxpayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 14. 7 20.9 22.0 22.4 0.16 
Disagree 67.6 55.9 61.4 59.3 
Undecided 17.6 23.2 16. 7 18.3 
20. Teachers who receive merit increments 
v.ould be subjected to resentment by 
professional asrociates. 
Agree 60.3 59.3 63.2 70.5 0 , 02 * 
Disagree 17 .6 20.5 17.4 18. 7 
Undecided 22.1 20.2 19.3 10.8 
21. Merit pay would encourage professional 
growth. 
Agree 47.1 48.9 44.8 46.3 0.25 
Disagree 29.4 27.0 34.0 34. 7 
Undecided 23.5 24.1 21.2 19.0 
22. C.ooperation am:mg teachers would be 
reduced by a merit pay program. 
Agree 38.2 44.3 52.0 55.2 0.01 ... 
Disagree 27.9 30.0 28.3 22.4 
Undecided 33.8 25.7 19. 7 22.4 
23. Merit pay \\Ould encourage good teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 44 .1 50. 7 47.5 45.9 0.6-i 
Disagree 30.9 28.0 32.3 34.0 
Undecided 25.0 21.4 20.3 20.1 
24. ''Politics" would influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 66.2 61.6 62. 7 6-i. 9 0. 71 
Disagree 8.8 14.8 13. i 15.3 
Undecided 25.0 23.6 23.6 19.8 
25. The use of rerit pay \\Ould ioJ,rove 
the quality of instruction. 
Agree 17 .6 25.5 27.6 24.3 
0.01 •• 
Disagree 47.1 40.7 47.5 50.4 
Undecided 35.3 33.9 25.0 25.4 
26. Merit pay would cause teachers to 
caipranise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
Agree 32.4 29.8 38.5 41.8 
0.02 • 
Disagree 42.6 43.4 39.6 34.i 
Undecided 25.0 26.8 22.0 23.5 
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TABU: 7 Continued 
(RX.JP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
26-35 36-45 46-55 56 or ove r \"alue: 
27. Sul ary 1 ncrL!=:; b~u upon m.:r 1 t pay 
111101Jld encourage young people to enter 
the teaching profession. 
Agree 26.5 28.2 28.1 26.1 0.19 
Disagree 39. 7 44.8 49.9 51.1 
Undecided 33.8 27 .0 22.0 22.8 
28. Merit pay ~uld initiate a breach 
bet~n administrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
Agree 30.9 35.2 42.6 44.4 0.02 • 
Disagree 38.2 37 .3 37 .o 35.8 
Undecided 30.9 27 .5 20.5 19.8 
29. Teachers not receiving merit increments 
would increase their efforts. 
Agree 14. 7 20. 7 18.2 18.'i 0.28 
Disagree 42.6 46.6 51.8 51.9 
Undecided 42.6 32. 7 30.0 29.5 
30. A merit pay program ~uld ca.use an 
undesirable strain on teachers 
when evaluators visit the classrocm. 
Agree 30.9 30.9 33.0 38.4 0.16 
Disagree 45.6 53.4 50.3 43.3 
Undecided 23.5 15. 7 16. 7 18.3 
31. Merit pay ~uld help professionalize 
teachers. 
Agree 20.6 25. 7 23.1 25.0 0 . 72 
Disagree 54.4 53.4 56.8 57 .5 
Undecided 25.0 20.9 20.1 17.5 
32. Teachers denied merit increrents 'I\Uuld 
becane professionally derroralized. 
Agree 33.8 44.8 47. 7 51.9 0.00 
Disagree 25.0 25.0 26.3 2-L 6 
Undecided 41.2 30.2 26.1 23.5 
33. Merit pay would stim.llate individual 
self-evaluation aaong educators. 0.3'.; 
Agree 42.6 45.9 4-Ll -12.2 
Disagree 30.9 28.4 35.1 33. G 
Undecided 26.5 25.7 20.8 2-1.3 
34. Teachers not receiving merit increnent s 
would limit their efforts. 
Agree 27.9 32. 7 36.8 39.G 
0.23 
Disagree 30.9 34.1 3·Ll 32.1 
Undecided 41.2 33.2 29.1 
28.-1 
•• Significant at .01 level . Significant at .05 level 
ti Expected frequencies too smll for valid chi-~uare test 
teacher in professional relationships, while 37.7% of the 45 years 
of age and under group disagreed with the statement. 
Responses Classified According to Present Position 
Administrative position was studied as a possible factor in the 
detennination of attitudes toward merit pay. In this study, the 
classification according to position included that of superintendent 
and principal. 
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Table 8 reveals that in the responses of agreement, 21 of the 34 
statements had a variance of less than 5%. Items 10, 11, 20, 28, and 
33 varied less than 2%. 
In response to Item 5, only 10.6% of both superintendents and 
principals agreed that merit pay is really an effort on the part of 
the state officials to keep taxes down, while the majority, 70.7%, 
disagreed with this belief. 
Table 8 shows that Item 32 also had no degree in variance of 
agreement. Both superintendents and principals agreed 46.8% that 
teachers denied merit increments \rould become professionally derror-
alized. However, the variance of difference in responses of disagree-
ment was 15.5%, with 40.4% of the superintendents and 24.9% of the 
principals disagreeing. 
The largest percentage of difference in responses of agreement, 
17.7%, was found in Item 18, which states that teachers should have 
the opportunity to assist in planning and administering merit pay in 
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TABLE 8 
RESPC>.'\SES TO IIDI.S ACXXJIDI'.\G TO PRESD'T PJSITIO:-; 
GI0..1> I: PRlllISES REI.ATIVE TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
Superint endent Principal \'alu1;: 
1. A fair -.ay to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the grantini; of merit inc.rerents. 
Agree 46.8 44. 0 0 . 90 
Disagree 34. 0 37. 0 
Undecided 19.1 19. 0 
2. The teaching profession is losing good 
teachers because of the lack of a merit 
system. 
Agree 14.9 21.9 0 . 29 
Disagree 68.1 66.9 
Undecided 17.0 11.2 
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is 
inevitabl e. 
Agree 42.6 38. 0 0. 78 
Disagree 40 .4 41. 'j 
Undecided 17 .0 20 .3 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear irerit 
pay . 
Agree 6.4 10. 5 
Disagree 91.5 82.3 
Undecided 2.1 7.2 
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes down. 
Agree 10. 6 10 .6 
Disagree 76. 6 ~. 9 
Undecided 12.8 24. 5 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
ina::rrpatible. 
Agree 23.4 28. 6 0 .52 
Disagree 55.3 55 .6 
Undecided 21.3 15 . 8 
7, With adequate salaries, nerit pay w:iuld 
be unnecessary. 
Agree 57 .4 60.5 
Disagree 31. 9 29.9 
Undecided 10 .6 9. 6 
8. Merit pay v.ould only be necessary in 
ti.m:!s of teacher shortages, 
Agree 2. 1 4.4 
Disagree 89 .4 85 . 3 
Undecided 8.5 10 . 2 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonm.nce are justifiabl e. 
80 . 5 Agree 89 .4 
DiSagI"ee 6.4 11, 3 
Undecided 4.3 8 . 2 
10. Merit pay is a disguised attenpt at 
discrimination through rrerit incrarents. 
0.56 Agree 12.8 13.3 
Disagree 76 . 6 70 .4 
Undecided 10 .6 16 . 2 
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TABLE 8 Continued 
GRCXJP II: POLICIES a::>NCER.~ING MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
Superintendent Princ ipal Value 
11. Administrators in the state of Florida 
a.re adequately qualified by professional 
training and experience to a.cir~nister 
a srerit pay program. 
Agree 27. 7 28. 7 0.38 
Disagree 42.6 49.8 
Undecided 29.8 21.5 
12. niere should be a limit to the nunber 
of teachers receiving rrerit incrsnents 
in a school system in any one year. 
Agree 17.0 12 .5 
Disagree 63.8 78.0 
Undecided 19. 1 9.5 
13. Merit increrrents should be pe:rrranent 
rather than on an annual basis. 
Agree 6.4 9.4 :: 
Disagree 89.4 80 .1 
Undecided 4.3 10.5 
14. Merit pay soould be subsidized by the 
state. 
Agree 83.0 80.8 
Disagree 12.8 8. 7 
Undecided 4.3 10.5 
15. A teacher sh:>uld be eligible for a rrerit 
increrrent as soon as outstanding teach-
ing has been denonstrated. 
Agree 70.2 62.1 0.52 
Disagree 19.1 23.5 
Undecided 10.6 1-L3 
16. Only school administrators soould rate 
teachers for srerit increments. 
Agree 21.3 18.5 0.63 
Disagree 61. 7 GS.1 
Undecided 17.0 13.3 
17. A srerit system soould be organized &i as 
to penni t an appeal by teachers who are 
denied a merit increment. 
Agree 59.G 53.6 0.42 
Disagree 23.-1 32 .3 
Undecided 17 .0 H.l 
18. Teachers soould have the opportunity to 
assist in planning and aaninistering 
uerit pay in their respective systems. 
Agree 59.G 77.3 
Disagree 25.5 13.8 
Undecided 14.9 8.8 
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TABLE 8 Continued 
CiOJP III: rossrnu: EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
Superintendent Principa l Va l ue 
19. A mer i t pay proE;Tarn would tend to assure 
the taxpayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 23 . 4 21.2 0.93 
Disagree 57.4 59. 5 
Undecided 19.1 19.3 
20. Teachers wtx:> receive merit increments 
would be subjected to resentment by 
professional associates. 
Agree 61.7 63 . 3 0. 65 
Disagree 23.4 18 . 5 
Undecided 14 . 9 18. 1 
21. Merit pay would encourage professional 
growth. 
Agree 51.1 46.4 0,27 
Disagree 21.3 31.9 
Undecided 27. 7 21. 6 
22. 0:x>peration anong teachers would be 
reduced by a merit pay program. 
Agree 38.3 49 .8 0.12 
Disagree 40 .4 27. 2 
Undecided 21.3 23.1 
23. Merit pay would encourage good teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 38.3 48.4 0 .24 
Disagree 31.9 31.1 
Undecided 29.8 20 .5 
24 . ''Politics" would influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 57.4 63. 2 0.17 
Disagree 23.4 13. 8 
Undecided 19 . 1 23.1 
25. 1be use of merit pay would :iIJt>rove 
the quality of instruction . 
Agree 34.0 25.4 O.H 
Disagree 31.9 46. 3 
Undecided 34.0 28.4 
26. Merit pay ,;iould cause teachers to 
CCXJpranise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
0.46 Agree 27. 7 36.2 
Disagree 46 .8 39.8 
Undecided 25.5 24 .0 
TABLE 8 Cont. inued 
CRXJP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percent.age 
Superintendent Principal 
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay 
would encourage young people to enter 




28. Merit pay would initiate a breach 
between aaninistrator and teacher 




29. Teachers not receiving merit incranents 




30. A merit pay program would cause an 
undesirable strain on teachers 









32. Teachers denied merit increrrents would 




33. Merit pay would stim.J.late individual 




34. Teachers not receiving merit increrrents 




























** Significant at .01 level 




































their respective systems. The responses of agreement ranged from 
59.6% for superintendents to 77.3% for principals. 
Over 80% of the administrators responding to Item 9 agreed that 
high salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable. 
The percentage difference of agreement between the two groups was 
8.9%. 
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Both superintendents and principals expressed over 80% agreem2nt 
with the statement that merit pay should be subsidized by the state. 
There was only a 2.2% difference in agreement on Item 14. 
Table 8 shows only one significant chi-square was obtained on 
responses according to administrative position. 
Responses Classified According to School Classification 
The background factor of school classification was studied as a 
possible detenniner of attitudes toward merit pay. Respondents were 
categorized into four school groups: elementary, middle, junior high, 
and senior high. 
Table 9 presents the responses in percentages according to the 
respective school classifications. An examination of the responses 
of agreement shows that the replies of all four groups vary less than 
5% in Items 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 32, and 34. Item 8, which states that 
merit pay would only be necessary in tim2s of teacher shortages, was 
found to have the snallest variance, 2.1%, even though the majority 
of respondents disagreed with this statement-. 
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As shown in Table 9, Item 17 had the largest percentage of differ-
ence in responses of agreeJIEnt, 18.7%, and is significant at the .01 
level. The respondents from the high school group agreed 68.3% that 
a merit system should be organized oo as to permit an appeal by 
teachers who are denied a IIErit increment, while only 49.6% of the 
elementary school group agreed with this statement. 
In response to Item 1, a fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the granting of merit increments, 40.4% of the elementary school 
group agreed with this statement and 40.9% disagreed. It is interest-
ing to note that the percentage of agreement responses increases with 
each school classification to 54.5% for the high school group. The 
percentage difference, 14.1%, between these two groups is significant 
at the .01 level. 
Although the majority of respondents disagreed with Item 2, only 
17.6% of the middle school group agreed that the teaching profession 
is losing good teachers because of the lack of a merit system. The 
responses of agreement ranged from 17.6% for the middle school classi-
fication to 29.6% for the high school group, with a difference of 
12.0%. 
In response to Item 15, the majority of the respondents in all 
school classifications agreed that a teacher should be eligible for 
a merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been derron-
strated. The largest percentage of agreement, 71.4%, was found 
anong respondents of the high school group. The least agreement was 
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TABLE 9 
RE:Sro'.\SES TO IID1.S ACXXlRDING TO s:HX>L CL\SSIFICUIO:-
GRa.'P I: PfIDJISES RDATIVE TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage: p 
Elementary Middle Jr High High School \"&.lut 
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the granting of merit increrents. 
Agree 40.4 47.1 50.0 54.5 0. 01 .. 
Disagree 40.9 29.4 33. 7 27.0 
Undecided 18. 7 23.5 16.3 18. 5 
2. Tile teaching profession is losing gcod 
teachers because of the lack of a merit 
system. 
Agree 20.6 17.6 24.5 29.6 0.02 • 
Disagree 69.2 66.2 62.2 59.3 
Undecided 10.1 16.2 13.3 11.1 
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is 
inevitable. 
Agree 38.3 31.6 38.8 41.3 0.57 
Disagree 41. 7 48.5 40.8 37. 0 
Undecided 20.0 19.9 20.4 21. 7 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit 
pay. 
Agree 9.8 8.8 14.3 12.7 0.38 
Disagree 83.2 83.8 81.6 77 .8 
Undecided 7.0 7.4 4.1 9.5 
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes oown. 
Agree 10.8 12.5 7 .1 10 .1 0.52 
Disagree 63.4 64.7 73.5 67 .2 
Undecided 25. 7 22.8 19.4 22.8 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
incx:rq:>a. t ib le . 
Agree 28.B 23.5 26.5 32.3 0 . 76 
Disagree 55,5 58.8 58.2 52.4 
Undecided 15.6 17 .6 15.3 15.3 
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay v.ould 
be unnecessary. 
Agree 61. 7 64. 0 53.1 5G. 6 0 .07 
Disagree 28.8 22.8 39.8 3-1 • .; 
Undecided 9.4 13.2 7.1 9. 0 
8. Merit paj• v.ould only be necessary in 
times of teacher shortages. 
Agree 4.3 3.7 4.1 5.8 
Disagree 85.8 83.1 89.8 82.5 
Undecided 9.9 13.2 6.1 11.6 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonnance are justifiable. 
Agree 79.4 80 .9 77.6 86 .S 0.17 
Disagree 11.8 9.G 12.2 10 . 1 
Undecided 8.8 9.6 10 .2 3.2 
10. Merit pay is a disgu.ised attertl)t at 
discrimination through merit increrrents. 
Agree 14.1 10.3 11.2 13.2 0 .41 
Disagree 70.7 66.9 73.5 70 .4 
Undecided 15.3" 22. 8 15.3 
16.4 
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TABLE 9 Con t:im1ed 
GJOJP II : POLICIES CONCDl'slNG MER IT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage P 
Elarenta.ry Middle J:r Hig-i H1gh Schco] \"alw:· 
11. Aaninistrators in the state of Flori da 
11.rC U.UL'41.lalL·ly (.fU:d Jr j L'U uy 11rufl!= iu11al 
training and experi ence to aanini ster 




12. 'There should be a limit to the oumeT 
of teachers receiving irerit increments 




13. Meri .t increrrents shoul d be penmnent 









15. A teacher sh)uld be eligible for a irerit 
i.Dcra:rent as soon as outstanding teach-




16. Only schcx)l acininistrators sh:>uld rat e 




17. A 1IErit s ystB!l sh:>uld be organized s::, as 
to permit an appeal by teachers -.mo a.re 




18. Teachers should have the opportunity to 
assi st in plaonin.g and a.aninis:tering 












10 . 0 
78.9 
10.4 






























































































TABLE 9 Continued 
GOJP III: POSSIBLE EF'FOCI'S OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
El ernen tary Middl e Jr High High School \·aluE: 
19. A merit pay program would tend to assure 
the ta.-xpayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 18. 7 21.3 25.5 30 .2 0.01 .. 
Disagree 62 .3 56.6 57 .1 50.3 
Undecided 19. 0 22.1 17 .3 19 .6 
20. Teachers who receive merit increments 
'11,Quld be subjected to resent.nent by 
professional associates. 
Agree 65.2 62.5 57 .1 58.7 0.51 
Disagree 17.5 17 .6 21.4 22. 2 
Undecided 17.3 19.9 21.4 19.0 
21. Merit pay would encourage professional 
growth. 
Agree 43.6 47 .1 53.1 55.0 0.03 • 
Disagree 34.0 26.5 30.6 27 . 5 
Undecided 22.4 26.5 16.3 17.5 
22. Cboperation anong teachers v.ould be 
reduced by a rrerit pay program. 
Agree 51.8 44.9 41.8 48.1 0.13 
Disagree 25.6 25 . 7 35.7 30 . 7 
Undecided 22.5 29.4 22 .4 21.2 
23. Merit pay would encourage good teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 46.8 46.3 52. 0 55. 0 0 .02 • 
Disagree 32. 1 27 .2 37 .8 25. 9 
Undecided 21.1 26 .5 10 .2 19 .0 
24. ''Politics" 1AOuld influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 64. 6 56.6 68A 58. 7 0 .37 
Disagree 13. 0 17 . 6 11.2 15.9 
Undecided 22.4 25.7 20.4 25 .,l 
25. The use of rrerit pay would :inprove 
the quality of instruction. 
Agree 23.8 22.8 28.6 32 .3 0.08 
Disagree 48.5 4-1.1 46.9 37 . 6 
Undecided 27. 7 33.1 2-L 5 30 .2 
26. Merit pay v.ould cause teachers to 
ccrrpranise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
31.2 0.09 Agree 36.9 40.4 33. 7 
Disagree 37 .8 37 .5 40 . 8 49. 7 
Undecided 25.3 22.1 25.5 19 . 0 
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TABLE 9 Continued 
CiOlJP III: POSSIOLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
Elementary Middle Jr High High School Value 
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay 
v.ould encourage young people to enter 
the teaching profession. 
Agree 2G.6 20.6 33. 7 34.9 o.~ • 
Disagree 48.6 50.0 49.0 42 .3 
Undecided 24.8 29.4 17 .3 22 .8 
28. Merit pay v.ould initiate a breach 
between actninistrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
Agree 43.0 32.4 27.G 38.1 0. 01 ** 
Disagree 33.6 41.9 50.0 38.1 
Undecided 23.4 25. 7 22 .4 23.8 
29. Teachers not receiving merit incrernents 
v.ould increase their efforts. 
Agree 17.0 21.3 17 .3 25 A 0.20 
Disagree 51.3 48.5 48.0 43.9 
Undecided 31. 7 30.1 3,1. 7 30. 7 
30. A merit pay program '\\Ould cause an 
undesirable strain on teachers 
when evaluators visit the classroan. 
Agree 35.3 33.1 27 .6 28.G 0.35 
Disagree 47 .6 47 .1 53.1 55.6 
Undecided 17 .2 19.9 19.4 15 . 9 
31. Merit pay '\\Ould help professionalize 
teachers. 
Agree 21.6 25.0 30.6 30 . 7 0.01 ** 
Disagree 59.6 52.9 50.0 4G. O 
Undecided 18.8 22.1 19.4 23.3 
32. Teachers denied merit increnents '\\Ould 
become professionally deuoralized. 
Agree 47.6 43.4 43.9 47 .6 O.G2 
Disagree 25.5 22 .1 27 .G 22 . 8 
Undecided 2G.9 34.6 28.G 29. G 
33. Merit pay '\\Ould stinulate individual 
self-evaluation anx:mg educators. 
Agree 42.8 47.8 48.0 4G. G 0. 75 
Disagree 32. 7 33.1 29.6 30 . 2 
Undecided 24.6 19.1 22.4 23.3 
34, Teachers not receiving merit increments 
11110uld limit their efforts. 
Agree 34.9 35.3 36. 7 39.2 
0.87 
Disagree 34.1 30.1 32. 7 32 .8 
Undecided 31.0 34.6 30.6 28.Cl 
** Significant at .01 level 
* Significant at .05 level 
# Expected frequencies too smll for val id chi-square test 
expressed by elementary school respondents where 59.6% were of this 
opinion. 
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The rnajori ty of respondents were not of the opinion that a merit 
pay program \IDUld tend to assure the taxpayers better education for 
their children. For Item 19, the largest percentage of agreement, 
30.2%, was expressed by high school respondents. The least agreerrent, 
18. 7%, was found am:::mg elementary school respondents. 
For Item 21, the majority of respondents for all school classi-
fications were in agreement that rrerit pay oould encourage profes-
sional growth. The percentage of agreement responses ranged from 
43.6% for the elementary school group to 55.0% for the high school 
group. It is interesting to note that the junior high school and 
high school classifications had the snallest variance in responses 
of agreement of 1.9%. 
In response to Item 23, which states that merit pay oould encour-
age g;ood teachers to stay in the profession, the majority of respond-
ents for all school classifications was in agreerrent. The percentage 
of agreement between the elementary school and middle school respond-
ents was very close, 46.8% and 46.3% respectively, with a difference 
of • 5%. The largest percentage of agreement, 55. 0%, was found arrong 
high school respondents, with 52.0% agreement expressed by respond-
ents in the junior high school classification for a difference of 
3.0%. 
Although the majority of respondents was not in agreanent with 
Item 27, which states that salary increases based upon merit pay oould 
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encourage young people to enter the teaching profession, high school 
respondents had the largest percentage of agreement, 34. 9%. The 
least agreement was expressed am::mg middle school respondents where 
20.6% were of this opinion. 
For Item 28, a divergence of opinion was expressed by the respond-
ents regarding the statement that merit pay v.ould initiate a breach 
between administrator and teacher in professional relationships. The 
majority of middle school and junior high school respondents disagreed 
with this statement. Respondents of the elementary school classifi-
cation were in agreement, 43.0%, while the high school group evenly 
agreed and disagreed, 38.1%. 
In response to Item 31, the majority of the respondents did not 
agree that merit pay 'WOuld help professionalize teachers. The largest 
percentage of agreement , 30. 6% and 30. 7% , ,vas found anong respondents 
in the junior high and high school classifications respectively. 
Respondents of the elementary school group showed the least agreerrent, 
21.'6%, with this staterrent. 
Table 9 shows that there were 10 significant percentage differ-
ences occurring in the category of school classification. 
Responses Classified 
According to Years of Experience as Educator 
Years of experience as an educator was studied as a possible 
factor in detennining attitudes toward rerit pay. Respondents were 
categorized into six groups according to the number of yea.rs of 
experience as an educator. 
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TABLE 10 
RESPQ);SES TO IIDIS ACCDRDING TO YEARS OF EXPERIE',CE AS A.'\ EDCCATOR 
GRCX.1P I: PRDJISES REL-\TI\'E TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percent a.gt p 
1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-2-1 25 or O\'E:r \"alue: 
l. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the granting of ITErit increrrents. 
Agree 50.0 40.0 44.6 48.6 40.9 43.4 
Disagree 35.0 33.8 27.7 40 .9 40.5 
Undecided 50.0 25.0 21.5 23.6 18.2 16. 1 
2. The tca.c.:hing profession is losing 1-,-uod 
teachers because of the lack of a ITEri t 
system. 
Agree 25.0 20.0 21.5 25. 7 18.8 21.3 
Disagree 75.0 60.0 70.0 61.6 67. 7 68.8 
Undecided 20.0 8.5 12. 7 13.5 10 .0 
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is 
inevitable. 
Agree 75.0 25.0 38.5 41.1 34. 7 38.8 
Disagree 50.0 36.2 39.4 45.9 41.8 
Undecided 25.0 25.0 25.4 19.5 19.5 19.5 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear ITErit 
pay. 
Agree 25.0 20.0 10.0 9.9 9.6 10.5 F 
Disagree 75.0 75.0 85.4 81.5 82.8 82.9 
Undecided 5.0 4.6 8.6 7.6 6.6 
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes dov.n. 
Agree 25.0 8.5 7.9 10.6 12.9 
Disagree 50.0 65.0 68.5 66.1 65.3 6-1.3 
Undecided 25.0 35.0 23.1 26.0 2-1.1 22.9 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
inCOOl)atible. 
Agree 20.0 35.4 26.7 30.0 27 .3 
Disagree 75.0 50.0 45.4 58.9 56.8 55. 7 
Unde cided 25.0 30.0 19.2 14.4 13.2 17 . 0 
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay \IOuld 
be unnecessary. 
Agree 50.0 65.0 68.5 53.8 60.1 62.1 
Disagree 50.0 25.0 23.8 34.9 28.4 29.G 
Undecided 10.0 7. 7 11.3 11. 6 8.2 
8. Merit pay \¥:luld only be necessary in 
tilres of teacher shortages. 
3.G Agree 5.0 9.2 4.1 4.0 
Disagree 100.0 75.0 76.2 88.4 87 .8 85.2 
Undecided 20.0 14.6 7.5 8.3 11.3 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonnance are justifiable. 
85.0 80.0 83. 2 78.9 80.5 Agree 100.0 
Disagree 15.0 8.5 8.9 13.5 11.6 
Undecided 11.5 7.9 7.6 
7 .9 
10. Merit pay is a disguised attelJ1)t at 
discrimination through merit increrrents. 
16.1 Agree 10.0 6.9 9.2 15.2 
Disagree 75.0 65.0 71.5 77 .1 71.6 66.8 
Undecided 25.0 25.0 ·21.5 13. 7 13.2 
17 .1 
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TABlE 10 Conti1l ed 
GO.JP I I: FOUCIES CUNrnr-m c MERIT PAY 
11. 
Type of Response to I te:n 
Aaninistrators in tbe state o:f Florida 
&re adequately qua • Hied b}' professfonal 
training and e;,,;perience to adinin.ister 




12. 1bere should be a unit to the nlni:>er 
of teachers receivin.g llErit iJ:lcre:nent:s 




13. Merit i.ncrarents should be pen!W'lent 










A teacher shou1d be e i.gible for a n:erit 
increm::nt as 9)01'.1 as outst.anding teach-




16. Only school a.dmin.istrators soould rate 
17. 
18. 




A CEri t systan should be organized so as 
to permit an appeal b}' teachers who are 




Teachers should have the opportunity to 
assist iD plamlin.g and aaninistering 





l~ 5-9 10-14 15-19 2 2~ 25 or oYer Ya2 t 
50. 0 30.0 27.7 ZiA 
50.0 35.0 53.1 49.0 
35.0 19.2 23.6 
25. 0 10.0 13. B .0 
50.0 60.0 78.5 76 .4 
25.0 .o 8.5 9.6 
5. 0 8.5 8.6 
1s. o 75.o so. o s::.2 
25. 0 20.0 ll.5 9.2 
100. 0 70.0 87.7 81.5 
10 . 0 '3.1 5.1 
20.0 9.2 13.4 
50. 0 55. 0 66.9 60.6 
20.0 18.5 2-L 3 















10 . 0 23.8 15.1 20. 5 
75. 0 85. 0 6,;'. 6 7:? . 3 66.3 
25. 0 S,. O 11.5 12.7 13.:? 
50 . 0 50.0 51.5 52.4 
25. 0 30.0 3,2.3 31.5 
2.5.0 20 . 0 16.2 16 .1 
75. 0 75. 0 73. 8 ,BO. J. 
25.0 15. 0 15A lJ . 0 
































TABLE 10 Continued 
G!U,'P III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
1--4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25 or over \'alu E-
19. A treri t pay program \IOUld tend to assure 
the taxpayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 50.0 20.0 12.3 22.6 22.8 21.8 
Disagree 25.0 75.0 63.8 53.4 62.0 59.8 
Undecided 25.0 5.0 23.8 24.0 15.2 18.4 
20. Teachers who receive trerit increments 
would be subjected to resentrrent by 
professional associates. 
Agree 75.0 65.0 59.2 57 .9 67.0 6-L8 
Disagree 20.0 18.5 19.5 16.8 19.5 
Undecided 25.0 15.0 22.3 22.6 16.2 15. 7 
21. Merit pay v.ould encourage professional 
growth. 
Agree 75.0 35.0 50.8 47.3 47 .9 44.8 ;: 
Disagree 25.0 45.0 23.1 28.4 32.0 34.5 
Undecided 20.0 26.2 24.3 20.1 20. 7 
22. Cooperation anong teachers \IOuld be 
reduced by a trerit pay program. 
Agree 25.0 45.0 41.5 46.2 52.1 51.6 :: 
Disagree 30.0 28.5 27 .4 28.4 27 .3 
Undecided 75.0 25.0 30.0 26.4 19.5 21.1 
23. Merit pay v.ould encourage good teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 75.0 35.0 42.3 52.1 49.8 46.G 
Disagree 25.0 45.0 28.5 28.4 30. 7 32.9 
Undecided 20.0 29.2 19.5 19.5 20 .5 
24. ''Politics" v.ould influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 75.0 60.0 61.5 61.3 66. 7 6'.:.l 
Disagree 20.0 15.4 12. 7 13.5 H .8 
Undecided 25.0 20.0 23.1 26.0 19.8 23. 0 
25. The use of trerit pay would ilrprove 
the quality of instruction. 
Agree 50.0 15.0 18.5 27 .1 25. 7 26.8 
Disagree 25.0 55.0 46.9 38.0 48.8 47., 
Undecided 25.0 30.0 34.G 34.9 25.4 25.5 
26. Merit pay v.ould cause teachers to 
ccxrpranise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
39.1 
Agree 50.0 35.0 30.8 29.5 38.3 
Disagree 50.0 40.0 40.0 44.2 3,.0 
39 . 5 
I 
Undecided 25.0 29.2 26.4 2-LS 
21.4 
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TABLE 10 Continued 
GROUP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25 or over \"alue 
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay 
v.ould encourage young people to enter 
the teaching profession. 
Agree 25.0 25.0 24.6 30.1 28.4 26.8 
Disagree 25.0 50.0 48.5 40.4 48.2 51.G 
Undecided 50.0 25.0 26.9 29.5 23.4 21.6 
28. Merit pay \IOUld initiate a breach 
between administrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
Agree 25.0 35.0 34.6 34.2 39.6 44.5 
Disagree 25.0 45.0 42.3 35.6 35.6 36.8 
Undecided 50.0 20.0 23.1 30.1 24.8 18.8 
29. Teachers not receiving rrerit incrancnts 
v.ould increase their efforts. 
Agree 25.0 15.0 14.6 22.6 19.5 17.9 F 
Disagree 25.0 60.0 44.6 4-L2 50.2 53.0 
Undecided 50.0 25.0 40.8 33.2 30.4 29.1 
30. A merit pay program would cause an 
undesirable strain on teachers 
when evaluators visit the classrocm. 
Agree 50.0 40.0 30.0 29.1 34.3 35.4 
Disagree 50.0 50.0 46.9 54.5 50.5 47 .3 
Undecided 10.0 23.1 16.4 15.2 17 .3 
31. Merit pay \IOuld help professionalize 
teachers. 
Agree 25.0 30.0 17. 7 26.4 2-L8 2-Ll 
Disagree 25.0 65.0 56.9 51.0 57 .8 56.6 
Undecided 50.0 5.0 25.4 22.6 17 .5 19.3 
32. Teachers denied merit increrrents \IOuld 
becane professionally denPralized. 
Agree 25.0 45.0 37. 7 42.8 48.5 50.4 
Disagree 25.0 30.0 23.8 24.3 26.1 25 . 9 
Undecided 50.0 25.0 38.5 32.9 25.4 23.8 
33. Merit pay v.ould stim.llate individual 
self-evaluation anong educators . 
Agree 50.0 35.0 40.0 46.2 45.2 43.9 
Disagree 25.0 55.0 28.5 28.1 33. 7 33. 9 
Undecided 25.0 10.0 31.5 25. 7 21.1 2:2.1 
34. Tea.chers oot receiving merit incremmts 
1110uld limit their efforts. 
Agree 25.0 30.0 30.8 30.1 38.0 38.4 
Disagree 50.0 40.0 31.5 34.6 33.0 33.4 
Undecided 25.0 30.0 37. 7 35.3 29.0 28.2 
/: Expected frequencies too srral l for valid chi-square test 
An examination of Table 10 reveals the responses of agreement 
for all 6 groups vary rrore than 20% on 15 of the 34 statements. 
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Items 2, 8, 17, 18, and 27 had a variance of less than 10% in responses 
of agreement. 
Item 27 produced the snallest percentage difference in responses 
of agreement of 3.8%. Respondents in the 15 to 19 years category 
expressed the largest percentage of agreement, 30.1%, for the state-
rrent that salary increases based upon merit pay wuld encourage young 
people to enter the teaching profession. 
Item 3, which states that merit pay for salary purposes is 
inevitable, was found to have the largest percentage of difference in 
responses of agreement, 75.0%. This opinion was expressed by educa-
tors in the 1 to 4 years of experience category. Respondents in the 
5 to 9 years of experience group had the least agreement for this 
item, 25.0%. 
Application of the chi-square test failed to produce any signif-
icant percentage differences in the category of years of experience 
as an educator. 
Responses Classified 
According to Years of Experience as Principal 
The background factor of years of experience as a principal was 
studied as a possible variable in detennining attitudes toward merit 
pay. Respondents were placed into four groups according to the num-
ber of years of experience as a principal. 
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Table 11 shows that the responses of the four groups varied less 
than 5% on Items 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 24, 27, and 30. Item 8, 
which states that merit pay WJuld only be necessary in times of 
teacher shortages, produced the snallest variance, 1.2%, in responses 
of agreement am:mg the four groups. However, over 85% of all the 
respondents disagreed with this statement. 
For Item 1, the majority of respondents with less than 20 years 
of experience as a principal agreed that a fair way to reward outstand-
ing teaching is by the granting of merit increments. The group least 
in agreement, 40.8%, were the respondents with 20 years or rrore 
experience, of which 43.7% disagreed with this statem3nt. 
In response to Item 10, the percentages in each group showed 
marked disagreement that merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrim-
ination through merit increm3nts. The 20 years and over group were 
rrost in agreement, 19.0%, while the 4 years and under group were 
least in agreem3nt, 9.9%. 
The majority of the respondents was in agreement with Item 14, 
which states that merit pay should be subsidized by the state. 
Respondents with 20 years or rrore of experience agreed the least with 
this statement, 74.1%. The group rrost in agreem3nt, 85.5%, were the 
respondents with 5 years or less experience as a principal. 
The percentage difference in responses of agreement arrong the 
four groups was fairly snall for Item 17, ranging from 52.5% for the 
group with the least experience to 56.9% for the group with the roost 
experience. All of the groups were of the opinion that a reri t 
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system should be organized oo as to permit an appeal by teachers who 
are denied a merit increment. 
In response to Item 19, the percentages in each group sho\red 
disagreement that a merit program would tend to assure the taxpayers 
better education for their children. The 4 yea.rs and under group were 
in agreement the rrost , 25. 8 % , with the 5 to 9 years group in agreement 
the least, 17.4%. The respondents with 10 to 19 yea.rs and 20 or IIDre 
yea.rs of experience as a principal were very close in agreement, 20.8% 
and 20.7% respectively. 
The majority of respondents was in agreement with Item 20, which 
states that teachers who receive merit increments \IDuld be subjected 
to resentment by professional asoociates. This item was found to have 
the largest variance in responses of agreement of 15.9%. The group 
IIDst in agreement were the respondents in the 10 to 19 yea.rs category, 
69.5%, and the group least in agreement were those with under 5 years 
of experience, 53.6%. 
For Item 21, the majority of the respondents agreed that merit 
pay would encourage professional growth. Respondents whose experience 
was 4 years or less showed the oost agreement, 51.9%, and those with 
10 to 19 years of experience expressed the least agreement, 40.8%. 
Although the majority of respondents disagreed with Item 27, 
which states that salary increases based upon merit pay would encour-
age young people to enter the teaching profession, respondents with 
less than 5 years of experience agreed the rrost, 31.6%. Respondents 
least in agreement were the group with 5 to 9 years of experience, 
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TABU: 11 
RESPO:'\SES TO IID1S ACXX>RDI:-lG TO YEARS OF EXPERIE!\CE AS A PRI~IPAL 
GR0..1P I: PRlllISES RELATIVE TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or over Val ue 
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the granting of merit incranents. 
Agree 48 . 7 44.6 41.6 40 .8 0.01 ** 
Disagree 29.9 34.8 40.8 43.7 
Undecided 21.4 20. 7 17.5 15.5 
2. 1be teaching profession is losing good 
teachers because of the lack of a merit 
system. 
Agree 27.0 21.3 18.6 20.7 0.08 
Disagree 60.6 66.6 70 . 9 69. 0 
Undecided 12.5 12.1 10.5 10 .3 
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is 
ine\·itable. 
Agree 38.8 37. 7 37 .5 39.7 0.56 
Disagree 38.8 40.0 4-L3 42.5 
Undecided 22.3 22.3 18 . 1 17 .8 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit 
pay. 
Agree 11.9 9.8 9.9 9.2 0.77 
Disagree 80 .9 M.3 82.1 85.1 
Undecided 7 .2 5.9 8.0 5. 7 
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes dovm. 
Agree 7.0 10.8 11.1 16 .1 0.09 
Disagree 68.1 64.3 65.8 60 .3 
Undecided 24.9 24.9 23.1 23. 6 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
incatl)atible. 
Agree 25.2 28.5 32.0 24. 7 0 . 18 
Disagree 56.5 55.4 54 . 8 56.3 
Undecided 18.3 16.1 13.2 19. 0 
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay v.ould 
be unnecessary. 
Agree 56.8 62.0 62.1 60 .3 0.29 
Disagree 35.1 26.9 28.0 30 . 5 
Undecided 8.1 11.1 9.9 9. 2 
8. Merit pay \\Ould only be necessary in 
ti.Ires of teacher shortages. 
4.0 0 . 70 Agree 5.2 5.2 3.3 
Disagree M.1 86.2 86.4 M. 5 
Undecided 10. 7 8.5 10.3 11.5 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonmnce are justifiable. 
0.79 Agree 79.1 79.7 82.5 81.6 
Disagree 11.0 12.1 10.7 10.9 
Undecided 9.9 8.2 6.8 7 .5 
10. Merit pay is a disguised attf:lll)t at 
discrimination through merit increments. 
19.0 0.05 • Agree 9.9 12.5 14.2 
Disagree 71.0 74.1 70.1 65.5 
Undecided 19.1 13.4 15.7 
15, 5 
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TABLE 11 Continued 
GRaJP II: POLICIES CDNCER.'iING MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or O\'E:r \'alue: 
11. Aaninistrators in the state of Florida 
are adequately qualified by professional 
training and experience to a.aninister 
a rrerit pay program. 
Agree 25.5 28.5 29.3 33.3 0.67 
Disagree 51.3 50.8 48 .7 46.G 
Undecided 23.2 20. 7 22.1 20.1 
12. There should be a limit to the nmt>er 
of teachers receiving rrerit increments 
in a school system in any one year. 
Agree 11.9 13.4 12.4 13.8 0 .20 
Disagree 76.5 76.7 76.9 82.2 
Undecided 11.6 9.8 10. 7 4. 0 
13. Merit inc.renents should be pe:nmnent 
rather than on an annual basis. 
Agree 7 .8 7.2 10.9 10.9 0.-44 
Disagree 82.3 83.0 77. 7 79.9 
Undecided 9.9 9.8 11.3 9.2 
14. Merit pay soould be subsidized by the 
state. 
Agree 85.8 80.0 80.4 7-Ll 0.03 • 
Disagree 5.2 8.9 9.9 13.2 
Undecided 9.0 11.1 9.7 12.6 
15. A teacher soould be eligible for a rrerit 
increment as soon as outstanding teach-
ing has been denonstrated. 
Agree 60.9 64.3 61.4 6-L 9 0.3G 
Disagree 22.0 21.0 25.6 2-Ll 
Undecided 17 .1 14.8 13.0 10.9 
16. Only school administrators should rate 
teachers for irerit increments. 
Agree 17 .7 21.0 16. 7 21.8 0.53 
Disagree 70.-1 65.2 68. 7 65.5 
Undecided 11.9 13.8 14.6 12.6 
17. A rerit system should be organized s, as 
to penni t an appeal by teachers who are 
denied a rrerit increrrent. 
Agrt.>c 52.5 54.4 53.2 56.9 O.D-i • 
Disagree 28.-1 34.8 3-1. 0 28.7 
Undecided 19.1 10.8 12.8 H.4 
18. Teachers soould have the opportunity to 
assist in planning and a.ctninistering 
uerit pay in their respective system5. 
73.G 0.11 Agree 77. 7 80.0 75.1 
Disagree 11.0 13.8 15. 7 17.8 
Undecided 11.3 6.2 9.3 8.G 
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TABLE 11 Continued 
CKX,'P III: rossrnu: EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to ltl:!Tl PercentagE: p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or over \"a1uE: 
19. A merit pay program \\Ould tend to assure 
the ta.>..1)ayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 25.8 17 .4 20 .8 20 . 7 0.02 • 
Disap-ec 56.8 57 .4 61.6 62 .1 
Undecided 17.4 25 .2 17 .5 17 . 2 
20. Teachers who receive merit increments 
\\Ould be subjected to resentment by 
professional associates. 
Agree 53.6 63.3 69.5 6-L9 0.01 ** 
Disagree 22.3 18.4 16.5 18.4 
Undecided 24.1 18.4 14. 0 16 .7 
21. Merit pay v.ould encourage professional 
growth. 
Agree 51.9 49.8 40.8 4G.6 0.01 ** 
Disauee 28 .1 25 .6 36 . 7 3-L5 
Undecided 20.0 2~.G 22.5 19 . 0 
22. C.OOperation azrong teachers \\Ould be 
reduced by a nerit pay program. 
Agree 43.2 47 .2 53.8 52.9 O.OG 
Disagree 29.9 28.2 26 . G 25.3 
Undecided 27.0 24. 6 19 . G 21.8 
23. Merit pay \\Ould encourage good teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 53.9 45. 6 4G.4 45 .4 0.32 
Disagree 27 .2 33.8 31.8 32 . 2 
Undecided 18.8 20 . 7 21.9 22.4 
24. "Politics" 1110uld influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 63.8 60.3 64.5 Gl.5 0 .5G 
Disauee 13. 0 14 .8 13. 0 18 .4 
Undecided 23.2 24. 9 22 .5 20 .1 
25. nie use of merit pay would ill:prove 
the quality of instruction. 
Agree 29.9 23. G 24.1 25 .3 0, (17 
Disagree 41.4 42. 6 4£1.9 48 .3 
Undecided 28. 7 33.8 26 . 0 2G.4 
26. Merit pay would ca.use teachers to 
CCCl)rcmise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
43.1 0 . 21 Agree 31.3 3G. 7 3G.1 
Disagree 44.1 40 . 7 38.8 34. 5 
Undecided 24.6 22. G 25 . 2 22 .4 
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TABLE 11 Continued 
GOL'P III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or O\"er Value 
27. Salary increases based uJx:m merit pay 
110uld encourage young people to enter 
the teaching profession. 
Agree 31.6 24.6 27 .0 27 .o 0.05 • 
Disagree 40.9 48.9 51.8 49.4 
Undecided 27 .5 26.6 21.2 23.6 
28. Merit pay v.ould initiate a breach 
between administrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
Agree 34.8 36. 7 45.6 39. 7 0.04 • 
Disagree 38.8 37.4 34 .8 37 . 9 
Undecided 26.4 25.9 19.G 22.4 
29. Teachers not receiving merit incrmients 
w:>uld increase their efforts. 
Agree 23.8 20.0 16.3 14.9 0.01 ** 
Disagree 40.6 47.5 55.5 ~. 6 
Undecided 35. 7 32.5 28.2 30.5 
30. A merit pay program v.ould cause an 
undesirable strain on teachers 
when evaluators visit the classroan. 
Agree 32.8 30.8 34.4 35.6 0.87 
Disagree 50. 7 52.5 48.5 46 . 0 
Undecided 16.5 16.7 17 .1 18.4 
31. Merit pay v.ould help professionalize 
teachers. 
Agree 27 .2 24.9 21.0 25.9 0.05 • 
Disagree 49.6 53.4 61.0 56.9 
Undecided 23.2 21.6 17.9 17.2 
32. Teachers denied merit increnents v.ould 
becane professionally derroraJ. ized. 
Agree 38.3 46.6 53.0 47 .1 0.01 ° 
Disagree 27 .5 25.2 23 . 1 28.2 
Undecided 34.2 28.2 23.9 2-1.7 
33. Merit pay v.ould stim.llate individual 
se lf--€val uat ion anong educators. 
Agree 47.5 44.G 41.2 45.4 0.12 
Disagree 26. 7 31.5 3G.9 32.2 
Undecided 25.8 23.9 21.9 22.4 
34. Teachers not receiving 116"it incrsrents 
110uld limit their efforts. 0.15 
Agree 31.9 31.5 39.8 37 .9 
Disagree 34.8 36.4 30.5 3-L 5 
Undecided 33.3 32.1 29. 7 
27.6 
•• Significant at .01 level . Significant at .05 level 
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24.6%. There was a consensus of agree~nt between the tv.o groups with 
the rrost experience, 27.0%. 
Respondents with 10 years or rrore experience agreed that ~rit 
pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher in 
professional relationships, while respondents with 9 years and less 
experience disagreed with this statement. The group least in agree-
ment with Item 28 were those in the 4 years or less category, 34.8%. 
The group rrost in agreement were those in the 10 to 19 years of 
experience category, 45.6%. 
In response to Item 29, the majority of all four groups disagreed 
that teachers not receiving merit increments v.ould increase their 
efforts. It is interesting to note that the too groups with the least 
experience, 9 years or less, had a higher percentage of agreement than 
the tv.D groups with the rrost experience of 10 years or rrore. The 
responses of agreement ranged from 23.8% for the 4 years or less 
category to 14.9% for the 20 years or rrore category, with a percentage 
difference of agreement of 8.9%. 
For Item 31, over 55% of all the respondents disagreed with the 
statement that merit pay v.ould help professionalize teachers. The 
greatest percentage of agreement, 27.2%, was expressed by the group 
with 4 years or less experience. The least support given to this 
statanent was by the respondents in the group with 10 to 19 years of 
experience, 21.0%. 
The majority of all four groups agreed that teachers denied merit 
increments \\Uuld become professionally derroralized. For Item 32, the 
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largest percentage of agreement, 53.0%, was expressed by those in the 
group of 10 to 19 years of experience. Respondents in the group of 
under 5 years of experience gave this statement the least support, 
with 38.3% agreeing. 
Table 11 shows that significant chi-squares were produced on 12 
of the 34 statements by grouping the respondents according to years 
of experience as a principal. 
Responses Classified 
According to Years of Experience as Superintendent 
Years of experience as a superintendent was the final background 
factor studied in the determination of attitudes toward merit pay. 
Respondents were placed into four groups according to the number of 
years of experience as a superintendent. 
An examination of Table 12 reveals that Items 4, 8, and 32 had 
a variance of less than 5% in responses of agreement. Item 32 produced 
the smallest percentage difference in responses of agreement of 3.3%. 
The majority of the respondents agreed that teachers denied merit 
increments would become professionally derroralized. 
Item 15, which states that a teacher should be eligible for a 
merit increment as soon as outstanding teaching has been derronstrated, 
was found to have the largest percentage of difference in responses 
of agreement, 66.7%. 
For Item 7, over 60% of the respondents expressed the belief 
that with adequate salaries, merit pay wuld be unnecessary. The 
greatest percentage of agreement, 100%, was expressed by those 
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TABLE 12 
RESro\"Sf.S TO I'I'E'>f3 ACCDRDI~ TO YEARS OF EXPIBI~CT AS A Sl."PIBI\-n::-;:QE\7' 
GEOJPI: PRDJISES REI..ATI\'E TO MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or ove r \"a. JUE: 
1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching 
is by the granting of merit increrrents. 
Agree 44.0 46.7 50.0 33.3 :: 
Disagree 36.8 33.3 41. 7 66.7 
Undecided 19.2 20.0 8.3 
2. The teaching profession is losing good 
teachers because of the lack of a merit 
system. 
Agree 22.0 13.3 8.3 
Disagree 66.9 66.7 50.0 100.0 
Undecided 11.1 20.0 41.7 
3. Merit pay for salary purposes is 
inevitable. 
Agree 38.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 
Disagree 41. 7 53.3 16. 7 50.0 
Undecided 20.3 6.7 33.3 
4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit 
pay. 
Agree 10.5 6.7 :: 
Disagree 82.4 93.3 91. 7 100.0 
Undecided 7.1 8.3 
5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part 
of state officials to keep taxes dov.n. 
Agree 10. 7 6.7 8.3 16. 7 :: 
Disagree 65.1 80 .0 GG.7 66 . 7 
Undecided 24.2 13.3 25.0 16. 7 
6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are 
incarpatible. 
Agree 28.6 20.0 8.3 50.0 
Disagree 55.6 66. 7 50.0 33.3 
Undecided 15.8 13.3 41. 7 16.7 
7. With adequate salaries, merit pay ~uld 
be unnecessary. 
Agree 60.5 53.3 41. 7 100.0 
Disagree 29.9 33.3 41. 7 
Undecided 9.6 13.3 16. 7 
8. Merit pay ~uld only be necessary in 
ti.Ires of teacher shortages. 
Agree 4.5 
Disagree 85.4 93.3 83.3 83.3 
Undecided 10.1 6.7 16. 7 16. 7 
9. High salaries for outstanding teacher 
perfonna.nce are justifiable. 
80.0 83.3 66.7 ;: Agree 80.9 
Disagree 11.1 13.3 8.3 33.3 
Undecided 8.1 6.7 8.3 
10. Merit pay is a disguised atterrpt at 
discrimination through merit inc:rerrent s. 
Agree 13.1 20.0 16. 7 33.3 
Disagree 70.8 6G. 7 6G. 7 50.0 
Undecided 16.1 13.3 16.7 
16. 7 
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TABLE 12 Continued 
GRCXJP II: POLICIE.S CDNCERNING MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or over \"alue 
11. Aaninistrators in the state of Florida 
are adequately qualified by professional 
training and experience to aaninister 
a merit pay program. 
Agree 28.9 20.0 25.0 
Disagree 49.7 46.7 25.0 83.3 
Undecided 21.4 33.3 50.0 16. 7 
12. There should be a limit to the minber 
of teachers receiving merit incranents 
in a school system in any one year. 
Agree 12. 7 25.0 16. 7 
Disagree 77. 7 93.3 33.3 66. 7 
Undecided 9.6 6.7 41. 7 16. 7 
13. Merit increrrents should be pe:nmnent 
rather than on an annual basis. 
Agree 9.3 6.7 16. 7 
Disagree 80.2 93.3 91.7 83.3 
Undecided 10.5 8.3 
14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the 
state. 
Agree 80.9 86.7 91.7 50.0 F 
Disagree 8. 7 13.3 8.3 33.3 
Undecided 10.4 16. 7 
15. A teacher slx>uld be eligible for a rrerit 
increment as &>OD as outstanding teach-
i.ng has been daronstrated. 
Agree 62.4 46. 7 100.0 33.3 ;: 
Disagree 23.2 40.0 66.7 
Undecided 14.4 13.3 
16. Only school a.ckni.nistrators srould rate 
teachers for merit increments. 
Agree 18.6 '2f3. 7 16. 7 16. 7 
Disagree 68.1 60.0 58.3 66.7 
Undecided 13.3 13.3 25.0 16. 7 
17. A merit system srould be organized so as 
to penni t an appeal by teachers who are 
denied a merit incranent. 
Agree 53.8 46.7 50.0 83.3 
Disagree 32.1 33.3 25.0 16. 7 
Undecided 14.1 20.0 25.0 
18. Teachers should have the opportunity to 
assist in planning and aaninistering 
merit pay in their respective systems. 
Agree 77.0 66. 7 66. 7 66. 7 
Disagree 13.9 33.3 16. 7 33.3 
Undecided 9.1 16. 7 
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TABLE 12 C.Ontinued 
ca,_;p III: POSSIBLE E:F'F1X:TS OF MERIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Per centage· p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or over \'al uc: 
19. A rrerit pay program '\lOuld tend to assure 
the taxpayers better education for their 
children. 
Agree 21.2 26. 7 33.3 ;: 
Disagree 59.4 60.0 58.3 66 , 7 
Undecided 19.4 13.3 8.3 33.3 
20. Teachers wtx:> receive rrerit increments 
would be subjected to resentrrent by 
professional associates. 
Agree 63.1 66.7 66. 7 83.3 ::: 
Disagree 18.9 6.7 16. 7 16. 7 
Undecided 18.0 26. 7 16.7 
21. Merit pay would encourage professional 
gro'w"th. 
Agree 46.7 53.3 41. 7 16 . 7 I: 
Disagree 31.6 20.0 25.0 66.7 
Undecided 21. 7 26. 7 33.3 16 . 7 
22. C.OOperation am:mg teachers would be 
reduced by a DErit pay program. 
Agree 49.1 60.0 58.3 50.0 ::: 
Disagree 27. 7 26.7 16. 7 33.3 
Undecided 23.1 13.3 25.0 16 . 7 
23. Merit pay '\lOuld encourage go:>d teach-
ers to stay in the profession. 
Agree 48.7 26. 7 33.3 
Disagree 30.6 53.3 33.3 83.3 
Undecided 20.8 20.0 33.3 16.7 
24. "Politics" 'llOuld influence merit pay 
programs. 
Agree 62.8 BG. 7 41. 7 83.3 
Disagree 14.0 13.3 25.0 16. 7 
Undecided 23.2 33.3 
25. 1be use of rrerit pay v;uuld irrl:>rove 
the quality of instruction. 
Agree 25.5 33.3 41.7 
Disagree 45. 7 40.0 41. 7 83.3 
Undecided 28.8 26.7 16. 7 16.7 
26. Merit pay 'llOUld cause teachers to 
c.arprcmise their individuality in 
order to please the evaluator. 
8.3 6G.7 Agree 36.0 40.0 
Disagree 40.0 40.0 50.0 33.3 
Undecided 24.1 20.0 41. 7 
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TABLE 12 Continued 
m:xJP III: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MrnIT PAY 
Type of Response to Item Percentage p 
0 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or over Value 
27. Salary increases based upon merit pay 
'IIIOuld encourage young people to enter 
the teaching profession. 
Agree 27.8 40.0 8.3 
Disagree 47 .6 53.3 50.0 100.0 
Undecided 24.6 6.7 41. 7 
28. Merit pay v.ould initiate a breach 
between administrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
Agree 39.9 40.0 41. 7 33.3 
Disagree 36.8 33.3 41. 7 50.0 
Undecided 23.3 26.7 16. 7 16 . 7 
29. Teachers not receiving rerit inc.ranents 
would increase their efforts. 
Agree 19.0 33.3 8.3 
Disagree 49.4 53.3 58.3 66. 7 
Undecided 31. 7 13.3 33.3 33.3 
30. A merit pay program w;:,uld ca.use an 
Wldesirable strain on teachers 
when evaluators visit the classroan. 
Agree 33.2 33.3 33.3 50.0 
Disagree 49.5 66.7 58.3 33.3 
Undecided 17 .3 8.3 16. 7 
31. Merit pay v.ould help professionalize 
teachers. 
Agree 24.1 33.3 25.0 16. 7 F 
Disagree 55.6 60.0 50.0 66 . 7 
Undecided 20.2 6.7 25.0 16.7 
32. Teachers denied rerit increnents w;:,uld 
becare professionally denoralized. 
Agree 46.8 46.7 50.0 50.0 
Disagree 25.2 33.3 50.0 16. 7 
Undecided 28.1 20.0 33.3 
33. Merit pay v.ould stim.llate individual 
self-evaluation am::,ng educators. 
Agree 44.4 53.3 41. 7 
Disagree 32.0 26. 7 41. 7 100.0 
Undecided 23. 7 20.0 16. 7 
34. Teachers oot receiving rerit incre112nts 
would limit their efforts. 
Agree 35. 7 33.3 16. 7 50. 0 
Disagree 33.5 26. 7 50.0 l G.7 
Undecided 30.8 40.0 33.3 33.3 
# E,cpected frequencies too smll for valid chi-square test 
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respondents in the 20 years and over category. The least support, 
41.7%, given to this stateITEnt was by those respondents in the 10 to 
19 years of experience group, for a percentage difference of agree-
ment of 58.3%. 
Application of the chi-square test failed to produce any signif-
icant percentage differences in the category of years of experience 
as a superintendent. 
Personal Experience and Reaction to Merit Pay 
The last section of the questionnaire asked for the respondent's 
personal experience and reaction to the issue of merit pay. Three 
major issues were addressed. 
First, the respondents were asked, "If your school system were 
to adopt a merit plan, which person or persons \\Ould you want to 
participate in the evaluation of teaching perfonnance?" Table 13 
shows the reaction of the respondents to this question. Over 96% of 
the respondents indicated that the principal should participate in 
the evaluation of teaching performance. The position of supervisor 
was the second choice of the respondents with over 74% responding 
affinnatively, and over 63% chose fellow teachers to participate in 
the evaluation process. AlnDst 55% of the respondents believed that 
the teacher (self) should take part in the evaluation. Only 16% to 
21% of the respondents were of the opinion that pupils, superintend-
ents, and lay persons should be included in the process of evaluation. 






RESPONSES 'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVAllJATIO , 
OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Yes No Percentage Yes 
1,258 51 96.1 
978 331 74.7 
Fellow Teachers 836 473 63.9 
Teacher (self) 716 593 54.7 
Pupils 275 1,034 21.0 
Superintendent 247 1,062 18.9 
Lay Person 228 1,081 17.4 
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After the person or persons who should participate in the 
evaluation process has been established, it then becomes necessary to 
detennine the criteria for evaluating teacher performance. The 
respondents were asked to select five criteria from the provided list 
and rank order them in order of importance. From the data supplied 
by this ranking process, it was possible to arrive at the rean and a 
ranked list of the eleven criteria. The criterion with the lower 




RANKINGS OF CRITERIA FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Rank Criteria Number Means 
1 Quality of Instruction 1,295 1.14 
2 Pupil Growth (test scores) 849 2.94 
3 Inter-Personal Relations 820 3.16 
4 Professional Growth 923 3.39 
5 Outstanding Professional Contribution 
and Achievement 577 3.65 
6 Scholarship 558 3.66 
7 Personality 278 3.72 
8 Pupil Opinion and Reaction 311 3.75 
9 Teaching Load 190 3.78 
10 Experience 477 3.81 
11 Cormrunity Participation and Service 158 4.27 
Table 14 reveals that the respondents believed that "Quality of 
Instruction" and ''Pupil Growth (test scores)" were the two rrost 
important criteria for evaluating teaching perfonnance. "Corrmunity 
Participation and Service" was the least :i.n:portant criteria indicated 
by the respondents. (See Appendix G for further analysis of responses 
according to background factors.) 
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The last question that was asked of the respondents was, 11Is 
there a merit provision in the salary schedule of the school district 
with which you are associated?' Of the 1,309 total respondents, 99 
or 7.6% reported having a irerit provision. From those \mo reported 
yes, 34 or 34.3% indicated that the merit pay plan 'WaS totally accept-
able to them. Thirty-seven or 37 .4% reported that their irerit pay 
plans were acceptable in pa.rt, while 28 or 28.3% expressed that the 
plan was not acceptable to them., 
Table 15 shows that the majority of the respondents did not 
have a rreri t pay plan in their school district. Table 16 discloses 
that, of those reporting rrerit pay plans, the majority of respondents 
\\'2re satisfied in part with these plans. 
TABLE 15 
RESPO SES ID MERIT P1\Y PLANS I EXISTENCE 
Yes 0 Percentage Yes 
Superintendents 2 45 4.3 
Principals 97 1,1'65 7.7 
TABLE 16 













In the previous presentation of data, background factors v.~re 
reported in relation to responses of opinion items. As shown in 
Table 17, there were 12 significant chi-squares produced for tbe 
background factor of years of experience as a principal and 10 for 
the factor of school classification. There were 7 significant 
chi-squares for the factor of age, 4 for sex, 2 for marital status, 
and only 1 for the background factor of present position. Signifi-
cant chi-squares oould not be produced for the background factors 
of years of experience as an educator and years of experience as a 
superintendent because of the s:nall number of observations in oom2 
categories. 
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The section on the questionnaire titled rfussible Effects of 
Merit Pay" was checked acoording to significant values of chi-squares 
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for each opinion statement, for each background factor, and tabulated. 
Chi-squares were obtained on 22 items in this section. Items 19 
and 28 produced 3 significant values of chi-square. There were two 
significant chi-squares for Items 20, 21, 23, 27, 31, and 32. Items 
22, 25, 26, and 29 each had one significant value of chi-square. 
The section on the questionnaire titled ''Premises Relative to 
Merit Pay" produced seven significant chi-squares. Item 1 produced 
3 significant values of chi-square. TvvD of the chi-squares were 
obtained on Item 2. Items 3 and 10 each had one significant value 
of chi-square. 
Responses to i terns under ' 'Policies Concerning Merit Pay' ' 
produced seven significant chi-squares. Three of the chi-squares 
were obtai ned on Item 17. Item 15 produced tw significant values 
of chi-square. Items 13 and 14 each had one significant value of 
chi-square. 
TABLE 17 
SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS IN ATIITUDES TOWARD MERIT PAY 

























































TABLE 17 Qmtinued 
Item Number 




























SUMMARY, OONCLUSIONS, AND REOOMMENDATIONS 
Sunrnary 
In the sumner of 1983, the Florida Legislature passed a bill 
enacting a rrerit compensation program for teachers. The plan was 
designed "to increase the perfonnance of public school students and 
to provide economic incentives to attract and retain qualified 
instruct i onal personnel" (Florida Senate Bill No. 38-B, 1983). 
The 1984 Florida legislature airended the Florida Meritorious 
Instructional Personnel Program to establish the State Master Teacher 
Program which provides incentive awards for qualified instructional 
personnel . The purpose of the program is to recognize superior 
ability anong Florida's instructional personnel and to provide an 
economic incentive to such personnel to continue in public school 
instruction. A person may participate in the program as an associate 
master teacher or as a master teacher; participation is on a volun-
tary basis (1984 Supplement to Florida Statutes 1983). 
With the announcement of the legislature's intent to enact a 
merit pay program in Florida, educators in general began to exhibit 
a trerrendous arrount of apprehension and concern in regard to the 
irr.plerrentation of a rrerit pay plan. It became apparent from this 
initial impression that without the knowledge of educator's attitudes 
1 <)17 
toward merit pay, a program in Florida possibly could be defeated 
before its inception. 
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Drawing from this background information the idea for this study 
was developed. The primary purpose of this study was to identify the 
attitudes of superintendents and principals in Florida toward the 
concept of merit pay. 
The evaluation instrument used for the collection of data was a 
questionnaire that was developed and validated by Ro~to in 1961. 
For this study, the instrument consisted of 34 stat~nts and 4 ques-
tions related to merit pay. Respondents to the questionnaire were 
asked to evaluate each item listed according to a three-point scale; 
agree, disagree, and undecided. 
During the 1983-84 school year, the instrument was mailed to a 
total of 1,990 educators in the state of Florida. Included in the 
sample were all 67 district superintendents and 1,923 selected prin-
cipals. Usable returns were obtained from 47 superintendents and 
1,262 principals. 
The responses were tabulated and analyzed by a computer which 
was programred to evaluate responses for each of the 34 statements 
in tenilS of eight derrographic variables used as a basis for testing 
eight hypotheses. This process was corrpleted by the use of the 
chi-square test for significant differences, with a .05 level chosen 
as the acceptable level of significance, and the CDchran • s Q test for 
related observations to opinion responses. 
Sunrna.ry of Findings 
This study examined the differences in attitudes of principals 
and superintendents toward merit pay according to eight derographic 
variables. 
The hYJX)thesis relating to years of experience as a principal 
produced 12 significant chi-s:iuares, of which 11 were similar in 
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the degree of response agreement and disagreement. Only Item 28 
produced a difference in attitudes. The majority of principals with 
10 years or rrore experience agreed that merit pay wuld initiate a 
breach between administrator and teacher in professional relation-
ships, while the majority of principals with 9 years or less exper-
ience disagreed with this statement. 
In reference to school classification, 10 itens were significant 
for this hYJX)thesis. Again, Item 28 produced the only significant 
difference in attitudes. The majority of elementary school respond-
ents agreed with the statement, middle school and junior high school 
respondents disagreed, while those in high school were alrrost even 
in their response of agreement and disagreanent. 
The hYJX)thesis concerning age classification produced seven 
significant chi-squares, of which only three were similar in the 
degree of response agreement and disagreement. For Item 1, the major-
ity of educators 56 years of age or over disagreed that a fair was to 
reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of merit increments, 
while those 55 years of age and under agreed with this statarent. 
Item 17 aloo produced a difference in attitudes between the age 
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classifications. The majority of educators 36 years of age or over 
agreed that a merit system should be organized so as to permit an 
appeal by teachers who are denied a merit increment, while the 35 
years and under group disagreed. Item 26, which states that merit pay 
wuld cause teachers to corr.promise their individuality in order to 
please the evaluator, had a three-way difference of opinion. Educa-
tors 26 to 45 years of age disagreed with the stateIIEnt, those in the 
46 to 55 year group were alrrost even in their percentage of agreement 
and disagreement, and the majority of the 56 years of age and over 
group responded favorably. Item 28 also produced a difference in 
responses according to age. Educators 46 years of age and over agreed 
that merit pay would make a difference in professional relationships 
between administrator and teacher, while those 45 years and under did 
not believe merit pay \IDuld make a difference. 
In reference to sex classification, only four significant chi-
squares were produced for this hypothesis. Items 2, 13, 15, and 19 
were all similar in the percentage of response of agreement and dis-
agreement, with varying degrees of intensity between the responses of 
males and females. For Items 2 and 13, fanales had a higher percent-
age of disagreerrent than males. For Item 15, males had the higher 
percentage of agreement, and the sexes split evenly on disagreement 
for Item 19. 
The hypothesis relating to marital status produced tw:> chi-squares 
of significant differences. The majority of married educators dis-
agreed with Item 3 which states that rrerit pay for salary purposes , 
is inevitable, while those in the single and other category agreed 
with this statement. For Item 23, the married and other category 
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were of the opinion that rrerit pay would encourage good teachers to 
stay in the profession, while single educators were not of this belief. 
Only one significant chi-square was found for the hypothesis 
relating to the attitudes of principals and superintendents toward 
merit pay. Both positions agreed that teachers denied merit incre-
ments \\Duld become professionally derroralized, however, superintend-
ents disagreed to a greater degree with this statement than principals. 
The t\\D hypotheses relating to years of experience as an educator 
and years of experience as a superintendent failed to produce any 
chi-squares of significance due to the sna.11 nurrber of observations 
in some categories. 
In the last section of the questionnaire, the overwhelming major-
ity of educators indicated that the principal should participate in 
the evaluation of teaching perfonnance. The position of supervisor 
was the second choice and fellow teachers was third. 
The highest ranking criteria for evaluating teaching performance 
selected by educators was quality of instruction and pupil test scores. 
The lowest ranking criteria was corrmunity participation and service. 
The majority of the .respondents did not have a merit pay plan 
in their school district. Of the total responding population, 99 
educators reported having an existing merit pay provision in their 
school system, of which only 34 indicated that the plan was totally 
acceptable to them. 
Conclusions 
Despite the widespread apprehension surrounding the issue of 
merit pay, this study concludes that much agreement seems to exist 
arrong the composite attitudes of principals and superintendents in 
the state of Florida with regard to premises relative to merit pay, 
policies concerning merit pay, and possible effects of merit pay. 
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Principals and superintendents in Florida public schools favored 
the philooophy of merit pay. They agreed with the basic premise of 
merit pay, which is to reward outstanding teaching with merit incre-
ments. In this study, the educators concurred that high salaries for 
outstanding teacher performance are justifiable and should be subsi-
dized by the state. However, they did believe that if teachers were 
paid adequate salaries merit pay programs w:>uld be unnecessary. 
Principals and superintendents were in agreement on several 
policies concerning merit pay. They favored the idea that teachers 
should have input in planning and administering merit pay programs. 
Both groups aloo concurred that a teacher should be eligible for 
merit pay as soon as outstanding teaching has been derronstrated and 
that no limit be placed on the number of teachers able to receive an 
incentive. In addition educators believed that merit increrrents , 
should not be considered permanent and that teachers who are denied 
merit pay should have the right to an appeal. 
A concern of principals and superintendents about merit pay was 
the issue of implementation and administration e They were of the 
opinion that administrators in the state of Florida were not 
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adequately qualified by professional training and experience to admin-
ister a merit pay program. Additionally, both groups were against the 
idea of school administrators being the sole evaluators of teachers. 
The evaluation of teaching performance should include a team approach 
consisting of the principal, the supervisor, fellow teachers, as well 
as the teacher being evaluated. 
Another concern expressed by the educators in this study was the 
possible negative effects of merit pay. Principals and superintend-
ents strongly believed that "politics" would have an influence on 
merit pay programs in the state of Florida. However, their primary 
concern was that teachers who receive merit increments wuld be sub-
jected to resentment by professional associates and those who are 
denied the awards would become professionally derroralized. Also, 
they believed that the implementation of a merit pay program would 
reduce cooperation arrong teachers as well as hinder the profession-
alization of teachers. 
Even though the majority of educators were of the belief that 
merit pay would not assure taxpayers better education for their 
children, both groups shared similar attitudes toward the positive 
effects of merit pay. They agreed that merit pay wuld encourage 
professional growth of teachers, encourage good teachers to stay in 




There is a distinct possibility that teachers in the state of 
Florida might express entirely different attitudes concerning rrerit 
pay from those obtained by principals and superintendents. Therefore, 
a similar state-wide study should be conducted to examine the atti-
tudes of Florida teachers. 
Another recomnendation \\Duld be to replicate this study in other 
states considering IIErit pay programs for cross-validation purposes. 
It \\Duld be beneficial for states contemplating a IIErit pay system 
to gather attitudinal data in order to facilitate the planning and 
impleIIEntation of such programs. 
Also, there exists the need for a national study to determine 
the attitudes of teachers, principals, and superintendents toward 
the various aspects of merit pay. Through such an investigation, 
infonnative comparisons could be developed. Comparisons could be 
made to determine the similarities and differences between educators 
in states with and without existing merit pay plans. In addition, 
such a study would provide a composite of educator's attitudes and be 
used as an indicator of a national trend toward merit pay as well as 
a reflection of the nation's climate toward the issue. 
The scope of this study did not include the factors involved in 
the development and establishment of a merit pay program in the state 
of Florida. A follow-up study comprised of these elerrents may assist 
in determining key cooponents which affect attitudes toward rrerit pay. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
CDPY OF LEITER SENr TO SUPERINrENDENTS 
Data collected by: 
Albert W. Helms 
Assistant Principal 
Oak Ridge High School 
Orange County, Florida 
Dear Superintendent: 
Faculty Adviser: 
Dr. Arthur Olson 
College of Education 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing 
in the ccx:>perative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and 
the University of Central Florida. I am currently attanpting to survey 
professional educator attitudes toward merit pay. 
In recent years merit pay for salary purposes has becane a wide-
spread controversial issue. 'Ibis study is not an attempt to devise a 
merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an atta:npt to prove or disprove 
that teachers salaries should be based on a merit systan. 'Ibis survey 
is being undertaken to determine the attitudes of superintendents and 
principals toward merit pay. 
Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appre-
ciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your time 
and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your 
response is important in making the sample representative. 
A self-addressed stamped envelope has been enclosed for your con-
venience. Please reply as soon as possible. Thank you for your coop-
eration. 
Professionally yours, 
Albert W. Helms 
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APPENDIX B 
COPY OF IEITER SENT 'ID PRINCIPALS 
Data collected by: 
Albert W. Helms 
Assistant Principal 
Oak Ridge High School 




Dr. Arthur Olson 
College of F.ducation 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing 
in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and 
the University of Central Florida. I am currently attanpting to survey 
professional educator attitudes toward merit pay. 
In recent years merit pay for salary purposes has beccme a wide-
spread controversial issue. This study is not an attempt to devise a 
merit pay pl.an for teachers, nor is it an attanpt to prove or disprove 
that teachers salaries should be based on a merit systan. This survey 
is being undertaken to detennine the attitudes of superintendents and 
principals toward merit pay. 
Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appre-
ciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your ti.me 
and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your 
response is important in making the sample representative. 
A self-addressed stamped envelope has been enclosed for your con-
venience. Please reply as soon as possible. Thank you for your coop-
eration. 
Professionally yours, 
Albert W. Helms 
APPENDIX C 
OOPY OF IEITER SENT TO ORANGE OOUNIY SUPERINTENDENT 
Data collected by: 
Albert W. Helms 
Assistant Principal 
Oak Ridge High School 
Orange County, Florida 
Dear Dr. Schott: 
Faculty Adviser: 
Dr. Arthur Ols:>n 
College of Education 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing 
in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and 
the University of Central Florida. I am currently attanpting to survey 
professional. educator attitudes toward merit pay. 
In recent years IIEri t pay for salary pu:rposes has becare a wide-
spread controversial issue. 'Ibis study is not an attanpt to devise a 
merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an attanpt to prove or disprove 
that teachers salaries should be based on a merit system. This survey 
is being undertaken to detennine the attitudes of superintendents and 
prillcipals toward merit pay. 
Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appre-
ciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your t~ 
and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your 
response is important in making the sample representative. 
The Di.rector of Program Evaluation for Orange County School District 
has approved this research study and has assigned the form control number 
of BB0502 to the survey. A self-addressed envelope has been enclosed for 
your convenience for return in the courier service. Please reply as &)On 
as possible. Thank you for your cooperation. 
Professionally yours, 
Albert W. Helms 
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APPENDIX D 
ffiPY OF LEITER SENT 'ID ORANGE OOUNTY PRINCIPAI.S 
Data collected by: 
Albert W. Helms 
Assistant Principal 
Oak Ridge High School 
Orange Cowity, Florida 
Dear Principal: 
Faculty Adviser: 
Dr. Arthur Olson 
College of Education 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, Florida 
I urgently need your help in a dissertation project I am pursuing 
in the cooperative doctoral program at Florida Atlantic University and 
the University of Central Florida. I am currently attanpting to survey 
professional educator attitudes toward merit pay. 
In recent years ID=rit pay for salary purposes has becane a wide-
spread controversial issue. This study is not an attanpt to devise a 
merit pay plan for teachers, nor is it an attarpt to prove or disprove 
that teachers salaries should be based on a 1D=rit system. This survey 
is being undertaken to determine the attitudes of superintendents and 
principals toward merit pay. 
Your cooperation in assisting in this study will be greatly appre-
ciated. I am sure that it will take only a few minutes of your tilD= 
and your reply and opinions will be held strictly confidential. Your 
response is important in making the sample representative. 
The Director of Program Evaluation for Orange County School District 
has approved this research study and has assigned the form control number 
of BB0502 to the survey. A self-addressed envelope has been enclosed for 
your convenience for return in the courier service. Please reply as soon 
as possible. Thank you for your cooperation. 
Professionally yours, 
Albert W. Helms 
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APPENDIX E 
OOPY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
EDUCATIONAL SURVEY ON MERIT PAY 
Part I: The following information will be used to classify data and will 
be held strictly confidential. 
PLEASE CHOCK THE ANSWER THAT BEST DFSCRIBF.S YOU 
1. SEX: 
(1) Male 
2. MARITAL STATIJS: 
(1) Married 
3. AGE: 
(1) Under 26 
(2) 26 to 35 
4. PRESENT POSITION: 
(1) Superintendent __ 
5. SCHCX)L CLASSIFICATION: 




(3) 36 to 45 
(4) 46 to 55 
6. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS EDUCATOR: 
(1) None 
(2) 1 to 4 
(3) 5 to 9 
(4) 10 to 14 __ 
(5) 15 to 19 __ 
(6) 20 to 24 __ 
7. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS PRINCIPAL: 
(1) None 
(2) 1 to 4 
(3) 5 to 9 __ 
(4) 10 to 14 __ 
(5) 15 to 19 __ 
(6) 20 to 24 __ 
8. YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS SUPERINI'ENDENT: 
(1) None 
(2) 1 to 4 
(3) 5 to 9 
(4) 10 to 14 __ 
(5) 15 to 19 __ 
(6) 20 to 24 __ 
(3) Other 
(5) 56 or over 
(2) Principal 
(3) Jr. High 
( 4) High School __ 
(7) 25 or over __ 
_,,. 
(7) 25 or over __ 
(7) 25 or over __ 
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Part II: 'lbe _following statements represent various points of view concerning 
Merit Pay for teachers. In this study Merit Pay is restricted to 
uean the evaluation or judgment of teaching performance ma.de admin-
istratively by one or JIDre persons, for the purpose of granting 
salary increases. 
PLEASE GIVE YOOR OPINION AIDUI' EACH SI'A'IDIBNT BY DRAWING A CIRCLE 
AROUND A LEITER IN THE MARGIN 'ID SHc:m WHErnER YOU AGREE, DISAGREE, 
OR ARE UNO:OCIDED AIOJT IT. THE IBI'TERS MEAN: 
A-Agree D-Disagree U-Undecided 
I PmJISES REL\TIVE TO MERIT PAY 
A D U 1. A fair way to reward outstanding teaching is by the granting of 
merit incranents. 
ADU 2. The teaching profession is losing good teachers because of the lack 
of a merit systan. 
ADU 3. Merit pay for salary purposes is inevitable. 
ADU 4. Only the inferior teacher will fear merit pay. 
ADU 5. Merit pay is really an effort on the part of state officials to 
keep taxes down. 
ADU 6. Merit pay and teacher tenure are inCCJDpatible. 
ADU 7. With adequate salaries, merit pay would be unnecessary. 
A D U 8. Merit pay would only be necessary in times of teacher shortages. 
ADU 9. High salaries for outstanding teacher performance are justifiable. 
ADU 10. Merit pay is a disguised attempt at discrimination through merit 
incranents. 
II POUCIE'S roNCERNING MERIT PAY 
ADU 11. Administrators in the state of Florida are adequately qualified by 
professional training and experience to administer a merit pay 
program. 
A D U 12. 'lb.ere should be a limit to the mmi>er of teachers receiving merit 
incranents in a school systan in any one year. 
AD U 13. Merit incranents should be permanent rather than on an annual basis. 
AD U 14. Merit pay should be subsidized by the state. 
ADU 15. A teacher should be eligible for a merit incranent as soon as 
rutstand.ing teaching bas been dawnstrated. 
ADU 16. Only school administrators should rate teachers for merit 
incranents. 
A D U 17. A merit system should be organized so as to penni t an appeal by 
teachers v.no are denied a merit increment. 
AD U 18. Teachers should have the opportunity to assist in planning and 
administering merit pay in their respective systems. 
III POOSIBLE EEI<EL'IS OF MERIT PAY 
A D U 19. A merit pay program would tend to assure the taxpayers better 
education for their children. 
ADU 20. Teachers v.no receive merit incranents would be subjected to 
resentment by professional associates. 
AD U 21. Merit pay would encourage professional growth. 
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A D U 22. Cooperation am:>ng teachers would be reduced by a merit pay program. 
AD U 23. Merit pay v.uu.ld encourage good teachers to stay in the profession. 
A D U 24. ''Politics" would influence merit pay programs. 
ADU 25. 'lbe use of merit pay would improve the quality of instruction. 
A D U 26. Merit pay would cause teachers to ccnpranise their individuality 
in order to please the evaluator. 
A D U 27. Salary increases based upon merit pay v.uuld encourage young people 
to enter the teaching profession. 
ADU 28. Merit pay would initiate a breach between administrator and teacher 
in professional relationships. 
ADU 29. Teachers not receiving merit increments would increase their efforts. 
A D U 30. A merit pay program would cause an undesirable strain on teachers 
v.nen evaluators visit the classroan. 
A D U 31. Merit pay would help professionalize teachers. 
ADU 32. Teachers denied merit increments would becane professionally 
dawralized. 
A D U 33. Merit pay would stim.llate individual self-evaluation aJIDng educators. 
AD U 34. Teachers not receiving merit increments would limit their efforts. 
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IV PERSCJW.. EXPERIENCE AND REACTION TO MERIT PAY 
35. If your school system were to adopt a merit plan, which person or persons 
"WOuld you want to participate in the evaluation of teaching performance? 
Pl.EASE CHOCK EITHER YES OR :00 
Yes No Yes No 
A. Principal ---- ---- E. Fellow Teachers 
B. Supervisor ---- ---- F. Teacher (self) 
c. Superintendent ---- ---- G. Lay Person 
D. Pupils ---- H. Any Other 
36. If your school district were to adopt a merit plan, what factor or factors 
ViUUld you want as the criteria for evaluating teaching performance? 
PI.EASE SELECT' FIVE OF THE CRITERIA LISI'ED BEI.DW AND RANK THEM IN ORDER OF 
!MP:)RTANCE. THE CRITERIA OF GREATEST IMroRTANCE MARK 1, THE NEXT RANK 
MARK 2, ETC. 
A. Quality of Instruction 
B. Professional Growth 




G. Pupil Opinion and Reaction 
H. Pupil Growth (test scores) 
I. Teaching Load 
J. Ccmnmity Participation 
and Service 
K. C>.ltstanding Professional 
Contribution and Achievanent 
L. Any Other 
37. Is there a merit provision in the salary schedule of the school district 
with which you are associated? Yes No 
38. If yes, is it acceptable to you? Yes No In Part 
Explain: ______________________ _ 
APPENDIX F 
RESPONSES TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
ACXX)RDING TO BACKGROUND FACIDRS 
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TABIB 18 
RESULTS OF FEMALES 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 331 8 97.6 
Supervisor 264 75 77.9 
Teacher (self) 227 112 67.0 
Fellow Teacher 213 126 62.8 
Pupils 79 260 23.3 
Superintendent 78 261 23.0 
Lay Person 62 277 18.3 
TABIB 19 
RESULTS OF MAI.ES 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 927 43 95.6 
Supervisor 714 256 73.6 
Fellow Teacher 623 347 64.2 
Teacher (self) 489 481 . 50.4 
Pupils 196 774 20.2 
Superintendent 169 801 17.4 
Lay Person 166 804 17.1 
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TABIB 20 
RESULTS OF MARRIED RESPONDENTS 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 1,110 44 96.2 
Supervisor 858 296 74.4 
Fellow Teacher 737 417 63.9 
Teacher (self) 619 539 53.6 
Pupils 231 923 20.0 
Superintendent 211 943 18.3 
Lay Person 202 952 17.5 
TABIB 21 
RESULTS OF SINGLE RESPONDENTS 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 88 5 94.6 
Supervisor 71 22 76.3 
Fellow Teacher 54 39 58.1 
Teacher (self) 54 39 58.1 
Pupils 24 69 25.8 
Superintendent 24 69 25.8 
Lay Person 14 79 15.1 
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TABLE 22 
RESULTS OF THE "OTHER" CATEGORY 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 60 2 96.8 
Supervisor 49 13 79.0 
Fellow Teacher 45 17 72.6 
Teacher (self) 43 19 69.4 
Pupils 20 42 32.3 
lay Person 12 50 19.4 
Superintendent 12 50 19.4 
TABLE 23 
RESULTS OF THE 26-35 AGE CATEGORY 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 64 4 94.1 
Supervisor 53 15 77.9 
Fellow Teacher 43 25 63.2 
Teacher (self) 34 34 . 50.0 
Superintendent 17 51 25.0 
Pupils 12 56 17.6 
Lay Person 9 59 13.2 
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TABLE 24 
RESULTS OF THE 36-45 AGE CATEGORY 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDPJMNCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 422 18 95.9 
Supervisor 351 89 79.8 
Fellow Teacher 291 149 66.1 
Teacher (self) 251 189 57.0 
Pupils 96 344 21.8 
Superintendent 95 345 21.6 
Lay Person 67 373 15.2 
TABLE 25 
RESULTS OF TIIB 46-55 AGE CATEGORY 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN TIIB EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 519 14 97.3 
Supervisor 390 143 73.1 
Fellow Teacher 334 199 62.7 
Teacher (self) 290 243 . 54.4 
Pupils 110 423 20.6 
Lay Person 105 428 19.7 
Superintendent 100 433 18.8 
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TABLE 26 
RESULTS OF THE 56 OR OVER AGE CATEGORY 
ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMAOCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 253 15 94.4 
Supervisor 184 84 68.7 
Fellow Teacher 168 100 62.7 
Teacher (self) 141 127 52.6 
Pupils 57 211 21.3 
Lay Person 47 221 17.5 
Superintendent 35 233 13.1 
TABLE 27 
RESULTS OF SUPERINTENDENTS 
ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 44 3 93.6 
Supervisor 33 14 70.2 
Fellow Teacher 24 23 51.1 
Teacher (self) 18 29 38.3 
Pupils 12 35 25.5 
Superintendent 9 38 19.1 
lay Person 6 41 12.8 
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TABIB 28 
RESULTS OF PRINCIPALS 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 1,214 48 96.2 
Supervisor 945 317 74.9 
Fellow Teacher 812 450 64.3 
Teacher (self) 698 564 55.3 
Pupils 263 999 20.8 
Superintendent 238 1,024 18.9 
Lay Person 222 1,040 17.6 
TABIB 29 
RESULTS OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL RESPONDENTS 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 803 36 95.7 
Supervisor 618 221 73.7 
Fellow Teacher 536 303 63.9 
Teacher (self) 470 369 56.0 
Superintendent 160 679 19.1 
Lay Person 136 703 16.2 
Pupils 136 703 16.2 
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TABLE 30 
RESULTS OF MIDDLE SCHOOL RE8roNDENTS 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVAIDATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 131 5 96.3 
Supervisor 105 31 77.2 
Fellow Teacher 92 44 67.6 
Teacher (self) 80 56 58.8 
Pupils 33 103 24.2 
Superintendent 21 115 15.4 
Lay Person 20 116 14.7 
TABLE 31 
RESULTS OF JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL RESPONDENTS 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERroRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 94 4 95.9 
Supervisor 73 25 74.5 
Fellow Teacher 58 40 59.2 
Teacher (self) 45 53 45.9 
Pupils 31 67 31.6 
Lay Person 21 77 21.4 
Superintendent 20 78 20.4 
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TABLE 32 
RESULTS OF HIGH SCHOOL RESPONDENTS 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 186 3 98.4 
Supervisor 149 40 78.8 
Fellow Teacher 126 63 66.7 
Teacher (self) 103 86 54.5 
Pupils 63 126 33.3 
Lay Person 45 144 23.8 
Superintendent 37 152 19.6 
TABLE 33 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENI'S WITH 1-4 YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 4 0 100.0 
Supervisor 4 0 100.0 
Teacher (self) 3 1 75.0 
Superintendent 2 2 50.0 
Fellow Teacher 1 3 25.0 
Pupils 1 3 25.0 
Lay Person 0 4 0.0 
TABLE 34 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENI'S WITH 5-9 YEARS AS EDUCA1DR 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 19 1 95.0 
Fellow Teacher 14 6 70.0 
Supervisor 13 7 65.0 
Teacher (self) 10 10 50.0 
Superintendent 3 17 15.0 
Lay Person 2 18 10.0 
Pupils 2 18 10.0 
TABLE 35 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 10-19 YEARS AS EDUCA1DR 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 401 21 95.0 
Supervisor 332 90 78.7 
Fellow Teacher 275 147 65.2 
Teacher (self) 242 180 57.3 
Superintendent 101 321 23.9 
Pupils 88 334 20.9 
Lay Person 68 354 16.1 
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TABLE 36 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 20 OR OVER YEARS AS EDUCA1DR 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 834 29 96.6 
Supervisor 629 234 72.9 
Fellow Teacher 546 317 63.3 
Teacher (self) 461 402 53.4 
Pupils 184 679 21.3 
Lay Person 158 705 18.3 
Superintendent 141 722 16.3 
TABLE 37 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 0 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 28 0 100.0 
Supervisor 21 7 75.0 
Fellow Teacher 20 8 71.4 
Teacher (self) 14 14 50.0 
Superintendent 10 18 35.7 
Pupils 8 20 28.6 




RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 1-4 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 305 12 96.2 
Supervisor 252 65 79.5 
Fellow Teacher 196 121 61.8 
Teacher (self) 178 139 56.2 
Pupils 71 246 22.4 
Superintendent 68 249 21.5 
Lay Person 49 268 15.5 
TABLE 39 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 5-9 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PER.FDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 296 9 97.0 
Supervisor 227 78 74.4 
Fellow Teacher 200 105 65.6 
Teacher (self) 174 131 57.0 
Pupils 67 238 22.0 
Lay Person 63 242 20.7 
Superintendent 58 247 19.0 
TABIB 40 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 10-19 YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVAilJATION OF TEAQIING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 462 23 95.3 
Supervisor 354 131 73.0 
Fellow Teacher 310 175 63.9 
Teacher (self) 272 213 56.1 
Pupils 92 393 19.0 
Superintendent 87 398 17.9 
lay Person 81 404 16.7 
TABIB 41 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 20 OR OVER YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
TO PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 167 7 96.0 
Supervisor 124 50 71.3 
Fellow Teacher 110 64 63.2 
Teacher (self) 78 96 44.8 
Pupils 37 137 21.3 
Lay Person 29 145 16.7 
Superintendent 24 150 13.8 
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TABIB 42 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 0 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVAWATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 1,199 47 96.2 
Supervisor 935 311 75.0 
Fellow Teacher 803 443 64.4 
Teacher (self) 690 556 55.4 
Pupils 257 989 20.6 
Superintendent 236 1,010 18.9 
Lay Person 221 1,025 17.7 
TABLE 43 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 1-4 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVAilJATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 29 1 96.7 
Supervisor 21 9 70.0 
Fellow Teacher 18 12 60.0 
Teacher (self) 13 17 43.3 
Pupils 7 23 23.3 
Superintendent 5 25 16.7 
Lay Person 3 27 10.0 
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TABLE 44 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 5-9 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 14 1 93.3 
Supervisor 12 3 80.0 
Fellow Teacher 9 6 60.0 
Pupils 5 10 33.3 
Teacher (self) 5 10 33.3 
Superintendent 4 11 26.7 
Lay Person 2 13 13.3 
TABLE 45 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 10-19 YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVALUATION OF TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 12 0 100.0 
Supervisor 9 3 75.0 
Teacher (self) 6 6 50.0 
Fellow Teacher 5 7 41. 7 
Pupils 4 8 33.3 
lay Person 1 11 8.3 
Superintendent 1 11 8.3 
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TABLE 46 
RESULTS OF RESPONDENTS WITH 20 OR OVER YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
'ID PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVAIDATION OF TEACHING PERroRMANCE 
Evaluator Yes No Percentage Yes 
Principal 4 2 66.7 
Pupils 2 4 33.3 
Teacher (self) 2 4 33.3 
Fellow Teacher 1 5 16.7 
Lay Person 1 5 16.7 
Superintendent 1 5 16.7 
Supervioor 1 5 16.7 
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APPENDIX G 
RANKINGS OF CRITERIA FDR EVAIIJATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
















RESPONSES ID QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION 










RESPONSES ID PROFESSIONAL GROWTII 

























RESPONSES TO INTER-PEROONAL RELATIONS 










RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY 

























RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP 










RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE 

























RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 










RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTII (TEST SCORES) 


















RESPONSES 'IO TEACHING IDAD 










RESPONSES 'ID m1MUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FDR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY SEX 
Rank Male Female 
1 o.o o.o 
2 .6 .3 
3 2.1 1.2 
4 3.8 2.7 
5 6.1 6.5 









RESPONSES 'ID ourSTANDING PROFESSIONAL OONTRIBillION 








not ranked 57.4 51.6 
TABLE 58 
RESPONSES 'ID QUALI'IY OF INSTRUCTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY MARITAL STATUS 
Rank Married Single Other 
1 88.0 94.6 90.3 
2 8.1 4.3 6.5 
3 1. 7 1.1 0.0 
4 .6 o.o 3.2 
5 .3 0.0 o.o 

















RESPONSES TD PROFESSIONAL GROWTII 
FDR EVAWATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 









RESPONSES TD IN.rER-PEREDNAL RELATIONS 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 






































RESPONSES 'ID PER3::>NALI'IY 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 









RESPONSES 'ID SCHOLARSHIP 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 






































RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 









RESPONSES 'ID PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 






































RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTII (TEST SOORES) 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERroRMANCE 









RESPONSES TO TEACHING IDAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 






























RESPONSES ID OOMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMAOCE 






















RESPONSES W OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL OONIBIBUTION 
FOR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY MARITAL STATUS 
Married Single Other 
1.4 1.1 o.o 
8.8 10.8 8.1 
8.1 7.5 4.8 
11.4 14.0 9.7 
14.0 1-7.2 17.7 

















RESPONSES 'ID QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
91.2 89.8 88.7 
4.4 7.5 6.9 
1.5 1.6 1.3 
1.5 .2 1.3 
o.o .5 .2 
1.5 .5 1.5 
TABLE 70 
RESPONSES 'ID PROFESSIONAL GROwrH 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
0.0 .7 .9 
14.7 18.0 17.3 
25.0 22.3 18.6 
25.0 18.0 16.1 
5.9 15.0 16.3 
29.4 26.1 30.8 
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RESPONSES 'ID INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
1.5 .5 2.1 
16.2 20.2 21.0 
11.8 19.1 17.4 
11.8 13.2 11.8 
17.6 8.4 10.3 
41.2 38.6 37.3 
TABIB 72 
RESPONSES 'ID PERSONALITY 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
0.0 .2 .8 
2.9 1.8 2.4 
2.9 4.5 6.9 
2.9 3.6 9.0 
2.9 6.1 - 5A 
88.2 83.6 75.4 
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RESPONSES 'ID SCHOLARSHIP 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
o.o .2 .8 
5.9 6.8 6.4 
4.4 9.3 13.7 
10.3 13.6 12.6 
14.7 12.7 10.7 
64.7 57.3 55.9 
TABLE 74 
RESPONSES 'ID EXPERIENCE 
FOR EVALUATING TEACTIING PERFORMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
o.o o.o .4 
7.4 4.1 5.6 
10.3 8.2 7.7 
14.7 10.2 10.1 
13.2 11.6 13.3 
54.4 65.9 62.9 
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RESPONSES 'ID PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 
FDR EVAWATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
o.o .2 .4 
o.o 3.6 2.1 
7.4 5.2 6.2 
7.4 6.6 7.1 
1.5 7.3 7.9 
83.8 77.0 76.4 
TABLE 76 
RESPONSES 'ID PUPIL GROwrH (TEST SCORES) 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
7.4 7.0 3.2 
22.1 21.8 25.7 
19.1 16.4 14.1 
2.9 14.3 9.4 
16.2 8.2 12.4 
32.4 32.3 35.3 
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RESPONSES 'ID TEACHING IDAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY AGE 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
o.o 0.0 o.o 
1.5 3.2 2.8 
5.9 2.0 1.9 
1.5 3.2 5.8 
o.o 4.5 4.9 
91.2 87.0 84.6 
TABLE 78 







RESPONSES 'ID CDMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FDR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY AGE 
Rank 26-35 36-45 46-55 56 or Over 
1 o.o o.o o.o o.o 
2 o.o .5 .8 .4 
3 1.5 1.1 2.3 2.2 
4 5.9 3.4 3.6 3.0 
5 10.3 7.3 3.4 9.0 
not ranked 82.4 87.7 90.1 85.4 
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TABLE 79 
RESPONSES 'ID OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL OONTRIBUTION 
















26-35 36-45 46-55 
o.o 1.1 1. 7 
23.5 11.4 6.6 
10.3 9.3 7.5 
16.2 12.3 11.3 
14.7 15.7 12.9 
35.3 50.2 60.0 
TABLE 80 
RESPONSES 'ID QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY PRESENT rosITION 






























RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTH 
roR EVAllJATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 









RESPONSES TO INTER-PERSONAL REIATIONS 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
























RESPONSES 'ID PEROONALITY 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 









RESPONSES 'ID SCHOLARSHIP 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 



































RE8roNSES 'ID EXPERIENCE 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 









RE8roNSES 'ID PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
























RESPONSES 'ID PUPIL GROWfH (TEST SCDRES) 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 









RESPONSES 'ID TEACHING lDAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
















RESPONSES TO cn.1MUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 















RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMMCE 
























RESPONSES TO QUALI'IY OF INSTRUCTION 
roR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION 
Elem2ntary Middle Junior High 
89.3 89.7 86.7 
7.4 8.1 9.2 
1. 7 .7 1.0 
.5 0.0 1.0 
.2 .7 1.0 
1.0 .7 1.0 
TABLE 92 
RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROwrH 
:FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION 
Elementary Middle Junior High 
1.1 o.o o.o 
18.0 15.4 20.4 
21.9 15.4 19.4 
17.6 18.4 12.2 
14.3 16.2 13.3 































RESPONSES 'ID INTER-PERSONAL REIATIONS 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY SCHOOL CIASSIFICATION 
Elementary Middle Junior High 
1.3 .7 2.0 
21.1 19.1 14.3 
16.6 20.6 15.3 
15.5 9.6 8.2 
10.7 8.8 10.2 
34.8 41.2 50.0 
TABLE 94 
RESPONSES 'ID PERSONALITY 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY SCIKX)L CI..ASSIFICATION 
Elementary Middle Junior High 
.5 .7 o.o 
2.7 2.9 2.0 
6.2 5.1 5.1 
7.3 3.7 4.1 
6.0 6.6 5.1 































RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP 
FDR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION 
Elerrentary Middle Junior High 
.6 o.o o.o 
5.7 4.4 7.1 
9a2 14.0 17.3 
11.2 19.9 16.3 
11.2 11.0 6.1 
62.1 50.7 53.1 
TABLE 96 
RESPONSES TO EXPERIENCE 
FDR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY SCiroL CLASSIFICATION 
Elerrentary Middle Junior High 
.4 o.o o.o 
5.4 5.1 4.1 
8.9 5.9 9.2 
10.1 10.3 19.4 
11.8 · 13.2 15.3 
























RESPONSES TO TEACHING WAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY SCHOOL CIASSIFICATION 
Elementary Middle Junior High 
.1 o.o o.o 
2.9 3.7 3.1 
2.6 2.2 2.0 
4.9 3.7 1.0 
4.8 5.9 7.1 









RESPONSES TO CX>MMUNI'IY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY SC.HOOL CLASSIFICATION 
Rank Elerrentary Middle Junior High High School 
1 0.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 
2 .4 .7 1.0 1.1 
3 1.4 2.2 3.1 2.6 
4 3.2 4.4 5.1 3.7 
5 6.6 4.4 6.1 6.9 
not ranked 88.4 88.2 84.7 85.7 
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TABIB 101 
RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL OONIBIBUTION 















BY SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION 
Elerrentary Middle Junior High 
1.5 1.5 1.0 
9.4 10.3 5.1 
8.6 3.7 8.2 
12.2 8.1 13.3 
14.9 16.9 16.3 
53.4 59.6 56.1 
TABIB 102 
RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION 
roR EVAllJATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCA'IDR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
100.0 85.0 89.8 
o.o 15.0 7.1 
o.o o.o 1.7 
0.0 o.o .5 
o.o o.o .5 































REBroNSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROwrH 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o o.o .5 
o.o 25.0 19.2 
50.0 20.0 23.9 
0.0 20.0 19.2 
o.o 5.0 14.2 
50.0 30.0 23.0 
TABLE 104 
RESPONSES 'ID INTER-PERSONAL REIATIONS 
FOR EVAIIJATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o o.o .5 
50.0 5.0 21.1 
25.0 20.0 17.1 
0.0 15.0 12.3 
0.0 20.0 8.5 
25.0 40.0 40.5 
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RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o o.o .2 
o.o o.o 1.9 
o.o 0.0 5.7 
25.0 10.0 4.0 
o.o o.o 6.4 
75.0 90.0 81.8 
TABLE 106 
RESPONSES TO SCHOLARSHIP 
FOR EVAWATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o o.o .5 
0.0 o.o 6.9 
o.o 15.0 8.3 
o.o 5.0 14.9 
o.o 30.0 10.9 
100.0 50.0 58.5 
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RESPONSES 'ID EXPERIENCE 
FDR EVAllJATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCA'IDR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
0.0 o.o .2 
25.0 10.0 4.3 
o.o 10.0 8.8 
o.o 25.0 9.2 
o.o 5.0 13.3 
75.0 50.0 64.2 
TABIB 108 
RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCA'IDR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o o.o .2 
o.o o.o 2.1 
25.0 5.0 5.5 
o.o o.o 6.2 
o.o o.o 6.9 






























RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROwrH (TEST SCDRES) 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o 15.0 6.2 
25.0 10.0 21.1 
o.o 25.0 16.6 
25.0 5.0 12.1 
50.0 10.0 10.7 
o.o 35.0 33.4 
TABLE 110 
RESPONSES TO TEACHING WAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCATOR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
0.0 o.o 0.0 
o.o o.o 2.6 
o.o o.o 2.1 
o.o 5.0 5.0 
o.o o.o 4.0 
100.0 95.0 86.3 
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RE8roNSES ID mMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FDR EVAllJATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCAIDR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
o.o o.o o.o o.o 
o.o o.o .3 .7 
o.o 5.0 .9 2.2 
0.0 10.0 3.6 3.4 
25.0 5.0 6.6 5.9 








RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
BY YEARS AS EDUCAIDR 
1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
o.o o.o 1. 7 1.2 
o.o 35.0 12.3 6.7 
o.o o.o 9.0 7.6 
50.0 5.0 11.8 11.2 
25.0 25.0 15.2 13.8 


















RESPONSES TO QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
96.4 91.2 90.5 86.4 
3.6 5.7 6.6 9.7 
0.0 .9 1.3 1.6 
o.o .6 .6 .9 
o.o o.o .7 .4 
0.0 1.6 .3 1.0 
TABLE 114 
RESPONSES TO PROFESSIONAL GROWTII 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o .6 .7 1.0 
14.3 18.4 18.4 15.2 
28.6 23.0 18.7 20.6 
17.9 18.9 18.0 15.7 
10.8 14.5 15.3 15.3 
28.6 24.6 28.9 32.2 
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RESPONSES TO INTER-PEROONAL RELATIONS 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
0.0 .3 1.6 1.9 
10.7 21.5 20.3 20.2 
25.0 17.0 18.7 16.5 
21.4 11.0 14.8 13.0 
3.6 9.5 8.9 10.5 
39.3 40.7 35.7 37.9 
TABLE 116 
RESPONSES TO PERSONALITY 
:FDR EVAWATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRIN:::IPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
0.0 o.o .6 .6 
o.o 1.5 3.3 2.5 
o.o 3.5 5.2 8.2 
7.1 4.1 5.6 7.0 
3.6 5.4 5.6 6.4 
89.3 85.5 79.7 75.3 
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RESPONSES 'ID SCHOLARSHIP 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERroRMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o .3 .7 .4 
14.3 3.8 7.2 6.8 
14.3 11.0 12.5 10.5 
7.1 11.7 13.1 14.8 
10.7 11.1 11.1 11.8 
53.6 62.1 55.4 55.7 
TABLE 118 
RESPONSES W EXPERIENCE 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o .3 o.o .4 
7.1 6.3 4.3 4.5 
3.6 8.8 5.6 9.1 
3.6 11.7 11.1 9.3 
21.4 12.0 12.1 13.0 
64.3 60.9 66.9 63.7 
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RESPONSES TO PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 
FOR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFDRMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
o.o o.o .3 .4 
3.6 3.2 2.6 3.1 
3.6 4.7 7.9 5.6 
10.6 7.9 5.6 8.7 
14.3 6.6 8.2 6.4 
67.9 77.6 75.4 75.8 
TABLE 120 
RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTH (TEST SCORES) 
FOR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
3.6 5.4 3.9 6.1 
25.0 23.0 19.7 26.2 
7.1 16.7 15.7 14.0 
7.1 11.4 13.8 7.6 
17.9 9.4 11.5 11.3 























RE8roNSES TO TEACHING I.DAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
o.o o.o o.o .2 
3.6 3.2 3.6 2.1 
o.o 2.2 3.3 2.4 
0.0 4.4 1.3 6.0 
3.6 4.4 3.6 5.2 
92.8 85.8 88.2 84.1 
TABLE 122 







RE8roNSES TO CDMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS PRIOCIPAL 
Rank 0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
1 o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o 
2 o.o .6 .3 .8 o.o 
3 3.6 2.2 2.0 1.0 2.9 
4 3.6 4.1 2.3 4.5 1.7 
5 7.1 6.3 6.6 5.4 7.5 




RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CONTRIBUTION 















BY YEARS AS PRINCIPAL 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
0.0 1.6 .7 1.9 
14.3 11.4 12.8 6.4 
10.7 8.2 7.8 8.2 
21.4 12.3 11.5 11.5 
7.1 17.7 14.1 12.0 
46.5 48.8 53.1 60.0 
TABLE 124 
RESPONSES '1D QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
88.6 83.3 93.3 91. 7 
7.7 10.1 6.7 8.3 
1.6 3.3 o.o o.o 
.8 o.o o.o 0.0 
.3 o.o o.o o.o 
1.0 3.3 o.o o.o 






























RESPONSES 'ID PROFESSIONAL GROWTH 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINrENDENr 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
1.0 3.3 o.o 0.0 
17.1 13.3 13.3 8.3 
20.7 16.7 26.7 8.3 
17.3 23.3 6.7 25.0 
14.5 20.0 20.0 o.o 
29.4 23.4 33.3 58.4 
TABLE 126 
RESPONSES 'ID INrER-PERffiNAL RELATIONS 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERroRMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
1.4 o.o 0.0 o.o 
20.5 16.7 13.3 16.7 
17.6 16.7 13.3 25.0 
13.8 10.0 20.0 16.7 
9.5 23.3 6.7 o.o 
37.2 33.3 46.7 41.6 
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RE8roNSES TO PEROONALITY 
FDR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINrENDENr 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
.5 o.o o.o o.o 
2.5 6.7 o.o o.o 
5.6 3.3 6.6 8.3 
6.3 6.7 6.7 8.3 
6.3 0.0 6.7 16.7 
78.8 83.3 80.0 66.7 
TABLE 128 
RE8roNSES TO SCHOLARSHIP 
FDR EVAIDATING TEACHING PERroRMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
.4 0.0 0.0 o.o 
6.6 6.7 20.0 8.3 
10.7 20.0 13.3 33.3 
13.0 10.0 13.3 o.o 
11.6 10.0 13.3 o.o 
57.7 53.3 40.1 58.4 
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RESPONSES 'ID EXPERIENCE 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
.2 o.o o.o o.o 
5.2 3.3 13.3 o.o 
8.4 3.3 6.7 o.o 
10.5 6.7 o.o o.o 
12.4 16.7 13.3 16.7 
63.3 70.0 66.7 83.3 
TABIB 130 
RE8roNSES 'ID PUPIL OPINION AND REACTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 







0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
.2 0.0 o.o o.o o.o 
3.0 3.3 o.o 8.3 16.7 
6.5 3.3 o.o o.o o.o 
6.8 6.7 6.7 41. 7 o.o 
7.0 6.7 13.3 16.7 0.0 

















RESPONSES TO PUPIL GROWTII (TEST SOORES) 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
5.3 13.3 6.7 8.3 
23.8 20.0 20.0 33.3 
15.0 16.7 6.7 8.4 
10.8 6.7 26.6 0.0 
10.0 6.7 13.3 25.0 
35.1 36.6 26.7 25.0 
TABLE 132 
RESPONSES 'ID TEACHING IDAD 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PER.FDR.MANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 
.1 o.o o.o 0.0 
2.6 3.3 6.7 o.o 
2.6 0.0 6.7 8.3 
4.2 · 10.0 o.o o.o 
5.0 6.7 6.6 o.o 






















RESPONSES TO CDMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SERVICE 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINr.ENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
o.o 0.0 o.o o.o 0.0 
.6 o.o o.o o.o o.o 
1.8 o.o 6.7 o.o 0.0 
3.6 o.o 6.7 o.o o.o 
6.3 o.o o.o 8.3 16.7 








RESPONSES TO OUTSTANDING PROFESSIONAL CDNIBIBUTION 
FDR EVALUATING TEACHING PERFORMANCE 
BY YEARS AS SUPERINTENDENT 
0 1 - 4 5 - 9 10-19 20 or Over 
1.4 o.o o.o o.o 0.0 
8.9 10.0 o.o 16.7 16.7 
7.8 10.0 13.3 8.3 16.7 
11.4 16.7 13.3 8.3 o.o 
14.6 10.0 6.7 16.7 16.6 
not ranked 55.9 53.3 66.7 50.0 50.0 
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